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Preface 
The present volume is a continuation of the 2007 combined (spring-fall) 
special issue of our journal which dealt with the background, events and 
aftermath of the 1956 revolution in Hungary. While this 2008 volume also 
deals with some of the circumstances and consequences of the 1956 
developments in that country, its main focus is the Revolution's Canadian 
aftermath, both the immediate and the long-term. Accordingly, this volume is 
divided into two main parts. Part one contains articles that are a continuation 
of the subject of our 2007 special volume, while part two has studies dealing 
with the Canadian aspects of the Revolution and the coming of the refugees, 
as well as their post-1956 experiences in this country. 
Part I of this volume presents two essays, one by Professors Ivan and 
Ivan and the other by Professor Nagy, which deal with the subject of the 
denial and/or misrepresentation of the 1956 events during the so-called Kadar 
era (1956-1989) in Hungary. The third paper, a review article by Professor 
Szapor discussing the life of Julia Rajk, deals with the subject of one woman's 
efforts to keep the memory of the pre-1956 repression in Hungary alive and to 
alleviate for as many individuals as possible the post-1956 persecution of the 
Revolution's victims. 
The papers in Part II deal with diverse aspects of the impact on 
Canada of the Revolution — and of the coming of the refugees. The first 
paper, by myself, sets the scene and elaborates at length on the historical back-
ground to the reactions in this country to the Revolution in Hungary and the 
subsequent refugee crisis in Austria (and, to a lesser extent, in Yugoslavia). 
The next paper is a partly eye-witness account of an aspect of the Hungarian-
Canadian community's response to the Revolution, while the two following 
articles discuss the fate and activities of the refugees in the decades after 1956. 
The last paper in this section contains the reminiscences of one '56-er, a 
member of the Sopron School of Forestry that in 1956 was admitted to 
Canada, students and faculty as a whole, so that the former could complete 
their studies, in Hungarian, at the University of British Columbia. 
This Part II of our present volume is the bulkiest, both in terms of the 
number of articles it contains and in terms of volume. Taking this into 
consideration, this collection of essays can be called the "Canadian volume" in 
our two-part series. But this anthology of papers can be called "Canadian" for 
another reason as well: a great majority of its authors are Canadian citizens or, 
at least, they have had training at Canadian universities. 
A third part of this 2008 volume contains review articles or extended 
book reviews, some of which are not closely or not at all related to the theme 
of the 1956 Revolution. Our journal may not have a regular issue until the end 
of the decade and for that reason we thought that there should be a section in 
this volume in which the book reviews that had accumulated in recent years 
are included, rather than delaying their publication for a few more years. 
Nandor Dreisziger 
PARTI 
Denying the Revolution 
in Post-1956 Hungary: 
An Introduction 
Nandor Dreisziger 
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was crushed in November of 1956 by 
Soviet troops. Over the next few months the regime of Janos Kadar con-
solidated its power. The regime lasted till the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 
Eastern Europe in 1989. Throughout this period, and especially during its 
early phases, the memory of the Revolution was wiped from the Hungarian 
nation's collective recollection. Its events and ideas could not be discussed, or 
were distorted by the regime's propaganda machine. An aspect of this 
treatment of the events of 1956 had been discussed in a study that appeared in 
the 2007 volume of our journal: in Professor Beverly James' essay "Early 
Cinematic Representations of Hungary's 1956 Revolution." 
In part I of this volume we return to this theme. In a study entitled 
"The 1956 Revolution and the Melbourne Olympics: The Changing 
Perceptions of a Dramatic Story," Professor Emese Ivan, in collaboration with 
her sports-historian father Dezso Ivan, outline how during the Kadar regime 
the events of the Revolution, in particular as far as the Hungarian participation 
in the Olympics of 1956 were concerned, were first suppressed and then 
presented in a falsified way. Only with the passing of communism in Hungary 
could the country's public get to know the real story. 
This paper is followed by Professor Karoly Nagy's survey, entitled 
"Teaching a Fraudulent History of the Revolution During the Kadar Dicta-
torship," of the perversion of the Revolution's history that was presented in the 
school textbooks published in Hungary from the 1950s to the 1980s. 
The last section in this part of our volume is a lengthy book-review of 
a biography of Julia Rajk who was the widow of Laszlo Rajk, one of the most 
notorious victims of the Stalin era purges in Hungary. Rajk's connection to 
the Revolution was a post-humus one. It was his exoneration and public re-
burial in early October that, according to some historians, unleashed the chain 
of events that lead to the outbreak of the Revolution a little over two weeks 
later. The injustices committed by Hungary's regime against Rajk, and later 
against his persecuted widow, are ironic in-so-far as both were devoted — and 
in the case of Laszlo, also ruthless — communists. Though loyal to the 
ideology to the end, in the Kadar era Julia Rajk struggled against the regime's 
policy of falsifying history, especially as far as her husband's historical role 
was concerned — and also in the case of many other victims of the regime or, 
in many instances, their surviving relatives. 
The Kadarian brainwashing of Hungary's people ended in 1989. Ever 
since then, the country's historians have been trying to "undo the damage" but 
it is a big task. Between 1956 and 1989 a generation had grown up on denials 
and lies. Some aspects of the events of 1956 and their treatment in the history 
books subsequently are coming to light only now. We hope that in a modest 
way our volume will contribute to this process. 
The 1956 Revolution and the 
Melbourne Olympics: 
The Changing Perceptions of a 
Dramatic Story 
Emese Ivan with Dezso Ivan+ 
The Olympic Games can be seen as one of the few cultural events that bond, 
to a degree at least, the world's people together. They can be viewed as 'the' 
global event where, through the pursuit of sport, lasting friendships are 
forged,1 or they can be interpreted as a modern version of 'bread and circuses' 
where athletes and spectators are duped by political and commercial interests.2 
Although many sports fans consider 'politics' an unwelcome intruder in the 
Olympic Games, politics are in fact an integral part of this sporting event. The 
political dimensions of the Games are diverse and complicated. There is 
interplay and intrigue between the numerous international sport federations, 
there is also governmental interest to exploit the Games for national ends, and 
there is the International Olympic Committee (IOC) itself putting sometimes 
pressure on the national governments. 
Historically, with the Soviet Union's entry into the Olympic family in 
1951, the IOC became a Cold War arena in which the superpowers competed 
directly. In 1956, the international scene lurched from crisis to crisis that 
became mirrored in the life of the Olympic Movement itself. Despite the 
international turmoil in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, IOC President, 
Avery Brundage, insisted that the Melbourne Olympic Games must go on/ 
Much has been written about the modern Olympic Games and even 
about the Melbourne Olympiad. These works are diverse: they range from 
compilations of records and statistics, to biographies of Olympic heroes, to 
scholarly histories — as well as sensationalistic exposes. No doubt, in 1956 
among the athletes who where arriving in Melbourne, the Hungarians initially 
drew the most attention. Some of the controversies surrounding their team's 
travel ling to and arrival in Melbourne, the ongoing anti-Soviet demonstrations 
during the Games, and the water-polo match between the Soviet and the 
Hungarian teams, became legendary and were well-publicized by the media as 
well as by the academic literature.4 
The aim of this paper is to follow a different path. Namely, this study 
would like to answer the question how Hungarian sport historians interpreted 
the facts and described the events surrounding the 1956 Melbourne Olympic 
Games — and the Hungarian team's experience — during the past 50 years. 
Politics and Sport: The 1956 Melbourne Olympics 
In the 1890s, an idealistic French nobleman, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, 
sought to adapt the concept of the ancient Olympic Games, a system of sport 
competition in ancient Greek and Roman times were staged every four years 
over a period of 1,000 years, to modern conditions. The modern Olympic 
Games began as a forum for the youth of the world to unite in peaceful 
competition through sport. The Games were to benefit the athletes, to expose 
them to people from other parts of the world, to broaden their horizons, and 
instill in youth through sport competition the "virtue" of fair play — those 
virtues that were rapidly declining in the 19th century in the eyes of Baron de 
Coubertin. 
The modern Olympic Games were not meant to be competitions 
between the countries, rather, they were to provide a setting where athletes of 
various nationalities could meet peacefully and where national sporting 
programs could be tested for enhancing national spirit and values.5 After 
World War I, however, all this began to change. Particularly in Europe, there 
was an extraordinary upsurge in the sports phenomenon and, more specially, a 
constant rise in the number of international tournaments. The universalization 
of sports — creating and accepting worldwide recognizable rules of the games, 
organizing regular international competitions in different sporting disciplines, 
and obeying a systematic formation of record keeping among the most 
important characteristics — is the remarkable feature of the post-1918 world. 
After World War II, sport took an increasingly political quality with the Cold 
War rivalry between capitalist and communist states, and the idea promoted 
by both sides, that sporting victories were evidence of a socio-political 
system's superiority. Within the world political structure numerous forces 
competed for the attention and resources of the world. The Olympic system 
was but one of those. 
In years prior to the Melbourne Olympics, East-West relations were 
manifested primarily in the German and Chinese issues. The East-Germans 
requested recognition for Olympic participation in 1953. After long 
negotiations, finally in 1955 the East Germans fulfilled all of the IOC's 
requirements and they also agreed to the concept of participation in one, joint 
German team at the 1956 Olympics. In 1955, IOC President Avery Brundage 
stated: "We have obtained in the field of sport what politicians have failed to 
achieve so far."6 The debates surrounding the East-German problem became 
even more complex in the shadow of the existing "Chinese question." In the 
Chinese case the IOC, in recognizing both Committees: the Formosan 
(Nationalist) and Mainland (Peoples' Republic of China or PRC) Committees, 
took a very different stance. Many IOC members asked the question why 
should these two committees exist as separate IOC members when there is no 
possibility for the two East and West German committees to co-exist? Finally, 
in 1954 in a close vote, 23 to 21, the IOC chose to recognize both committees. 
On the eve of the Melbourne Olympics of 1956 Soviet military units 
stationed in Hungary were called upon by Hungary's communist leaders to 
help put down a revolution that had broken out in Budapest. Soon thereafter 
the Israelis invaded Egypt and headed toward the Suez Canal. Using this as an 
excuse, British and French expeditionary forces landed in the canal zone "to 
assure the safety" of this important international waterway. These actions 
precipitated worldwide outcries and flooded the Melbourne Games with 
political agitation and tension. Avery Brundage, presiding over his first 
Olympic Games, made the following statement: "Every civilized person 
recoils in horror at the savage slaughter in Hungary but that is no reason for 
destroying the nucleus of international cooperation.... The Olympic Games are 
contests between individuals and not between nations."7 
When the Soviets intervened in Hungary, they provoked cries of 
outrage from the Western world. Immediately, the Netherlands and Spain 
withdrew from the Games. In the case of Spanish, their real reason was 
thought to be financial and the Hungarian affair simply provided them a good 
excuse. In the case of Netherlands the president of its National Olympic 
Committee criticized the IOC for saying that the Olympic ideal should prevail. 
"How can sports prevail over what has happened in Hungary?" he asked.8 
When the chancellor of IOC, Otto Mayer, learned the reports that some 
Hungarian athletes had been fighting in the streets during the crisis, and that 
most could not get out of the country for the Games, he persuaded the Swiss 
government to intercede with Hungarian authorities in the name of the IOC to 
provide safe passage to Prague, where the Czeehoslovakian government 
would provide transportation to Melbourne. This was arranged, and for Mayer 
it was a great personal triumph. Politically, after this incident the Swiss 
Olympic Committee joined Spain and the Netherlands in voicing their outrage 
and withdrawing from the Games. This was a severe blow to the IOC, for 
their headquarters were in Switzerland/' And the Suez incident, coming close 
on the heels of the Hungarian crisis, produced similar withdrawals and 
protests, this time in the Arab world. 
At the Games themselves, numerous demonstrations by Hungarian 
ex-patriots and others were staged, protesting the Soviet action; and in the 
athletic contest, incidents occurred which reflected that atmosphere. The water 
polo match between Hungary and the Soviet Union was a brutal one. A rough 
sport to begin with, the game was marred by much violence and fighting. The 
Hungarians, who had long ruled the sport, soundly trounced the Soviets 4 to 
0. 
The Melbourne Olympics were surrounded by economic and other 
problems as well — not making the IOC's position easier. First of all, the Aus-
tralian government decided to provide financial support to the Olympics only 
in 1954, and began the building of the Olympic Village and other sporting 
facilities only thereafter.10 Secondly, some of the international sport fede-
rations did not want to participate in the Melbourne Olympic Games because 
of the extremely high transportation costs to Australia. For example, the 
Equestrian Sport Federation found itself in a very strange situation: it faced 
serious difficulties regarding the Australian regulations on horse import. Since 
the issue could not be resolved, the Equestrian events took place in Stockholm 
during the same time while other Olympians competed at the Melbourne 
Olympics. The International Soccer Federation (FIFA) simply wanted to see 
the competition on the "old" instead of the "fifth continent." 
Despite all the above mentioned problems and difficulties, the 1956 
Melbourne Olympics became a success in the history of the Olympic Games. 
We also have to admit that recalling the Games' closing ceremony one can see 
a real indicator of the general reduction in political and national tensions that 
characterized so prominently the Games. Namely, the IOC living up to its 
values and ideals, changed the traditional closing ceremony, in which each 
national contingent had marched behind its own standard, to one in which a 
token 500 athletes out of the 4000 that participated in the Games marched as a 
single cavalcade, with no regard to order or country, mingling in the spirit of 
international friendship. 
Unfortunately, the tension could not be alleviated for the Hungarian 
athletes. As sport historians Endre Kaklich, Laszlo Gy. Papp, and Zoltan 
Suher pointed out: "At the closing ceremony of the Melbourne Olympics the 
Hungarian athletes and officials stood at the crossroad. Some of them, 
deceived by the horrible stories about the red terror in Budapest or acting 
under the force of the Western propaganda, did not return to Hungary."11 
The Melbourne Olympics from a Hungarian Perspective 
Taking 1895 as the beginning, at the World War II in 1945, Hungary had 
exactly half-a-century of experience in organized sport. In those fifty years 
sport had became a familiar part of the pattern of Hungarian life. Hungary had 
important victories and successes, which earned admiration all around the 
world. In 1896, Baron de Coubertin told the Hungarian member of the IOC, 
Ferenc Kemeny: "Your country's physical culture and love of sport would 
merit the honor of organizing the first Olympic Games."12 In 1979, when Lord 
Killanin, one of the most distinguished Presidents of the IOC, visited Hungary 
he declared: "I had to come to this country, admired by the whole world as a 
source of outstanding sporting achievements, where over many decades so 
many champions have been raised, and where the great love of sport is an 
example to all."13 
Following the establishment of a Communist regime in Hungary in 
the wake of World War II, sport in the country became organized on a strictly 
centralized basis. From this time on sport relations formed an important part 
of Hungarian international affairs. Sport also played a very prominent role in 
the ideological and cultural life of the newly-established socialist state. During 
the late 1940s the various Ministries and state-owned companies put their 
hands on Hungary's private sport clubs. The clubs started to receive about 
40% of their revenue from the state's budget. In 1948, the National Office of 
Physical Education and Sport (NOPES) was established, as the highest 
governmental sport organization. The President of this office was at the same 
time the President of the Hungarian Olympic Committee (HOC). The Office 
proceeded to work on the fundamental reorganization of Hungarian sport life. 
It issued a sport development plan and aided the process by which the old club 
system was replaced by a state-controlled structure. The Office also 
introduced a competition calendar, and a unified qualification and registration 
system for the athletes to compete in international events. 
Participation in the Olympic Games played an extremely important 
role in the new, "socialist" Hungary. As the state-owned periodical Nemzeti 
Sport (national sport), explained on July 16, 1948: 
Although Hungary does not want to compete with fascists (sic!) it 
does not want to interrupt the tradition of its participation in 
Olympic Games either. Especially does not at the moment, when 
Western countries make all their efforts to deepening the gulf 
between the two camps of nations. We would like to demonstrate 
the likelihood, effectiveness, and strength of our political and 
economic structure even at the Olympic Games.14 
About the 1952 Helsinki Olympics the Nemzeti Sport wrote: 
We can conclude on the development of a nation from its 
performance at an Olympic Game. That's why it is important that 
the team of the communist Soviet Union is leading the official 
table of medal winners at the Olympics and the team of the People 
Republic of Hungary recently is the third.1:1 
The outstanding results of the new socialist sporting system became 
evident at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. Hungary won 16 gold medals at the 
Games and the Hungarian soccer team, the "Golden Team," or "Magical 
Magyars" won the Olympic Championship and went undefeated for 46 
matches between 1951 and 1955 — except in the finals of the 1954 World Cup 
in Switzerland. 
Unfortunately this success gave rise to complacency and over-
confidence that gradually pushed the Hungarian Olympic movement in a 
wrong direction. A resolution of the Communist Party in 1954 sought to help 
prevent the slide, but it was only partly successful in bringing the movement 
back on the right rails. In this context, although the Hungarian athletes worked 
hard to fulfil the requirements of the official competition calendar, meet the 
established qualification levels and "lived and worked by socialist principles," 
there was an ongoing debate among officials about participation in and goal 
settings for the Melbourne Olympics.16 
On the 29th of October, six days after the outbreak of the Revolution, 
all the athletes were placed in the Sport Hotel on Margitsziget (an island in the 
Danube and thus a somewhat isolated location) in Budapest. Everybody could 
leave the camp and had a "day of f ' to visit their relatives and friends, taking 
into consideration the turmoil of the time and the insecurity of the future. 
Since governmental organizations and Ministries were not functioning, the 
athletes did not have their papers — they had to break into one of the Ministry 
offices to get their documentation. There was no transportation available for 
them because of the ongoing general strikes. With the help of enthusiastic 
volunteer track drivers, the athletes managed to get to the Czechoslovak 
border where the neighbour country's sport officials and sportsmen helped the 
Hungarians with training facilities, outfits, and equipment. On the 3rd of 
November, Air France, the airline company with which the Hungarian 
Olympic Committee arranged the teams' transportation, announced its 
decision: it would not transport the Hungarian team. Air France officials 
claimed that there was anarchy in the country that could lead to the non-
payment for the company's services. Once again the Czechoslovaks helped out 
the Hungarian athletes with a guaranty of payment. Thus, the team was able to 
leave Prague for Melbourne on the 6lh of November. But some of the 
Hungarian athletes had set sail with Soviet athletes to Melbourne before the 
Soviet intervention had happened. News of this sparked much speculation as 
to the relations between the two groups during the voyage. Upon their arrival 
in Melbourne the athletes said, perhaps unaware of the recent events in 
Hungary, that the relationship had been devoid of any incident.17 
Despite the fact that the Hungarian team finished fourth in the 
unofficial medal winners' competition among the nations, the Melbourne 
Olympics cannot be seen as an unqualified success in Hungarian sport history. 
One of the reasons for this "unsuccessful image" one can find, of course, in the 
political context of the Games, namely the effect of the Revolution that 
completely overshadowed the 1956 Olympics; and also in the fact that many 
of the Hungarian athletes, several of them medal winners, did not return to 
Hungary after the Games. 
The Melbourne Olympics in Hungarian Historiography 
But what has been written about these Olympic Games by Hungarian sport 
scientists and sport historians? In order to analyze the written accounts in a 
systematic, empirical fashion, it is necessary to survey the historical and 
political context of the period. Historians approach the topic of their interest 
by gathering the available documentation, i.e. the evidence concerning the 
subject. Without sufficient primary and contemporary secondary sources, 
historians are unable to explain what happened and why it happened that way. 
At the same time, history is not a isolated discipline. The historian's agenda is 
set by a combination of past and present. The events and issues that mattered 
at the time being studied confront the attitudes, ideologies and hindsight of the 
historian's own day.18 
After the general overview of the Melbourne Olympics and the 
political and economic circumstances surrounding this event, it is interesting 
to analyze how these facts became interpreted in subsequent Hungarian sport 
historiography. 
In the period between 1956-1963 "silence" was the most appropriate 
approach of historians, statisticians, researchers, journalists and even 
politicians towards the dramatic events of the fall of 1956.19 Accordingly, 
stories on athletes, events, sport competitions, and even sport statistics 
completely ignored the 1956 Olympic Games and their results. Usually data 
was gathered and analyzed on the outcome of Olympic Games between 1948-
1952, and those after 1956. In their narratives sport historians generally 
provided one or two negative sentences regarding the "counter-revolutionary 
events" of 1956 and their "destructive effect" on Hungarian sports. Then they 
jumped immediately to the history of the following sporting success, event, or 
the next Olympic Games. All this cannot be blamed on the sport historians of 
the times — they just followed the "party-line" prevailing in those days. Their 
works were in line with the general discourse of the time: what was not told, 
did not exist — which was an unwritten rule of both sports reporting and 
sports scholarship in those years. 
The only contemporary source of detailed information on the 
dilemmas and problems Hungary's athletes and sport officials faced during 
and after the Melbourne Olympic Games are the issues of the above-
mentioned periodical, the Nemzeti Sport, published between 9 and 17 
December, 1956. These issues tried to describe the Hungarian athletes' 
physical and mental conditions — as well as their deliberations during their 
long journey back from Australia whether to return home or stay abroad. This 
is what we read in a reporter's account published in the December 9 issue of 
this periodical: 
To my knowledge 82 Hungarian athletes and officials left the 
Olympic Village yesterday and began their flight... back home... 
According to Australian newspapers many Australian-Hungarians 
bade farewell to the Hungarian athletes. The Olympians who re-
mained in Melbourne would help with closing the Hungarian 
house in Melbourne and would fly back only after.... 20 
In the December 11 issue we read the following: 
Hungarian athletes had a successful Olympics at Melbourne. They 
won 9 gold, 10 silver, and 7 bronze medals. Many foreign radio 
stations did not report this success. They speculated that part of the 
Hungarian Olympic Team is not going to return home. 
Unfortunately the athletes heard about the events that interrupted 
the normal life of their country. And being far away from home, to 
hear the news was terrifying. According to the foreign news 
agencies there were several athletes who did not book tickets for 
the return flight. In these days, one has to understand the context 
for decisions made. We have to respect the sportsmen's decision 
taking into consideration that they cannot rely on the up-to-date 
information and, perhaps, they did not make the decision with a 
calm mind. I am sure... that after a while they would come to 
understanding the mistake they made and they would return.21 
And, in the same periodical's December 16 issue, the reporter 
continued: 
Unfortunately we do not return home with the same team of 
people as we had come to Melbourne. As a result of the political 
events in Hungary our sportsmen became the focal point of all the 
news and political interest here in Melbourne. Forty-five 
sportsmen decided to remain in Melbourne and there is huge 
question mark as to whether they would like to return home at 
all....22 
In 1963 Hungary's regime proclaimed an official amnesty and brought 
to an end the period of reprisals that had followed the Revolution. The tragic 
events of 1956, including the participants' actions, started to be looked upon 
in a little less sinister light. The government began to take the view that not all 
the people who left the country in 1956 had committed crime. In the years 
following Hungary, from a country that previously had been seen by Western 
media as one of "anarchy and terror," turned into "the happiest barrack of the 
Socialist camp" in the eyes of the World. These changes in time led to a 
change in the Hungarian regime's official discourse regarding the 1956 events 
— including the 1956 Melbourne Olympics. Books published on Hungarian 
and Olympic sport history started to mention the Melbourne Olympic Games. 
The language remained strident but the event, at least, was no longer ignored. 
Writing in 1964, sport historian Sandor Bares pointed out: 
Today we... judge the fact that some of the sportsmen left the 
country with much more tolerance than we did in 1957. [In regard 
to] the events in Melbourne we have to argue that the decision to 
participate in the Olympics was a good one. The idea, however, to 
participate with a lot of athletes with no real chance to win, was 
not good. That part of the Hungarian team did not have any chance 
to win or get good results, just worked against the discipline and 
the Olympic spirit of the others. And judging the athletes' decision 
is unfair from another perspective as well. It is a well-known fact 
that in Melbourne there were many Australian-Hungarians around 
the team. They simply wanted to hear and speak Hungarian and 
enjoy the companionship of the Hungarian athletes. But there were 
a lot of Hungarian emigrants from other countries, the so called 
"hawks", who came to Melbourne with the sole purpose of luring 
Hungarian athletes to remain [abroad]....23 
During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s Hungary's state-
owned publishing companies started to understand the growing relevance of 
sport as part of entertainment. The increasing number of international 
competitions, combined with the widespread use of TV broadcasting of those 
events, brought sport into each family's living room. Publishers discovered a 
niche market by producing nicely illustrated books on such topics as "The 
History of Hungarian Olympic Gold Medals," "The History of Hungarian 
Olympians," "The History of Olympic Games" etc. We may ask what was 
written about the Melbourne Olympic Games in these books? These 
publications no longer ignored the event per se. They included congenial 
photographs of the Hungarian athletes — only those who returned to Hungary 
of course — as well as pleasant stories and anecdotes about the athletes' 
successes. This gave the producers of these books an opportunity to share 
their pride and success with the audience, while quietly ignoring many of the 
real events of the games — as well as the political turmoil that was associated 
with them. 
The 1980s witnessed new attention paid in Hungary to the revolu-
tionary events of 1956 and, as a result, a further change in the official attitude 
towards the Melbourne Olympics. After 1985 some athletes — and, most 
importantly, the famous members of the "Golden" soccer team — came to 
Hungary for visits. Hungarians knew very well that some of these athletes — 
Ferenc Puskas, Sandor Kocsis, and Nandor Hidegkuti among others — had 
had brilliant careers abroad, in Spain, Portugal, and South-America. 
Hungarians — both the fans and the media — welcomed them warmly. They 
immediately became celebrities again. The media was excited about 
interviewing them on TV and radio, and even politicians competed for being 
seen with them in public. They were really and honestly welcomed by 
everyone: they were the real Hungarian "sports heroes." 
In 1989 Puskas was invited to the conference "New Directions in 
Teaching Physical Education in Hungary," which was held at the University 
of Physical Education in Budapest in October of that year. At this conference 
Csaba Istvanffy, the Rector of the University, presented a paper on "Olympi-
sm and Its Role in Curriculum Development at Hungarian Universities." In 
this paper he argued the following: 
[This] subject is covered [at our institution] during the first and the 
second semester in 84 lessons. At the end of this the students have 
to sit for an oral examination. In our opinion, however, the present 
number of lessons... is inadequate. The memory of the Hungarian 
Olympic champions, the Olympic events and the Hungarian 
Olympic Movement in general, have to get back their real and 
honest place among the subjects covered. At last, we have to 
separate ideology from the subject of the Olympics."4 
At the same conference Puskas argued that he did not leave the 
country in 1956 because of any political reason, rather because he wanted to 
play soccer and "live the good life that I used to live between 1951-1956." He 
claimed that in 1956 he could not see the possibility of doing that any more in 
Hungary, and he decided to defect.25 Being international stars at the time, it 
was not hard for him and his team-mates to get contracts immediately 
anywhere in the world. This explanation was understandable and easy to 
digest for Hungarians living in the harsh realities of the 1980s when the 
country faced deadlines from international credit agencies (such as the World 
Bank and IMF) to pay back the loans it had received in previous years. It was 
the time when the age of "Goulash-communism" had has just ended and the 
people's attention had switched from politics to economics. 
Conclusions 
This paper surveyed the primary and secondary sources dealing with the 
subject of Hungary and the 1956 Melbourne Olympics. It tried to show how 
Hungarian sport historians interpreted the events surrounding these games. 
Interestingly enough during the half-century since, Hungarian historiography 
never deal with the subject thoroughly and in detail. Although it is a fact that 
in 1956 there was an Olympiad hosted by Melbourne where Hungary became 
the fourth most successful country in winning medals, during the years that 
followed, these facts were totally ignored by Hungarian sport historians — in 
line with the political discourse prevalent in Communist Hungary at the time. 
In political discourse analysis a researcher examines the circum-
stances under which ideas, as articulated in the policy discourse, can serve as 
contributing factors to policy change, even in the absence of changes in 
institutions and interests. Political scientists distinguish between argu-
mentative discourses — being rhetorical and instrumental — that serve to 
reinforce an existing policy framework and transformative discourses — 
challenging and truth seeking — that seek to persuade various audiences of the 
need for significant policy change. In order to examine policy discourses in a 
systematic, empirical fashion, political scientists analyze the content of the 
policy frame for the issue in question: Who is constructing the discourse? 
What is the apparent purpose or action-imperative of the discourse? What are 
the specific elements at stake in the discourse?26 Based upon the answers to 
these questions political scientists Vandna Bhatia and William D. Coleman 
classify policy discourses into four types.27 
Rhetorical discourse is used to reinforce a dominant policy frame. 
The language accompanying this discourse is authoritative in-so-far as it 
validates the established beliefs and strengthens the authority structure. 
Theoretically speaking, this is what happened to 1956 Melbourne Olympic 
Games and the Hungarian athletes' participation in them between 1956 and 
1963. That is, the sport historians' discourse served to reinforce and 
institutionalize the dominant policy frame. The rhetorical discourse of the time 
ignored what could not be useful for its own goals — even such historical facts 
as the athletes' achievements. 
Instrumental discourse is employed to address small policy failures or 
inconsistencies within a dominant policy frame. The main purpose of this 
discourse is to justify and solidify the dominant frame by adjusting the rules to 
encourage further rule-guided behaviour. The Melbourne Olympics started to 
be mentioned by sport historians from the mid-1960s to the 1970s. Later, the 
event itself and the Hungarian team's performance began to be discussed and 
even analyzed as one of the "ordinary" Olympic Games. But even then 
detailed analyses or descriptive writings of the events surrounding the Games 
remained absent. Although there were a lot of debates in the 1960s and 1970s 
about the so-called problems and administrative failures connected with the 
Games, such as for example the circumstance that the Hungarian team left for 
Melbourne too early and that they would have been better off waiting until the 
turmoil in Budapest subsided — and so on. But on these "inconvenient topics" 
there was no systematic data presented, nor any analysis offered. Sport com-
mentators and historians writing in communist Hungary also failed to say 
anything on the lives of the athletes who had defected following the Olympic 
Games. 
Challenging discourse is directed outward, seeking to persuade 
diverse audiences both to think very differently about policy and to switch 
allegiances to those proposing new ideas. Challenging discourse may rely on 
appeals to fear, anxiety or insecurity to elicit desired responses, or they can be 
reasoned, where the main objective is persuasion-using facts. Weather 
invoking fear or reason, facts are relied upon to make the argument 
compelling. After the rehabilitation process in Hungary had started in the 
1980s, a lot of sportsmen returned to the country. Some members of the 
"Golden Team" became heroes for the second time. On the contrary, the 
Melbourne Olympics and Olympians did not get much attention from sport 
historians. We cannot find a growing number of contemporary academic 
works trying to answer the questions that authors in previous periods had so 
frequently asked about alleged administrative, coaching, and organizational 
mistakes; and there were no initiatives to collect the reminiscences of athletes 
and officials of the Melbourne Olympics so that the coming generations could 
understand better the past. 
Truth seeking discourses challenge the moral appropriateness and 
authority of society's underlying norms and beliefs, and seek to develop 
consensus around a new set of broad, normative parameters for policy 
making. Here actors try to convince each other to change their casual or 
principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned consensus about the validity 
claims. Since 1989 the Olympic Movement and the history of the Hungarian 
Olympic Movement have become cornerstones in sport studies departments 
all around the country. We can only hope that, with the growing international 
influence and importance of the IOC and the growing media coverage of the 
Olympic Games, more and more attention will be paid to the true history of 
earlier Games and the sport heroes of our past. Hopefully, this will lead to an 
effort to fill the missing knowledge in Hungarian sport history about the 1956 
Melbourne Olympics and the Hungarian athletes' participation in it. 
This paper tried to survey the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, the 
surrounding economic and political issues, from a Hungarian perspective. It 
also strove to focus some attention on how the historical circumstances of one 
particular event, namely the 1956 Olympic Games, had been interpreted 
through different political periods by Hungarian sport experts and sport 
historians. In describing the events of these Games, the commentators of the 
Kadar era in Hungary followed thoroughly the official political discourses — 
even if that meant ignoring much of the Games' story. 
We should also realize the fact that even today the 1956 Melbourne 
Olympics are not receiving as much attention by researchers, academics and 
analysts, as do other Olympic Games. This is a painful circumstance 
especially in view of the tragic but heroic events that enveloped Hungary's 
athletes and officials before and during the Games — as well as afterward. 
Nevertheless we must keep hoping that this painful episode of Hungarian 
sport history will someday get an honourable place in the collective memory 
of the Hungarian nation. 
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Teaching a Fraudulent History 
of the Revolution During 
the Kadar Dictatorship 
Karoly Nagy 
Errors of omission and distortion mar American history text-
books.... Why should children believe what they learn in American 
history, if their textbooks are full of distortions and lies?.... 
James W. Loewen. Lies My Teacher Told Me, Everything 
Your American History Textbook Got Wrong (New York: 
The New Press, 1995). 
One of the most dramatic moments of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was a 
short statement broadcast on October 30, 2:06 PM by the Budapest Radio 
Kossuth, by that Radio's new Revolutionary Committee, parts of which said 
the fol lowing: 
Dear listeners, we are beginning a new chapter in the history of the 
Hungarian Radio. For many years the radio has been an 
instrument of lies: it merely carried out orders. It lied day and 
night; it lied on all wavelengths. Not even at the hour of our 
country's rebirth did it cease its campaign of lies. But the struggle 
which... brought national freedom also freed our Radio. 
Those who spoke those lies are no longer among the staff of 
the Hungarian Radio, which can henceforth rightfully bear the 
name of Kossuth and Petofi. We who are now at the microphone 
are new men. 
We shall tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth.1 
Truth was an effect , just as the elemental need of truth was a cause of 
the Revolution. As an eighteen-year-old Hungarian revolutionary student told 
the United Nation's Special Committee in 1957: 
We wanted freedom and not a good comfortable life... Even 
though we might lack bread and other necessities of life, we 
wanted freedom. We, the young people were particularly 
hampered because we were brought up amidst lies. We contin-
ually had to lie. We could not have a healthy idea, because 
everything was choked in us. We wanted freedom of thought. 
The Commit tee 's Report noted: "This young student's words expressed 
as concisely as any the ideal which made possible a great uprising".2 
After completing its fact-finding hearings and investigations, the U.N. 
Special Commit tee concluded, among other things the fol lowing, regarding 
what they called "the essential facts" about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: 
What took place in Hungary [in October and November, 
1956] was a spontaneous national uprising, caused by long-
standing grievances... Soviet pressure was resented... The govern-
ment was maintained by the weapon of terror, wielded by the 
AVH or political police.... 
The demonstrations on 23 October were at first entirely 
peaceable. None of the demonstrators carried arms. The demon-
stration turned into armed uprising when the AVH opened fire on 
the people outside the radio building. Within a few hours, Soviet 
tanks were in action against the Hungarians. This... had the effect 
of still further uniting the people.... 
From start to finish, the uprising was led by students, 
workers, soldiers and intellectuals.... The majority of political 
demands put forward during the revolution included a stipulation 
that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian 
political structure.... 
The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people 
provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. 
A free press and radio came to life all over Hungary, and the 
disbanding of the AVH was the signal for general rejoicing, which 
revealed the degree of unity achieved by the people once the 
burden of fear had been lifted from them.... 
Hungarian resistance to the second Soviet military inter-
vention was a heroic demonstration of the will of the Hungarian 
people to fight for their national independence....3 
Adam Michnik of Poland's Solidarnosc said at the June 16, 1989 
solemn public reburial ceremony of Imre Nagy and other martyrs executed by 
the Kadar regime: "Today the spirit of liberty moves into Budapest." 
The previous occupant of Budapest and of the country for thirty-three 
years was the spirit of suppression, lies and communis t dictatorship after the 
Soviet army crushed the 1956 Revolution. The last Soviet soldier left Hungary 
on June 19, 1991. 
The thirty-three years too-long Kadar regime was conceived and born 
by and amidst treason and lies in 1956. 
During the dawn hours of the November 4, Sunday Soviet all-out 
military attack against Hungary, Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich read a 
statement in a radio broadcast from Szolnok, containing, among other things 
the following: 
We the undersigned, Antal Apro, Janos Kadar, Istvan Kossa and 
Ferenc Munnich, former Ministers in the Imre Nagy government, 
announce that on November 1, 1956, we broke off our relations 
with this government, left this government and took the initiative 
of forming the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Govern-
ment. 
We were prompted to take this responsible step by the 
realization that, within the Nagy government, which became 
impotent under the pressure of the reaction, we could do nothing 
against the counterrevolutionary danger menacing our People's 
Republic, the rule of the workers and peasants, and our Socialist 
achievements. 
We must put an end to the excesses of the counterrevolu-
tionary elements. The hour of action is here. We are going to 
defend the power of the workers and peasants and the achieve-
ments of the people's democracy. 
The Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Govern-
ment, acting in the interest of our people, our working class, and 
our country, requested the Soviet Army Command to help our 
nation in smashing the dark reactionary forces and restoring order 
and calm in the country 4 
After the brutally violent restoration of communist dictatorship, the 
Kadar regime began an all-out brainwashing campaign of Orwellian 1984 
dimensions to drill in the lies that the Revolution was a counterrevolution, that 
the revolutionaries were murderous reactionary fascists, that the Soviet 
Army's mass destruction and mass murder was selfless brotherly help and that 
the restored one-party communist dictatorship and police state was a 
legitimate government representing the will of the people's democracy. 
Immense number of pamphlets, books and articles were published 
detailing this grotesque propaganda for decades, while complete censorship 
enforced an absolute prohibition of any — even the faintest, mildest or poetic 
— public reference to any true or factual alternative interpretation, definition, 
question or idea about the Revolution. 
The enforcement of this taboo was all too real and concrete. The 
Communist Kadar regime executed 349 and arrested, jailed, deported and 
imprisoned more than 22,000 people between 1957 and 1963. 
The barrage of fraudulent propaganda material about 1956 seemed 
endless. The tenth, twentieth, twenty-fifth and thirtieth anniversaries of the 
Revolution were targeted by the regime as especially important dates to 
inundate the bookstores and libraries, the pages of academic and other 
periodicals and the newsstands with printed matter hammering the official 
"party line".^ 
Books and other publications documenting the actual facts about 1956 
which were published in western countries were available during these 
decades only in a few major libraries of Hungary behind the doors of closed 
sections, accessible only by special temporary research permission issued to a 
select few. Mailed or smuggled publications were the only other alternative, 
if they were not intercepted by the political police, the AVO, or by the border 
guards, thus risking reprisals. 
The most heinous brainwashing campaign was waged against Hunga-
ry's youth. Counting on the effectively enforced complete absence of any 
alternative information and the terrorized silence of the population, even 
within the private sphere of families, the regime had every schoolbook, 
textbook and history book, lesson book re-written to contain the blatantly 
fraudulent, perjurious messages about 1956 on all levels of education. 
Orwell wrote in his 1984: "They say that who controls the past controls 
the future, and who controls the present controls the past."6 The most 
effective way to achieve this control is to exclude the truth from and 
incorporate the lies into all the mandatory school textbooks of all the required 
classes teaching virtually the entire population. 
The history textbook for the thirteen to fourteen year-old, 8th grade 
students contained the following passages reprinted in various versions year 
after year in a chapter titled "The 1956 Counterrevolutionary Insurgence": 
The building of Socialism was temporarily interrupted by the 1956 
counterrevolutionary insurgence. Western imperialist circles and 
emigrant fascist counterrevolutionary elements were continually 
inciting against our people, our regime. They prepared the counter-
revolution with the aid of secret local centres. Armed counterrevo-
lutionary forces were pouring into our country from the West. They 
were striving to overthrow the people's democracy. They were 
murdering the communists and the progressive people; they were 
jailing thousands of patriots... Our government requested the help of 
the Soviet army and liquidated the counterrevolution.7 
For high school seniors, their history textbook's chapter about Hunga-
ry's 1956 was titled: "The 1956 Counterrevolution", or in other editions: 
"The 1956 Armed Counterrevolutionary Attack and Its Defeat." The chapter 
in most editions usually contained the fol lowing text: 
On October 23, during the evening hours armed coun-
terrevolutionary groups attacked the Hungarian Radio building as 
well as the Party's central newspaper, the Szabad Nep (Free 
People) building, the Telephone Centre, the Lakihegy radio 
transmission Centre and in order to obtain weapons, many armo-
ries, army barracks, police stations and other objectives.... 
At the end of October they restored the multiparty system... 
many extreme rightist, even fascist parties started to organize.... 
The danger of capitalist restoration was real.... 
Imre Nagy opened the door widely to the flood of capitalist, 
nationalist, fascist elements; bloody white terror ruled the streets.... 
On November 3, Janos Kadar and others formed a new 
government in Szolnok. In the name of the Revolutionary Wor-
kers' and Peasants' Government he announced on November 4 that 
they requested the help of the Soviet Union's Red Army to 
suppress the counterrevolution.s 
Higher education textbooks were not exempt either. In 1986, a new law 
prescribed a new course to be required in every college and university in 
Hungary, titled "Magyarorszag tortenete 1918-1975" (The History of Hungary 
1918-1975). The mandatory history textbook for this required course was 
Magyarorszag a 20. Szdzadban (Hungary in the 20th Century). This book had 
this to teach about the 1956 Revolution: 
The goal of the Hungarian counterrevolution was the 
restoration of the capitalist-landowner regime.... 
The counterrevolutionary insurgents attacked the Hungarian 
Radio building.... 
To incite mass hysteria, they demolished the Stalin statue 
on Gyorgy Dozsa Street. 
They succeeded drawing into their armed groups many 
hundreds of students and adults. 
Imre Nagy and his group encouraged the reactionary forces. 
International imperialism was helping the counterrevolution 
in Hungary to succeed, with the goal to establish a new war base.9 
How many young Hungarians were subjected to this fraudulent 
historiography about their nations' internationally appreciated, es teemed and 
acclaimed revolution? 
According to currently available statistics, 9 8 % of Hungary's relevant 
aged population attends 8th-grade education, 60 .9% attends high schools, 
20% studies in vocational schools and 17.4% attends colleges and 
universities. 
Between 1957, the year after the suppression of the Revolution and 
1988, the year before the regime change from Soviet-occupied communist 
dictatorship to independent democracy, 4,892,842 students graduated from the 
8th grade of the public school system and 2,046,163 students graduated from 
high schools.10 
What these numbers reveal is that within those three decades approxi-
mately 6,939,000 people — about 67% of the country's population — were 
taught blatant lies about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in primary and in 
secondary schools, more than two million of them at least twice, once in the 
8th grade and once again in the 12th grade. (Further research would surely 
reveal additional material and numbers about the vocational schools.) 
We must add to these those college and university students — annually 
approximately 17.4% of the relevant aged population — who received this 
fraudulent message at least three times during their school years, as an official, 
required and enforced lesson. 
These people today are in their 30's 40's 50's. Many of them are in 
leadership positions in Hungary. How honestly open and motivated are they to 
re-examine, to re-establish the true facts of history, so as to be able to learn 
from their real heritage of the brightest star of modern Hungarian history, the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution? Or, was their historical consciousness, their 
national identity seriously damaged by this prolonged and thorough 
brainwashing campaign? As Marcell Jankovics — film director and historian 
— observed in the 2006. 1. issue of the cultural periodical; Uj Horizont (New 
Horizon): 
Thanks to the decades of Communist rule, a not insignif-
icant part of our country's population became indifferent, 
insensitive about our nations' basic concerns. They are not patriots, 
they became merely inhabitant residents.... They came to feel that 
it is not good to be Hungarian with such a bad history... They were 
convinced that 1848 and 1956 was futile and senseless. 
They came to believe that our wonderful history is foul, a 
reproachable burden to be gotten rid of... They came to believe 
that they would ease their souls and conscience if they renounce 
their national identity.11 
Hungarian youngsters growing up since the 1990 regime changes in 
Hungary and the neighbouring countries in the Carpathian Basin are studying 
from a wide variety of textbooks in all classes of their primary, secondary and 
higher education, and the closed sections of the libraries have also opened up. 
Their new textbooks and other research resources, even entire scientific 
institutes, like the Institute for the History of 1956, and museums, like the 
House of Terror Museum, both in Budapest, provide them with adequate, 
valid, reliable facts about 1956. Thus , being no longer forcefully barred from 
access to the truths of their past, today's free and responsible citizens have 
excellent opportunities to negotiate Santayana's classic warning: "Those who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."12 
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Review Article: 
A Modern-Day Antigone: 
The Life and Times of Julia Rajk 
Judith Szapor 
Andrea Peto, Rajk Julia (Budapest: Balassi 2001). 275 pages. ISBN 
963506-423-3, ISSN 1586-3344.1 
In one of the ironic twists with which Hungarian history is so abundantly 
endowed, the history of the Hungarian 1956 would be forever linked with 
Laszlo Rajk whose reburial on October 6, 1956 marked the unofficial 
beginning of the revolution. Ironic for, had he lived and not been executed 
seven years earlier in the eponymous show trial, it is unlikely Rajk himself 
would have become a member of the reform Communist group formed around 
Imre Nagy and played a part in the revolution. Rajk had emerged in 1945 as 
the first among the non-Muscovites (those who lived through the war in 
Hungary or abroad as opposed to those in Soviet exile) of Hungarian 
Communists, with a stellar record of arrests, torture, and jail by both Horthy's 
police and the Arrow Cross, participation in the Spanish Civil War and the 
Hungarian resistance. He went on to serve in a series of high offices: as 
secretary of the Budapest party committee, deputy of Rakosi, the party 
secretary, minister of the Interior from March 1946 and minister of Foreign 
Affairs from August 1948. As minister of the Communist-controlled Ministry 
of Interior he was directly responsible for the annihilation of democratic and 
religious organizations and, ominously, the first show trials, against leaders of 
the opposition parties; he was also involved in the widespread electoral abuses 
(the so-called "blue slips" affair) during the August 1947 elections. Despite all 
this, he was by far the most popular Communist leader, a popularity earned as 
much by his charismatic good looks and oratorical gifts as by his openly 
uncompromising stance reinforced by genuine credibility. 
If Rajk's trial and fate came to symbolize the worst excesses of 
Rakosi's regime, his 1955 "rehabilitation" (agreed to by Rakosi only under 
Soviet pressure), the official admission that the charges and confessions had 
been false, contributed to a collective crisis of conscience. The reburial of 
Rajk and his three co-accused, attended by a quarter of a million people, let 
free flow to a massive outpouring of solidarity, guilt, and anger, and served as 
the prelude of the revolution, to erupt in little more than two weeks. The 
irony, however, was not lost on contemporaries; it was eloquently expressed 
by an old comrade, himself recently freed from Rakosi's prison who wryly 
remarked: "Poor Laci, were he alive today, he would surely have the troops 
fire at us." 
One could argue that Rajk's posthumous reputation and his likely 
position vis-a-vis the 1956 revolution are not only hypothetical but also 
irrelevant in this context, given that the subject of Andrea Peto's biography is 
not Rajk himself but his widow, Julia. Conversely, the argument could be 
made that Julia Rajk (1914-1981) is a legitimate subject of a biography and 
historians' interest only in-so-far as her association with Laszlo Rajk (1909-
1949) went, the five years during which she was his partner in the 
underground Communist movement and prison, from September 1944, and 
his wife from July 1945. (Counting the years of occasional contact in the 
underground movement, their acquaintance lasted a slightly longer eight 
years, still only a fraction of her life.) These arguments are very much at the 
heart of the book, equally rich in biographical detail and theoretical insight, 
and the author devotes considerable attention to addressing them. Andrea 
Peto, professor at the Gender Studies Department of Budapest's Central 
European University, is exceptionally well equipped to do so as she is not 
only among the pioneers of women's and gender history in Hungary but is 
also amply published in several areas that cut across Julia Rajk's life. In 
previous articles and a monograph, she covered the history of the women's 
associations after 1945 and their takeover by the Communist MNDSZ (the 
Democratic Organization of Hungarian Women in which Mrs. Rajk served as 
secretary and president),2 and wrote on gender and spousal relations in the 
Communist party.1 In these as in more recent works, she has displayed a 
passionate interest in the ways, often mitigated by gender, in which historians 
and the public shape historical memory. 
In the introduction, Peto elaborates on the methodological pitfalls of 
writing woman's biography in general and the specific challenges she faced as 
the biographer of Julia Rajk who seemed to fit the conservative template 
prescribing a supporting role for women in politics: after all, she gained a 
public profile and political office as Rajk's wife and was arrested and jailed as 
his wife. And, from the moment of her release in 1954 until the end. lulia 
devoted her life to the fight to clear Rajk's name and restore his legacy. Peto 
also describes the difficulties in finding documentary sources (destroyed, still 
not accessible, or of dubious value) and dealing with memoirs and interviews 
of contemporaries (distorted by personal and political considerations), 
commonly experienced by scholars of such recent period. Not even Julia's 
own interviews and written testimonies would be spared scrutiny as, shaped 
by her self-assumed role as an incorruptible witness, set to correct the lies, 
falsifications and manipulations of official history, they were still not immune 
to the human impulse of determining one's own legacy. 
The biography is built around the seeming paradox that informed 
Julia Rajk's life: the conscious decision on the one hand to fulfil the traditional 
role of the "nation's widow" and, on the other, her consistent efforts to acquire 
a name and public role "of her own." Peto highlights the significant 
connection between names and public roles for women by structuring her 
chapters around Julia's names, from her maiden name, Julia Foldi to Mrs. 
Rajk, to the only half-ironic "the nation's widow" to the final Julia Rajk or, 
simply, "the Julia," who became an institution. (She also describes the 
authorities' effort to erase her husband's memory by taking away his and her 
name and assigning her a different name, during and even after her 
incarceration.) Julia's greatest success in her role as the "nation's widow" was 
to achieve a public funeral for her husband and his co-accused, executed and 
buried in secret seven years earlier.4 Peto extensively documents this 
achievement, describing the traits — the relentless energy, the unusual 
frankness, the refusal to lie and make nice with the party officials she 
considered her husband's murderers — that became Julia's hallmark, mastered 
in later decades. To the high-level party functionaries, accustomed to the 
lizard-like servility of the Rakosi years, she represented a force of nature they 
were unable to handle; and the picture of Julia Rajk, standing at the grave of 
her husband, holding the hand of their young son, taken from her as an infant, 
was reproduced in the Western press, to become one of the iconic images of 
1956. 
Julia Rajk chose to remain a widow for life: in that sense, her personal 
life as a woman came to an end. But other aspects of her personal life, most 
importantly as a mother, did not end and neither does the biography; and it 
makes an emphatic point of erasing the lines between the personal and the 
public in a life that would be spent maintaining communities and building 
informal institutions, delicately balanced between the officially tolerated and 
repressed. Regardless of what her husband would have done, Julia Rajk went 
on to join the group of reform Communists around Imre Nagy. Following the 
Soviet invasion in November 1956, she shared their Romanian exile, acting as 
the group's unofficial leader after the removal of the men and, on her return, 
she became a bastion of solidarity and the go-to person during the worst years 
of repression. The political and diplomatic history of these events has finally 
come to light, due mostly to the efforts of the Institute of the History of 1956 
in the last nearly two decades.5 Some of the main figures of the group, among 
them Losonczy and Nagy, received a full-length biographical treatment.6 Peto 
contributes to this scholarship in unexpected ways, by examining the everyday 
challenges, family and group dynamics, and the personal, political, and 
cultural roots of the values that affected the individuals and the group during 
the post-1956 terror and the following years. 
She leaves no doubt that Julia Rajk had always remained a Commu-
nist but one who lived by her own interpretation of Communist principles: 
loyalty, integrity, and solidarity with the underdog. This makes the last 
chapter, describing the last two decades of Julia Rajk's life particularly 
rewarding: it was in these years, coinciding with the milder period of Kadar's 
"enlightened dictatorship," that Julia came out of the shadow of her husband, 
all the while keeping up the fight to honour his name and legacy. Despite the 
political differences with her son, prominent in the democratic opposition, she 
took a stand for the rights of dissidents. In the famous 1978 episode of the 
"three widows," Julia attended the trial of the dissident writer Miklos Haraszti, 
lending him support by demonstratively sitting in the first row with Ilona 
Duczynska (Karl Polanyi's widow) and Katinka Andrassy (the widow of 
Mihaly Karolyi); all, remarks Peto, women with a name "of their own." Her 
other achievements included the first Western-type shelter in Hungary for 
abandoned dogs, another joint project with Katinka Andrassy and her 
informal travel organization for friends, "Julia Tours;" perhaps less obviously 
significant but nevertheless important informal institutions that contributed to 
the building of a sorely missing civil society. 
Particularly enlightening is Peto's description of the modus operandi 
of Julia in the last chapter, titled "The two souls of Julia" (an expression 
borrowed from Gyorgy Litvan), especially for readers interested in the subtle 
ways the Kadar-regime co-opted the majority of Hungarian society, an even 
co-existed with members of the political opposition. Julia had no qualms 
about accepting the privileges — the best available medical care, travels to the 
West, multiple yearly holidays — granted to the party elite and extended to 
"victims of Stalinist persecution." She realized early on — a fact that does not 
diminish her personal courage — that, as Rajk's widow, she was untouchable. 
Nobody would dare to arrest her or, for that matter, her son, whose downtown 
apartment served as the "samizdat boutique" of the opposition from the 1970s. 
She also exploited the unspoken but widely whispered personal responsibility 
of Kadar in her husband's fate and used her personal connections to old 
comrades, still in power, to claim her husband a place in the official party 
history, on a street sign, in the pantheon of the Communist martyrs, in the 
name of a school and a university residence. Annoying officials to no end, she 
took up the cases of the persecuted, friends or not, to help them get a job, a 
passport, an apartment, a university placement unjustly denied. 
The personal arch, reminiscent of Greek tragedies, from Rajk to 
Kadar and from Kadar to Nagy came full circle in June 1989 at yet another 
reburial, of Imre Nagy, betrayed, kidnapped, tried and executed under Kadar's 
leadership. The ceremony, witnessed by hundreds of thousands in person and 
broadcast around the world from Budapest's Heroes' Square, became the 
unofficial beginning of yet another revolutionary change, Hungary's return to 
democratic government. The honour guard, led by Nagy's daughter and 
surviving members of Nagy's circle stood under the columns of the venerable 
Mucsarnok (Palace of Art), draped in stark black and transformed into a stage 
of historical proportions by a young set designer, Laszlo Rajk. 
Julia Rajk died of cancer in 1981, long before the June 1989 cere-
mony on Heroes' Square, an event she no doubt would have welcomed 
wholeheartedly. Two more years later, in 1991, her husband's name was 
removed from the street named after him and reversed to Pannonia Street, an 
event that most likely would have devastated her. And so the endless battle for 
history and historical legacy continues, providing instant lessons in the ways 
in which we shape our collective memory. As the recent 50th anniversary 
celebrations of the Hungarian 1956 so clearly demonstrated, this process is far 
from complete and the biography of this remarkable woman represents an 
important step in the process of interpreting these still highly contested events 
of Hungarian history. The book is not without flaws: while it is bursting at the 
seams with details of political and personal history, astute observation, wit, 
and theoretical and methodological insight, a firmer editorial hand could have 
helped to mould these strands together more seamlessly. Signs of careful 
editing include useful biographical notes and a chronology although a few 
names and events could have benefited from a short introduction or context, 
even for readers familiar with the recent history of Hungary. 
All in all, the book is an important contribution to our understanding 
of the role of individuals and communities in the fight for the right to 
remember, to retake and own their collective memory. Finally, it demonstrates 
the ways in which we create myths, demolish false idols, and uphold universal 
human values against the forces of tyranny and political expediency, just like 
the heroine of Sophocles's play, Antigone, and her unlikely modern-day 
follower, Julia Rajk did. 
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PART II 
The Revolution, the Refugees 
and Canada — in 1956 and After: 
An Introduction 
Nandor Dreisziger 
Perhaps it is appropriate for a journal edited in Canada to devote a large part 
of one of its issues to the Canadian circumstances and consequences of the 
events of 1956 in Hungary. We wish to accomplish this in Part II of our 
present volume, which contains some half-dozen studies. 
Setting the scene is my own paper dealing with the Canadian 
decision, made in late-November 1956, to admit a large number of the Hunga-
rian refugees to the country. The main question the paper tries to answer is 
why the Canadian government of the times, after hesitations and delays, 
reacted with such unprecedented generosity to the issue of the admission of 
refugees. It suggests that a number of factors were involved: the robust health 
of the Canadian economy, the greatly improved image of Hungarians in the 
country, the wide-spread public sympathy generated towards Hungarians by 
television coverage of the events in Hungary and at the Austrian border, and 
— above all — the fact that Canada's politicians were preparing for a federal 
election in 1957. The paper also explains how Canada's Suez crisis 
contributed to a decision by the government in Ottawa to open Canada's doors 
wide to the refugees. An appendix to this paper contains the report of the 
Honourable John Yaremko about his tour of Austria — and its camps for 
Hungarian refugees — in the late fall and early winter of 1956. 
The next paper in this section of the volume is also a document, an 
eye-witness account dating from the time. This is Professor Audrey Wipper's 
report on the efforts of Toronto's Hungarian community to help first the 
people of Hungary and eventually the refugees with a fund-raising drive. The 
drive was started by the members of the community who had neither the time 
nor the expertise to conduct it properly. The result was frenzied activity — and 
a great deal of chaos. Eventually professional fund-raisers took over and 
completed the task. 
The next three papers deal with some of the long-term consequences 
of the coming of the refugees. In the first one of these University of Ottawa 
doctoral candidate Christopher Adam examines the way the Kadar regime in 
Hungary looked upon the refugees in Canada in particular, and the whole 
expatriate Hungarian community in the country in general. Having decided 
that such communities constituted a danger to its interests, the regime set out 
to spy on their activities and leaders. In a unique paper based on research in 
contemporary Hungarian intelligence files, the author outlines this sordid 
story which few Hungarian Canadians — or as a matter of fact, Canadians — 
have any knowledge of. 
The next paper deals with the life-time achievements of those among 
the refugees who became entrepreneurs. Mrs. Eva Tomory, a doctoral 
candidate in business administration at the University of Pecs in Hungary, 
examines their story and tries to explain why among the Hungarian refugees 
there was greater propensity to undertake business ventures than has been the 
case among some other refugees to Canada, or in fact among Hungarian 
immigrants who came to the country at other times. In seeking answers to her 
questions she finds certain parallels with refugees who had fled Fidel Castro's 
communist Cuba. 
In this section's last paper Marta Mihaly, a 1956 refugee herself, 
reminisces about coming to Canada, being a student at the Sopron School of 
Forestry of the University of British Columbia, and about the legacy of the 
Soproners and their more nature-friendly attitudes to silviculture. 
The Biggest Welcome Ever: 
the Toronto Tories, the Ottawa Liberals, and the 
Admission of Hungarian Refugees to Canada in 1956 
Nandor Dreisziger 
The coming of the refugees of the Hungarian Revolution to Canada in 1956-
57 has been called an "unprecedented" event in the annals of Canadian 
immigration history.1 It was unrivalled above all because at no time in the 
country's past did so many refugees come in such a short time. The 
uniqueness of this event was the result of vigorous steps taken by Canadian 
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's Liberal government at the end of 
November, 1956, to hasten the movement of Hungarian refugees to Canada. 
These measures were unparalleled in the history of Canadian immigration 
policies. They placed no limit on the number of people who could be 
accepted. They involved a dramatic relaxation of immigration regulations in 
order to facilitate the speedy admission of thousands of applicants. And they 
provided free transport for everyone who came. The extraordinary generosity 
of these measures justifies the calling of the welcome extended to the 
Hungarian 56-ers the "biggest ever" given to any large group of newcomers to 
Canada. 
Ever since 1956 historians have been asking what conditions made 
possible such a "big welcome" for the Hungarian refugees? The answers given 
to this question have varied. Most authors point to the outpouring of 
sympathy for Hungary and Hungarians during and immediately after the 
Revolution in Hungary. According to Professor Gerald Dirks of Brock 
University for example, this sympathy translated into enough political 
pressure to bring Ottawa around to a policy of vigorous refugee admission.2 
This view is shared by Valerie Knowles, the author of a survey of Canadian 
immigration and immigration policies from the mid-16th to the late 20th 
century. "Humanitarianism" has also been identified as being one of the 
driving forces behind Canada's 1956 "Hungarian refugee policy" by Howard 
Adelman, a one-time Director of York University's Centre for Refugee 
Studies. Adelman, however, listed other factors that in his opinion also 
contributed to the Canadian decision favouring a generous admission policy: 
the yearning to reinforce the nation's "self-identity as European" and the desire 
to further Canada's interests "both in terms of helping our friends and 
embarrassing our enemies."4 
While not disputing the importance of such factors as a sympathetic 
Canadian public in Ottawa's decision to bring a great number of refugees to 
Canada, some historians stress the role that individual politicians played in the 
matter. Greg Donaghy and Michael Stevenson, students of post-World War II 
Canadian foreign policies, point to Lester ["Mike"] B. Pearson, the Secretary 
for External Affairs in 1956, as being the man behind Canada's decision to 
implement a policy of generous refugee admission.5 Still others, especially 
Hungarian Canadians, identify Pearson's colleague in the Cabinet, Minister of 
Immigration and Citizenship Jack W. Pickersgill, as the principal author of the 
vigorous steps the Ottawa government had taken to bring Hungarian refugees 
to Canada.6 
It is not the aim of this study to dispute any of the above inter-
pretations. This paper hopes to take a fresh look at the evidence and offer a 
more nuanced explanation of the actions of the country's political elite in the 
fall of 1956 in regard to the issue of refugee admittance. It will suggest that, in 
addition to the humanitarian inclinations of the Canadian population and 
certain Canadian public figures, the most important consideration in this 
matter was political expediency — and it had to do with the fact that 1957 was 
to be an election year in Canada. 
Besides the political situation in Canada in the fall of 1956 there were 
of course larger, mainly long-term developments that favoured the adoption of 
a policy of generous refugee admittance by the Ottawa government. These 
included the economic prosperity Canada had enjoyed since the end of World 
War II, the long-standing Canadian tradition to welcome immigrants from 
other lands, an auspicious change in the image that Hungarians had in the 
country, as well as several fortuitous political events that had taken place in 
the years or months before the fall of 1956. 
Post-War Canada 
By the end of World War II the United States had become the predominant 
economic power in the world. Japan, Germany, France and Italy lay in ruins 
and Russia's industrial heartland had been devastated. Britain was exhausted 
economically, while "the American mainland," as British historian Arthur 
Marwick pointed out, suffered "no bomb attacks." In fact, as Marwick put it, 
"far from fighting a battle for survival [as did the British], the Americans 
found themselves between 1940 and 1945 enjoying a higher standard of living 
than ever before."7 The health of the American economy in general and this 
high standard of living in particular had a positive impact on the post-war 
economic situation in Canada. It manifested itself above all in massive 
American investment in the country as US companies ploughed large funds 
into Canadian ventures especially in resource industries.* 
Post-war prosperity in Canada also had home-grown roots. Canadians 
had deferred "big ticket" purchases throughout the war, in fact in many cases 
from the darkest days of the Great Depression. With the Depression and the 
war over, and industry returning to civilian production, elevated levels of 
consumer spending propelled the Canadian economy to function in high gear. 
The seeds of prosperity had been planted during the war. The high 
unemployment that had characterized the Depression years had disappeared 
by 1942 and soon gave way to labour shortages especially in the country's war 
industries. Most workers could put in overtime to their hearts' content. 
Personal savings had increased and were often not touched till the war's end. 
During the war Canada's manufacturing sector had re-tooled for war 
production with the latest in machinery and technology. At war's end, much of 
this potential was put in the service of manufacturing for the civilian market. 
But there was still another reason why World War II was not followed 
by an economic recession. This was the fact that during the war the Canadian 
government made extensive plans for assuring the continuation of wartime 
prosperity. Planning for the post-war economy was so extensive that one 
historian of the times, Donald Creighton, entitled a chapter in his book dealing 
with the subject "The Coming of the Planners."9 Another historian, David 
Slater, added that these undertakings by the government in Ottawa represented 
"the first real Canadian adaptations of Keynesian economic stabilization 
strategies..."1" To a large extent then, post-war prosperity in Canada had been 
planned, but it took place in a favourable internal and external (i.e. North 
American) economic environment. 
The First World War had been followed by a prolonged recession but 
no such event came after the Second. The economic down-turn of the autumn 
of 1955 was short-lived and its quick passing further demonstrated that post-
war prosperity was here to stay. Not surprisingly under the circumstances, 
consumer confidence in the country remained high and living standards 
continued to increase, as did employment. The expanded labour market 
created a trend toward the increased growth of Canada's manufacturing 
centres, a trend that had been already evident throughout much of the war. 
The labour shortages boosted the demand for more vigorous immigration 
policies while the arrival of newcomers served to further intensify consumer 
spending. But before we discuss immigration, we must note still another post-
1945 Canadian phenomenon that was both a sign of a healthy economy and a 
promoter of economic activity: the advent of the famous post-war "baby 
boom." 
It all started in 1945. The marriages and births that Canadians had 
postponed during the war, in fact already during the Great Depression, began 
happening. In 1946 for example there were 33,000 more weddings than there 
had been two years earlier. Canada's birth rate that had hit a low point in the 
mid-1930s now started a swift ascent. In 1947 it reached a remarkable rate of 
28.9 births per thousand, and this extraordinary birth rate was not a flash-in-
the-pan as it continued at a high level for years. It was higher than that of any 
industrialized nation on the planet.11 More important from the point of view of 
our inquiry was the fact that immigration also grew in the post-war period. By 
the early 1950s the number of immigrants had reached new highs. In 1951 for 
example, 194,391 newcomers came to the country.12 
Canada as a Land of Immigrants 
Most readers need not be reminded that Canada was a nation of immigrants 
and that it had almost always been more of a receiver of population than a 
source of migrants going to other places. The volume of immigration to this 
land, however, always had its ebb and flow. This had been the situation even 
during the French regime. The late 1660s and early 1670s, the time when 
Canada was being converted from a commercial outpost of France to one of 
its important royal colonies, witnessed great efforts at boosting the colony's 
population. This situation did not last long and these efforts soon came to a 
virtual end when the French government's, more precisely Louis XIV's 
attention was diverted to European wars. Another time of great influx of 
newcomers came two short decades after the British conquest of Canada when 
the land saw the coming of the Loyalists, the refugees of the War of American 
Independence. This immigration gave rise to a bi-racial Canada, one that in 
time would become increasingly English everywhere except in the regions of 
original French settlement. Still another influx came, again mainly of English-
speakers, after the Napoleonic Wars. And then in the late 1840s came the 
victims of the famine in Ireland, adding economic refugees to the mainly 
political ones who had arrived in the wake of the above-mentioned wars. 
Immigration continued during the 1850s. In the following decade 
began — one might say accelerated — the process of Canada becoming a self-
governing colony of Great Britain. Soon thereafter started the expansion of a 
newly-established Dominion of Canada across the continent. The acquisition 
of the vast lands of much of the Canadian West, formerly administered by the 
Hudson's Bay Company, did not immediately result in a large influx of 
settlers. It wasn't till the last years of the century — after the prolonged 
economic recession of the 1870s, 1880s, and the early 1890s, and the filling-
up of the American prairies south of the border — that settlers began to pour 
into the Canadian West, a process that was halted only by the outbreak of the 
First World War. 
The war had more than a temporary impact on Canadian immigration. 
Before the war the idea had taken root that Canada needed only agricultural 
newcomers. With the war came the belief that those newcomers should come 
only from friendly countries, above all Great Britain. Furthermore, the conflict 
was followed by an economic downturn which meant that for a few years no 
immigrants were seen as needed, no matter where they wanted to come from. 
Nevertheless, with the advent of better times in 1924, the need for labour 
especially in the Canadian West became so great that immigrants were once 
again encouraged to come, even from the former enemy lands of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
The Great Depression saw Canada's gates shut once more. The gates 
remained closed during the Second World War, even though there were 
thousands of people who were desperate to leave a Europe increasingly 
dominated by Nazi Germany and threatened by renewed conflict. With war's 
end many in Canada expected immigration not to resume soon, as had been 
the case after the First World War. But, as we have seen, the situation in 
Canada after 1945 was greatly different from what it had been after 1918, and 
immigration resumed almost immediately. Most of the immigrants coming to 
Canada after the war's end came from the British Isles. Britain had been 
economically exhausted by the war and her living standards were low. Britons 
were anxious to exchange the poverty in their country for the relative 
affluence of Canada. There were also Central Europeans coming, people 
displaced by the war. Of these, Canada initially took only a rather small 
number, some 123,000, mainly manual labourers who were perceived to be in 
demand by Canada's resource industries and manufacturers.1' 
Admitting Displaced Persons from Western European refugee camps 
was one matter, but welcoming refugees from Communist rule in Eastern 
Europe was another.14 Canada's security establishment, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and the officials in the Immigration Department charged with 
protecting national security, had suspicions about people who were escaping 
communist rule that had been imposed by the Soviets in the territories they 
had occupied at the end of the Second World War. Could these people be 
sympathizers of the new socialist order? Or, worse still, could they be agents 
of the Soviets? These suspicions were deep-seeded and were fed by such 
phenomena as the McCarthy witch-hunts in the United States — that saw the 
questioning the loyalty of such people as the writer Graham Greene and actor 
Charlie Chaplin. 
Throughout the early Cold War years Canadian security personnel 
continued to have reservations about admitting refugees from Communist 
countries. Reflecting these concerns about "national security" were the strict 
guidelines regarding the processing of would-be newcomers that resulted in 
the Canadian admission process of the times being heavy on red-tape and 
short on speedy decisions.15 Interestingly, the revolution in Hungary in 1956 
and the coming of the Hungarian refugees served to diminish the reservations 
about refugees from Communist countries. 
Conditions in post-war Canada then — economic prosperity, high 
employment, population growth, the resumption of immigration — favoured 
the generous admission of refugees in 1956. The fear of communist 
sympathizers and agents coming, somewhat blunted these prospects. But what 
might have reduced them even more in the case of the refugees from Hungary 
was negative Canadian public opinion about Hungarians. 
The Image of Hungarians in Canada 
For much of the first half of the twentieth century the image of Hungarians in 
Canada had been an unfavourable one. East European immigrants in general 
had an negative image in the country. They were often referred to as "men in 
sheepskin coats" and were considered uncouth and poorly educated. Added to 
this perception was the fact that Hungarians were deemed enemy aliens in 
both World War I and World War II. There had been a time in North America 
when Hungary and the Magyars had a positive image. This was after the 
1848-49 War of Independence against Austria when the Hungarians, and 
especially their leader Lajos Kossuth, were seen as people who had fought for 
freedom against the despotic monarchical rule of the Habsburg prince Francis-
Joseph aided by the even more despotic Tsar Nicholas I of Russia. The 
refugees of that war who had made it to North America were men of soldierly 
bearing — often with a good knowledge of English and even some aristocratic 
charisma. Alas, for Hungarians, this image barely survived the nineteenth 
century. By the turn of the new century, the Hungarian image in the United 
States, and soon afterwards also in Canada, had become one of simple 
peasants who had come to the New World to take jobs from North Americans, 
often in the capacity of strike-breakers. Instead of dashing gentlemen-officers, 
the new immigrants became seen as backward labourers, "bohunks" as they 
were often called especially south of the border.16 
Anti-immigrant sentiments and xenophobia were rampant in the 
Canada of the times. They were openly proclaimed even by some politicians. 
Such attitudes got a boost in both World War I and II as a result of anti-enemy 
propaganda. They began abating in Canada in the late 1940s, but it was not till 
decades later that multiculturalism became accepted and cultural diversity 
became tolerated. The fact that many of the post-World War II newcomers 
from Hungary were educated people also helped to improve their image. 
The image of Hungarians was also linked to the image that Hungary 
enjoyed abroad. This image was quite favourable throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century but began declining early during the twentieth. 
Rather than being seen as an upholder of freedoms the Hungary of the times 
began to be viewed as an "oppressor" of minorities. The transformation 
coincided with a revolution in European international relations manifested by 
the rise of an entente first between France and Russia and then between these 
powers and Britain.17 Not surprisingly, Hungary's reputation declined further 
during the First World War. In the interwar years Hungary's image suffered 
even more. The war had been followed by revolutions in Hungary, first by 
moderate leftists and then by social democrats and communists. When the 
"old order" was restored, some two hundred thousand people who had 
participated in the revolutions or sympathised with their aims left Hungary. In 
emigration many of these people denounced the interwar Hungarian regime in 
the international media, contributing to the growing negative image of 
Hungary.'8 Not surprisingly under these circumstances, Hungary's reputation 
reached its nadir during and immediately after World War II when the country 
was viewed in the West, as well as the East, as "Hitler's last ally".19 
The image of Hungary and Hungarians in the West, including 
Canada, underwent a most dramatic transformation in the fall of 1956. By 
mid-November, the events in Budapest had been filling the TV screens of 
Canadian viewers for weeks. The revolution was the first international 
happening that had such extensive exposure throughout Canada as well as the 
entire Western world. The images of poorly armed youths fighting Soviet 
tanks, of buildings in ruin, and then of frightened civilians carrying their 
children and meagre belongings across Hungary's border with Austria created 
great compassion for the Revolution's victims. That they had the courage of 
standing up against the vast "evil empire" of the Soviets, made them objects of 
admiration. From former enemies, Hungarians became allies in the fight 
against communism. The fact that the West had not been able to help the 
freedom fighters in their struggle for liberty made the Western public, 
including Canada's, all the more eager to help the refugees. Never before — or 
since — had the image of Hungarians been so positive. Not surprisingly this 
swelling of public sympathy created an atmosphere in which the Canadian 
government found it easier to opt for a policy of generous admittance rather 
than one that denied entry to the majority of refugees.20 
The Political Scene in Canada Prior to the Autumn of 1956 
In the foregoing discussion of post-war Canada we have established that the 
economic situation in the country had created a climate favourable to the 
admission of new groups of immigrants. The prosperity and growth Canada 
was experiencing made it difficult for anyone to question the capacity of the 
country to absorb additional people. We have also seen that the image of 
Hungarians in particular had improved dramatically in October and November 
of 1956. Next we have to examine the political situation in Canada and its 
potential to affect governmental decision-making on the issue of the 
admission of a large group of refugees in response to a refugee crisis in 
Europe. 
In the fall of 1956 the Liberal Party of Canada was looking forward to 
the expected 1957 elections and to their re-election for an unprecedented sixth 
time in a row. Four years earlier the Liberals did not have a particularly 
difficult time retaining power. In 1953 the Ontario Tory Party did not support 
the federal Conservatives led by former Premier of Ontario George Drew. In 
November of 1956 however, there was no evidence that this situation would 
repeat itself. The amicable relationship that Prime Minister St. Laurent had 
with Ontario Premier Leslie M. Frost during the negotiations of the US-
Canada St. Lawrence Seaway Project was fading from memory. The Trans 
Canada Pipeline project, and especially, the debate about it in the House of 
Commons in the spring of 1956, instead of gaining popularity for the Liberals, 
strengthened the position of the opposition parties. Furthermore, there had 
been a clash between Premier Frost and Jack Pickersgill, St. Laurent's right-
hand man in the cabinet, over the planned introduction of hospitalization 
insurance in Canada. The Toronto Conservative newspaper Globe and Mail 
had even accused Pickersgill of calling for a "regime change" in Toronto, a 
serious allegation that Pickersgill denied:21 nevertheless, the affair embittered 
relations between the two men — they would clash again in November of 
1956 over the question of the admission of Hungarian refugees. 
It was under these circumstances that the crises of the fall of 1956, the 
revolt against Soviet rule in Hungary and soon afterwards the Anglo-French-
Israeli attack on Egypt, confronted Canada. The news of the Hungarian 
Revolution caused few ripples in Ottawa. As Donaghy tells us, some 
Canadian diplomats worried that any Canadian condemnation of Soviet 
actions would endanger carefully-built good relations between Canada and 
third world countries, especially the India of Jawaharlal Nehru.22 The Suez 
Crisis had a far worse impact on the governing Liberals. In siding with the 
United States (and, coincidentally, the USSR) on this issue, the Canadian 
government offended the pro-British sentiments of a large section of Canada's 
Anglophone population (and probably also the country's never too numerous 
pro-French Francophone residents). The Tories tried to make much mileage of 
this "perfidy". Ottawa's actions probably surprised no foreign policy expert, 
but they seemed to have driven stil l another nail into the coffin of the Liberals' 
re-election expectations. No wonder they were very keen on finding a solution 
to the crisis. 
Less than two weeks later, when the Suez Crisis seemed almost under 
control (but not forgotten by many Anglo-Canadians), another crisis began 
surfacing in Ottawa. It was the question of what to do with the masses of 
Hungarian refugees who started to pour into Austria after their uprising had 
been crushed by the Soviets. The government could not afford to be on the 
wrong side of public opinion on still another policy issue. 
The Liberal Government in Ottawa was slow to react to this latest 
crisis. On the 6th of November, Minister of Immigration Pickersgill 
announced that any Hungarian refugees wanting to immigrate to Canada 
would be given priority, but would have to meet all the requirements of the 
Immigration Act. This meant little, since large numbers of them could not be 
processed in a short time unless the government relaxed the complex rules 
governing admission to Canada. One Cabinet colleague of Pickersgill who 
realized this problem was Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson. He 
told the Minister of Immigration in a letter that Canada should adopt "a more 
liberal policy". "[I]f we stick rigidly" he continued, "to the usual health and 
job training requirements, Canada's offer to give priority will seem a rather 
meagre one..." Pearson concluded his letter by saying "I need not emphasize 
the domestic and international political desirability of making it clear that 
Canada is taking an unselfish interest in the plight of the Hungarian 
refugees...."23 In Ottawa, however, nothing was done in response to Pearson's 
plea. Five days after Pearson's letter, Pickersgill was still telling his Cabinet 
colleagues that Canada should be admitting only those refugees "who could 
take employment or who could be looked after by others,"24 and ten days later 
an External Affairs official, Jules Leger (a future Governor-General of 
Canada), could complain that Pickersgill had still not replied to Pearson's 
letter."3 Within the next fortnight, however, events would take place in the 
country, in particular in Ontario, that would force the hand of the Liberal 
government to take decisive action. 
Hungary and Hungarians in the Ontario Media 
During the middle of November the crisis in Austria continued to grow. In the 
meantime it continued to attract attention in Canada where tens of thousands 
of people were watching daily images of frightened and exhausted refugees, 
often with small children and minimum belongings, arriving at Austrian 
border stations. The situation also caught the attention of the Canadian media, 
in particular the influential Toronto conservative paper The Globe and Mail 
[hereafter the Globe], 
The coverage of the subject of Hungary and Hungarians in 1956 by 
this paper started innocuously enough. In its October 25 issue, the Globe's 
editors reported on the events in Warsaw and Budapest and made a few 
comments. They observed that the USSR, the "self-proclaimed anti-colonist", 
had "no aversion to sending in tanks... when one of her numerous colonies 
[made] a bid for self-determination." They added that it was obvious that "the 
Soviet Empire has weak spots all around its periphery...".26 
Two days later the paper's editors returned to the subject. They 
lamented the fact that the bid for self-determination by the Poles and 
Hungarians had not brought "an instant and passionate response from the 
capital of every free nation." They admitted that statements of sympathy had 
been issued by the American administration, but regretted that no such 
pronouncements have been issued in London and Paris. "Britain and France 
may feel..." they speculated "that their own colonial problems preclude them 
from denouncing Russia's bloody colonialism." Then they went on to criticize 
the silence they perceived in Ottawa: "Our Government is understood to have 
firm views on the subject of colonialism; was not this a time to express them?" 
They also criticised the government of India, that "rarely misses an 
opportunity to attack the colonial policies [of the western powers]," yet have 
been "unmoved" by Soviet intervention in Hungary. And, the same went for 
the UN. Does it have to "wait for somebody to lodge an official protest? Can it 
not... speak on its own?" "There may be no way, without bringing on global 
war," giving Poland and Hungary "physical support," the editorial concluded, 
but "they surely deserve far greater moral support than they have been 
getting...."27 
In the next two Globe editorials, entitled "Spam" and "The Yawn," the 
paper returned to the subject on the 29th of October and the 3rd of November 
respectively. In the first of these the editors outlined that, according to 
American statements, Hungarians could not expect any direct help from the 
United States in their fight for liberty "the thing the West has consistently 
encouraged them to fight for..." but, the editorial went on quoting a speech US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had made in Texas, the US will give 
economic aid to Hungary once it manages to break with Russia. They won't 
get help with their quest for freedom, the editorial concluded, but "under 
certain condition [Hungary] might have a tin of spam." Five days later the 
paper's editors turned to the subject of the Hungarian question and the United 
Nations. They noted that while the United States was not reluctant to 
denounce Anglo-French "imperialism" in the Middle East, it agreed to a 
postponement of the debate on Hungary. This approach, the editors 
concluded, allowed the Soviets "to steel a march — a march with armoured 
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tanks into the suburbs of the Hungarian capital." 
As the Globe had predicted, the Soviets stole a march and undertook 
to crush the Hungarian Revolution in the early hours of November 4th. 
During the next five days the paper's editors returned to the subject twice. In 
their editorial of the 7th they discussed what possible steps the West should 
take in view of the Soviet refusal to consider a cease-fire in Hungary or even 
to allow a UN inspection team "to enter the brave land." They felt that the 
extreme measure of expelling the Soviet Union warranted discussion under 
the circumstances.29 Two days later in an editorial entitled "What About 
Hungary?" the paper's editors found it ironic that the UN was "energetic" and 
"united" in confronting the issue of British and French intervention in Egypt, 
but not so in dealing with the Soviet Union in regards to Hungary. They also 
regretted that, unlike in the case of the crisis in the Middle East, there was no 
police force established "for the Hungarians." The editors next went on to 
report on the opinions of the paper's readers: 
This newspaper has reason to think, from the many letters and 
telephone calls it has received, that the majority of its readers 
support the action of Britain and France. It is Russia's action that 
angers and horrifies them. It is Russia's action they want the UN 
to deal with. And the UN's utter failure to deal with it is making 
them bitterly hostile to that wordy organization. 
The paper next listed what had been done by ordinary citizens throughout the 
world against the Soviets: the attacks on communist party headquarters 
(Paris), on Russian embassies (Luxembourg, Denmark), the burning of Soviet 
flags and anti-Soviet demonstrations everywhere in the West.30 Four days later 
the subject of the Globe editorials changed. From dealing with the question of 
Hungary, the paper turned its attention to the matter of Hungarian refugees 
streaming across the Hungarian-Austrian border. It deplored the decision of 
the federal government to take only 2,500 of the some 11,000 refugees who 
had crossed into Austria during the first half of November. It also regretted 
that the "Immigration Department" in Ottawa insisted that the refugees will 
have to meet all the regulations in order to qualify for admittance. The paper's 
editors predicted that Canadians "will be disgusted by Ottawa's cold, 
calculating attitude..." The Liberal Government should have "shown libera-
lity" and admit all "young or old, sick or well, skilled or unskilled...." and 
should have met the "full cost of bringing them here..." The government 
should have made a "generous gesture" the Globe editorial concluded. "In 
failing to make it, the Liberal Government showed once again... that it is 
totally out of touch with the Canadian people."11 
A Time for Decision: From "Codfish" to Generous Host 
During the course of the next ten days, the Globe1 s editorials dealt with the 
international situation. In the meantime the Government in Ottawa seemed to 
be doing nothing. By the second week of November the perceived inaction of 
the government had started receiving criticism especially from members of the 
opposition Conservative Party and more importantly, from the Tory 
establishment in Ontario. There the man of the hour was Premier Leslie Frost, 
the most powerful Tory politician in the country.32 
Another prominent Tory in Toronto was John Yaremko. The son of 
poor Ukrainian immigrants, he had been a brilliant law student. He was 
enticed to enter politics to prove that the Tory party's elite was not composed 
entirely of WASP individuals.33 Yaremko was a friend of Hungarians (he even 
tried to learn Magyar) and now he began urging Frost that the refugees be 
flown over in the manner former Ontario Premier George Drew had brought 
immigrants over from Britain in 1947.34 
At about the same time the Globe returned to the subject of the 
Hungarian refugees and began its campaign for large-scale admission — 
combined with ever more vigorous denunciations of the Liberals' non-action 
in the matter. The paper's opening salvo in this renewed campaign came on 
the 24th, a Saturday. The editorial was entitled "Open Ontario's Doors". It 
began by denouncing the free world's reluctance to take the refugees fleeing 
Hungary as "inhuman" and said that Canada had "gone along with that 
inhumanity." Canada's continued insistence that the refugees meet existing 
immigration requirements and provide assurances that they will not be a 
"charge on the public purse" the papers' editors called "shame." The 
"Government of Canada," they went on, "has displayed the ... generosity of a 
codfish;" and they continued: 
We believe that [the people of Canada] want bold action on the 
refugees.... Believing that, we propose the Ontario Government 
rescue Ottawa from its hypocracy.... We propose that Ontario 
charter all the aircraft and shipping necessary — and bring here, at 
its own expense, every Hungarian refugee who... wishes to 
come.... Let Ontario feed and house them initially,... Then let them 
filter into the lifestream of this wealthy and expanding Province.... 
Let the Ontario Government tear away every artificial barrier as 
the Hungarians tore at Russian tanks. Let it fling the door wide, 
wide open.35 
Two days later the paper praised the government at Queen's Park for 
accepting the proposals to bring to Ontario, "at its own expense, every 
Hungarian refugee who... is willing to come." The Globe also announced that 
Premier Frost had instructed Major (retired) J. S. P. Armstrong, Ontario's 
Agent-General in London, England, to fly to Vienna to make arrangements. 
Next the paper's editors assured the readers that from the ilood of letters they 
had received it was evident that the people of Ontario are anxious to receive 
the refugees and to give them "...the biggest welcome we ever gave any-
body."36 
The Tory establishment in Toronto had thrown down the gauntlet. 
From London, they dispatched their official agent, and from Toronto they 
were about to send to Austria Yaremko to lend prestige and credibility to their 
plans. The Liberals in Ottawa saw through the Queen's Park Tories' scheme 
and they were not about to be shamed into doing, at the bidding of their 
political opponents, what the Canadian public was expecting their politicians 
to do. As one Liberal official remarked about Ottawa's response to Premier 
Frost's challenge: "Jack [Pickersgill] pulled the carpet out from under 
[Frost]..."37 and made sure that the initiative in admitting the Hungarians 
remained with his government. Indeed, when William M. Nickle, Ontario's 
Minister of Planning and Development, phoned Pickersgill informing him 
about the Ontario Government's plans for an air-lift, Pickersgill could tell him 
that the federal government had already "chartered all available aircraft".39 
A few weeks earlier St. Laurent had tasked Pearson to tackle Canada's 
Suez crisis, now he assigned his friend and confidant Pickersgill to solve 
Canada's Hungarian refugee predicament. Accordingly, Pickersgill swung into 
action. On the 26th, the day the Globe reported the measures taken by Queen's 
Park, he announced before the re-convened House of Commons that Canada 
will admit every Hungarian refugee who wanted to come to Canada. The next 
day a large meeting convened in Ottawa to discuss matters. It was attended by 
representatives of various government departments and agencies, provincial 
delegates, NGOs as well as leaders of the Hungarian community. At this 
meeting Pickersgill emphasized not so much what his government had done to 
accelerate the admission of refugees, but the tasks that would remain after 
they arrived, tasks with which the government needed all kinds of help, 
especially from the provinces and non-governmental agencies.40 Then 
Pickersgill left the meeting to attend a session of the House of Commons. 
The job of informing those in attendance about the steps the govern-
ment had taken fell to Laval Fortier, the Deputy Minister of Immigration and 
Citizenship, and the meeting's chairman, "...the Department," Fortier began, 
"has endeavoured to simplify immigration procedures and eliminate all but the 
most necessary paper work..." In addition, "[s]taff had been added to the 
Immigration office in Vienna..." and measures had been taken to find 
"additional office space;" further, aircraft have been chartered and much space 
had been booked on passenger ships leaving Europe for Canada. Last but not 
least Fortier added, the Department had dispatched one of its high-ranking 
officials to the Austrian capital to expedite "high level decisions 
immediately."41 Soon the government announced that it would go even 
further: Pickersgill himself would fly to Vienna to oversee the prompt 
processing of refugees.42 Of course, another unstated purpose of the trip was 
to counteract the impression that only Queen's Park sent high-level 
delegations there. And, one more development came on that fateful day, 
Tuesday the 27th. Near the end of the meeting described above, it was 
reported that Pickersgill had made a public announcement that the 
"government will pay the cost of [the refugees'] transportation [to Canada]."43 
The news came late in the day and couldn't make the Globe's headlines the 
next morning. It did on the following day: "Free Passage for Refugees; 
Pickersgill Flying to Vienna" proclaimed the paper's front page in large 
print.44 
In the closing days of November, 1956, Pickersgill had "thrown away 
the books" — the Canadian Immigration Act of 1952 allowed him to do so. He 
did so after weeks of seeming procrastination and governmental half-measures 
in the matter of the admission of Hungarian refugees. By taking dramatic 
action at this time, however, he and his government had pulled the rug from 
under the Toronto Tories' scheme to embarrass the Liberal administration in 
Ottawa. The rest, as they say, is history. Thousands of refugees were 
"processed" in December and many thousands followed in the next several 
months. 
The Aftermath 
The business of admitting and settling the Hungarian refugees was not all 
smooth sailing from late November 1956 on. The war of words between the 
two antagonists, instead of abating in early December, only escalated. Now it 
was the Liberals' turn to make the accusations. First came a salvo of charges 
by Pickersgill against the Toronto Tories, in particular against the delegations 
they had sent to Vienna. The minister's words were relayed to Canadians on 
the pages of the other Toronto mass-circulation paper, the Toronto Daily Star 
[hereafter: The Star], by Douglas Blanchard the paper's staff correspondent 
accompanying Pickersgill on his visit to Austria. 
First, the minister accused the Toronto Conservatives of playing 
partisan politics. "There is no room for politics here" he asserted. "The 
situation is much too serious [and the] urgency is much too pressing." He was 
especially bitter about Ontario Agent-General Armstrong who had been to 
Vienna before Pickersgill arrived there. The Star reporter described the 
minister's criticisms of this "once-over-lightly visitor" whose "arrival in 
Vienna was announced by Premier Frost before he [Armstrong] had even left 
England." Pickersgill grumbled about Austrian officials becoming 
"bewildered" about just which visitor from Canada was speaking for her 
government: "To Austrians all Canadians are Canadians and they still can't 
grasp of the fact that various parts of Canada have various axes to grind." 
Next the Minister of Immigration rebutted the accusations Armstrong 
had made after his "hasty tour" against the federal government's handling of 
the refugee crisis. Pickersgill went on: 
The Ontario government has made a series of announcements 
about its intention of speeding the entry of Hungarian refugees. So 
far, however, the nearest thing to action that has been seen over 
here is Major Armstrong's visit. It was announced today that he is 
coming back to Vienna, this time bringing with him John 
Yaremko.... 
The Star's correspondent then concluded his report by saying that Pickersgill 
would leave Austria as soon as his job was accomplished because, in the 
minister's words, "outside visitors merely hamper the work of the... 
overworked staff....". Concerning the minister's accomplishments, the reporter 
had a glowing assessment. According to him, Pickersgill left "Austrian 
officials... breathless. The refugee situation has been transformed over one 
w e e k - e n d . T h e next day the Star's editors also commented on the subject: 
This is no time for politics. Charges by the Ontario government's 
agent in England about the handling of the refugees have a 
partizan ring to them, considering his very short visit to the scene. 
It would be better for the provincial government to devote its 
energies to the task at hand.... 46 
William Nickle, Ontario's minister of Planning and Development, sent 
a clipping of the Star article of the 4th to Premier Frost with the comment that 
"Jack Pickersgill is rather critical of Mr. Armstrong." The minister added that 
he had instructed his officials not to give statements to the press regarding the 
Hungarian refugee situation before he drafted a statement, that he planned to 
show to Frost, "...so there will be no controversy develop between the Federal 
authorities and the Government of Ontario." No doubt, the debate was 
becoming embarrassing for the Tories and they now switched to "damage 
control" 
Damage control or not, by the second week of the month a more 
serious, new dispute had begun emerging between Ottawa and Queen's Park. 
It had to do with the defrayal of some of the costs involved in refugee re-
settlement. Interestingly, the Ontario provincial government that had been 
ready to "fly over" thousands of refugees at its own expense found the 
prospect of paying for some basic expenses incurred by the newcomers 
burdensome. The dispute was not resolved for months.48 
Misunderstandings and squabbles between different levels of 
government were not the only source of problems after November, 1956. 
There were difficulties associated with the settlement and integration of the 
refugees. Perhaps the most serious among these had to do with the culture-
shock many of them experienced after arrival in Canada. Hardships were often 
encountered especially by middle-aged and older persons, including the 
parents of the writer of these lines. Some refugees could repeat the complaint 
of a Hungarian immigrant of the 1920s who said in this connection that 
Canada gave newcomers from Hungary "material things" but little in the way 
of "spiritual solace".49 
Many of those who experienced culture-shock found it especially 
difficult to accept the fact that in Canada of the 'fifties there existed no cradle-
to-grave social safety net. There was no public health insurance, the state 
offered no help with finding employment, university students had to pay 
tuition fees, and so on. Some refugees came to regret their departure from 
Hungary. This is not surprising since many of them had no time to learn 
anything about Canada or even to mull over their decision to leave Hungary 
as they made this often in a day or less, or started toward the Austrian border 
simply because their friends had decided to do so. In this respect more 
problems were encountered with the refugees than with the members of any 
other wave of previous Hungarian arrivals.51' In time, however, most of these 
difficulties were resolved. 
Conclusions 
In November of 1956 the massive influx of Hungarian refugees into Austria 
developed first into an Austrian and then into an international crisis that 
affected all the countries of the Free World. The development soon began to 
have serious repercussions in Canada. The country's Liberal administration 
was slow to react to this crisis. It tried to deflect public criticism of its seeming 
lack of concern with half measures. As late as the beginning of the Cabinet 
meeting of the 28th of November, Minister of Immigration Jack Pickersgill 
could tell his colleagues that "Canada was the only country which had not 
offered free passage to Hungarian refugees" who wanted to come to the 
country.51 
Actually, Prime Minister St. Laurent's government had been stag-
gering, one might say meandering toward a policy liberal refugee admission 
for some time before the last days of November. Manifestations of this trend 
were numerous. Certain members of the Liberal establishment were keen on 
such a policy. As has been mentioned, among the members of the Cabinet 
there was Pearson. Among the high-profile bureaucrats there was Jules Leger 
of the Department of External Affairs.52 Certain plans and actions of the 
Liberals also pointed in this direction. The proposal to send Pickersgill to 
Austria emerged as early as the middle of the month. On the 22nd the Cabinet 
agreed to ask Parliament to increase the funds allotted for Hungarian relief 
(includi ng the refugees) from the $200,000 earmarked earlier to one million.53 
The next day the Cabinet agreed to speed up the flow of refugees by, among 
other things, the hiring of aircraft to bring them over from Europe. 4 
The crowning moves in this process, the agreement to bring here 
every refugee who wanted to come, and to provide free transport for them, 
however, were not made until the last days of the month, after it became 
obvious that if Ottawa did not act, Queen's Park would. But, in this jockeying 
for the higher moral ground, the Liberals were not to be outdone, hence the 
measures announced by Pickersgill and the government in the evening of the 
27th and the following two days.55 These measures resulted in Canada 
admitting more Hungarian 56-ers relative to its population than any other 
country in the Americas or Western Europe. They also assured that these 
Hungarian fugitives received the "biggest welcome" ever accorded to refugees 
by Canada. Lastly and more importantly, the measures taken at the time by the 
federal government assured that credit for all this would go not to the Toronto 
Tories but to the ruling Liberal administration in Ottawa. 
At this point it might be worth asking what can be considered as the 
real historical catalyst of the "biggest welcome" that had been extended to the 
Hungarian refugees in the fall of 1956? If we had to answer this question in 
fifty words or less we could say that it was a political row between the Tory 
Party's Ontario branch and the leadership of the Liberal Party in Ottawa. It 
was more than the latter being spooked by the actions of the former. There 
was a meanness underlying the actions of both sides. First it was the Tories of 
Queen's Park who wanted to embarrass their federal counterparts. Then it was 
the latter who wanted to inflict political damage on their adversaries. If we 
want to reduce the conflict to personalities we might say that the catalyst of 
the events of late November was the by-product of enmity between Leslie 
Frost, the most powerful Tory politician in the country, and Jack Pickersgill, 
arguably the second most powerful Liberal politician in Ottawa. Their clash 
produced, almost as an incidental side-effect, a chain of events that we can 
truly call the "biggest welcome" ever accorded to refugees in Canada's history. 
In the way of further conclusions to this story of "the biggest welcome 
ever" we might ask who were its foremost beneficiaries? There can be little 
doubt that they were not the politicians involved. They were the some 38,000 
fugitives of the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956 who ended up as 
newcomers to Canada.36 They came to a country where they, or at least most 
of them, found political freedom and opportunities for economic advancement 
— as well as for personal fulfilment. 
Another obvious beneficiary of the arrival of a great number of 1956 
refugees was Hungarian-Canadian society. Despite the stresses the influx of 
thousands of Hungarians with their different attitudes and value systems had 
caused, the Hungarian-Canadian society that had pre-dated 1956 — many of 
whose communities were on the verge of complete cultural assimilation — 
was reinvigorated by the coming of the 56-ers. 
The greatest beneficiary, however, was Canada. First of all, the 
country gained experience in how to handle the admission and re-settlement 
of large masses of newcomers at the time of a serious refugee crisis in the 
world. This experience would be used time and again, as for example during 
the crisis of the Vietnamese boat people. But Canada also benefited from the 
admission of many, often well-trained young Hungarians, especially the 
students whom Pickersgill was fond of admitting. Most of them made 
valuable contributions to Canada, and the contributions of some were 
remarkable.58 And, as a group, the 56-ers helped to make Canada what it 
became in the second half of the 20th century: a truly pluralistic, multicultural 
society where not only the native-born but also immigrants could fulfil their 
dreams. 
It must be added to this analysis that, indirectly and in the long term, 
Hungary also benefited from the settlement of the 1956 refugees in Canada. 
The story of the demise of communism in Hungary some thirty-three years 
later is a complex one. There can be little doubt however, that the refugees 
who had come to Canada in 1956 and 1957 made a contribution to the 
weakening of communist rule in that country. They were instrumental above 
all for undermining the isolation that Hungary's rulers wished to impose on 
their people. Through their contacts with their relatives and friends in 
Hungary, through their frequent visits to the country and, especially, through 
their habit of bringing their loved ones for visits to Canada, the refugees 
spread a knowledge of life in Western democracies, as well as of western 
ideas, among the population of Hungary. All this no doubt helped to weaken 
the hold of communist ideology on her people and helped to undermine 
communist rule there.V) The end of communism in Hungary came in 1989, a 
little more than three decades after the Revolution of 1956 and the flight of the 
refugees. 
As a final observation on the subject of the Hungarian Revolution and 
the coming of its refugees to Canada a few words might be said about the 
Suez Crisis. Few people realize that there is an ironic connection between this 
crisis and the admission of the Hungarian refugees to Canada. Most students 
of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 agree that the Suez Crisis contributed to 
the Soviets' decision to crush the revolt in Hungary.60 At the same time, the 
Suez Crisis also contributed to the Canadian government's decision to admit a 
large number of Hungarian refugees. The fact was that during that crisis 
substantial elements of the Canadian public sympathized with Great Britain 
and France and approved of their intervention in Egypt. The government in 
Ottawa, however, found it both reprehensible and impolitic to back the British 
and the French. Canada's leaders, and especially Prime Minister St. Laurent, 
felt that the intervention in Egypt smacked of colonial adventurism, while 
they also felt obliged to side with Washington on this issue and oppose 
London and Paris' stand. 
The Ottawa government's position on the Suez Crisis stood to under-
mine the Liberal Party's prospects in the forthcoming federal election. When 
the debate about admitting the refugees of the Hungarian Revolution emerged 
into national limelight, the Liberals had to make sure that on this issue they 
would not be going against the grain of Canadian public opinion as they had 
with their initial policies concerning the Suez crisis. In other words, the 
Liberal government's stand on Suez made the adoption of a generous refugee 
policy in November of 1956 more necessary for a political party concerned 
about potential popular support in the forthcoming election. 
Despite their being on the side of the angels on the issue of the 
admission of Hungarian refugees in the fall of 1956, the Liberals lost the 
election in 1957. That they did so probably had little to do with what they had 
or hadn't done for the Hungarian refugees. Other issues were no doubt more 
important. Above all, after five consecutive terms of Liberal rule, the 
Canadian public was ready to hand power to the Conservatives. Under the 
new Tory government of John G. Diefenbaker, a generous admission policy 
concerning Hungarians did not survive. Soon after the election, unemploy-
ment levels went up in Canada and politicians in Ottawa were worried about a 
further influx of newcomers who would swell the number of people on public 
relief. 
This situation caused grief to the last of the Hungarian refugees who, 
after the Austro-Hungarian border had been sealed by Soviet and communist 
Hungarian security forces, had to make their way to socialist but not Soviet-
dominated Yugoslavia. There such "anti-communists" were certainly not 
welcome, but they were not returned to Hungary because the Yugoslav regime 
did not want to offend Western public opinion. Never-the-less, these fugitives 
had to move on from Yugoslavia as soon as there were countries willing to 
take them. By this time, however, the entry of further groups of Hungarians 
into Canada was no longer a potential election issue and those among the 
refugees who wanted to come to this country had to wait, in most cases for a 
long time.61 
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refugees the "biggest welcome we ever gave anybody." These developments 
amounted to an attempt by the Toronto Tory establishment to embarrass the 
ruling Liberal Party in Ottawa in anticipation of the federal election campaign 
of 1957. 
Mr. Yaremko's mission to Austria, the subject of Appendix II, had its 
origins in this same plot but, by the time it took place, it did not play any role 
in it. That is, it had minimum impact on provincial-federal relations and the 
jockeying between Canada's two main political parties for popular support 
among the country's electorate. Nevertheless it probably had an effect on 
public opinion. It might have persuaded those members of the Ontario 
Legislature who were not quite convinced of the wisdom of bringing 
thousands of Hungarian refugees to the province that it was all right to do so, 
that the Province was capable of absorbing such an influx of newcomers and 
that the refugees would be capable of adjusting to Canadian life. The 
circumstance that the report's author was himself a child of East European 
immigrants was important. Yaremko was proof positive of the fact that 
"ethnics" can adjust to Canadian life and succeed in this country as well as 
any WASP individual can. 
His report, however, has further significance. For us two generations 
later it is a storehouse of first-hand information on the conditions that refugees 
from Hungary faced in their attempts to escape from communist rule, and the 
conditions they found awaiting them in Austrian refugee camps. The report 
also gives some information on how Austrian officials dealt with the refugee 
crisis of the fall and early winter of 1956, as well as on how Canadian officials 
in Austria tackled the difficult situation — the masses of fugitives far in excess 
of what anyone was prepared for — they encountered at the time. 
In discussing the coming of the 1956 refugees to Canada it should be 
emphasized that Hungarians were fortunate to have had a man such as 
Yaremko to speak on their behalf in the inner circles of power in Canada's 
largest city and richest province. If indeed, as Mr. Yaremko claims, the idea of 
establishing an air-lift was implanted in the mind of Premier Frost by him, and 
perhaps also indirectly in the minds of the editors of the Globe newspaper, he 
certainly played a significant role in the chain of events that led to Canada's 
decision to welcome the refugees with generosity unparalleled in the country's 
history. What exactly happened in this connection might never become 
completely clear. The documents dealing with the subject of Hungarian 
refugees in the records of the Government of Ontario are silent on this matter. 
We do not have the memoirs written by Leslie Frost or his right-hand-man in 
this matter William M. Nickle. Federal documents relating to the subject, 
though they are more abundant and a lot more accessible than the provincial 
ones, are also silent on the subject — obviously as no one in Ottawa knew 
what transpired behind the scenes in Toronto. Whatever direct role Mr. 
Yaremko played in the events of the third week of November may never be 
documented precisely, but his influence thereafter can only be considered as 
positive from the point of view of the story of the 1956 Hungarian refugee 
movement to Canada. 
* * * 
As a final comment on this story I feel compelled to make a few personal 
observations. In studying this subject I am in the rare position of being both 
an eye-witness and a historian. My role as an eye-witness was nearly 
insignificant as I had no access to the decision-makers in 1956, aside from the 
odd lowly Canadian official who interviewed us or guided us through the 
processes of applying for admission and travelling to Canada. I was a silent 
and passive — and, above all, a bewildered — observer of events that were to 
impact greatly my future and the future of my parents and brother. 
The members of my family were among those Hungarian refugees 
who made a decision to leave Hungary very suddenly. The person responsible 
for this determination was above all my father. He had grown tired of a 
regime that came to regulate all aspects of life and stifled personal initiative in 
our country. My mother was more hesitant. What will happen to our 
belongings? she was inclined to ask, while I thought only of the difficulty of 
learning new languages abroad — by then I had been on to my fourth foreign 
language in school (English), and I was not making much progress, just as I 
had not been very successful with the first, second, and third. But we agreed 
to leave together, unlike some families I know, including my wife's, that could 
not reach such an agreement and were torn apart in the fall of 1956. 
The actual process of our escape from Hungary was interesting, even 
though in hindsight it was not filled with the dangers and hardships most 
refugees had experienced. First of all we lived in a small town called Csorna 
quite close to the Austrian border. Secondly, our escape was well-planned and 
executed. What happened was that several days after it became obvious that 
communist rule would be re-established in Hungary and the Austrian border 
was becoming more and more perilous to cross, my father's superior at work 
came to tell us that a truck would leave our town that night to take people to 
the border. After we agreed to go, the truck did appear in our yard and, under 
the cover of the darkness of the night, we got into its back. The truck's other 
occupants were members of Csorna's Jewish community, people of all ages 
including infants. Our inclusion in this venture must have been the result of 
my father's good standing with the leaders of Csorna's Jews. 
The truck, accompanied by look-outs who were riding motorcycles, 
proceeded to the Austrian border on back roads. It arrived there in the middle 
of the night. When we got off to continue our flight on foot across a makeshift 
bridge over a small stream I noticed a few Hungarian border guards — much 
to my horror. But, they just urged us on in the direction of an Austrian border 
post on the other side. They might have been bribed, but I will never know. 
We arrived at a school building in the village of Pamhagen (known as 
Pomogy to its many Magyar residents) from where a family of Hungarian 
peasants took my parents, me and my brother to their home and let us sleep a 
few hours in what must have been their own, and possibly only, bedroom. I 
would love to thank them in print now, but we had soon lost their name and 
address. 
The next day buses took the refugees assembled the previous night in 
Pamhagen to Vienna. There, we and a few other families were put up in a 
small hotel in the city's historic section. All this was very civilized when 
compared to the conditions Mr. Yaremko encountered on his visit to Hungari-
an refugee camps, probably only a few days later. 
We then made a decision to come to Canada, despite the urging of 
one of my father's brothers that we should emigrate to South America. We 
were "processed" in a short time and were on our way to Toronto, by air. I 
wonder now whether we ever crossed paths with any members of the 
Canadian delegations that were visiting Austria at the time. 
Looking back, I have never doubted the wisdom of our decisions in 
November of 1956, both the decision to leave communist Hungary and the 
one to come to Canada. 
After studying the political circumstances that made my family's entry 
into Canada in the fall of 1956 not only possible but quite smooth, I am still 
not entirely sure which of contemporary Canada's politicians to thank first and 
foremost: Jack Pickersgill, "Mike" Pearson, Leslie Frost, or Mr. John Yarem-
ko. More importantly, I am not certain as to what circumstance I should 
attribute the "big welcome" we got, but I strongly suspect that this would have 
to be the Canadian political expediencies of the day more than any other 
factor. 
Appendix I 
Globe and Mail editorials, 24 and 26 November 1956 
Open Ontario's Doors 
Only one word can properly describe the free world's reluctance to accept the 
refugees fleeing from tortured Hungary. It is inhuman — and Canada has gone along 
with that inhumanity. 
What has this great, rich, half-empty country offered the 60,000 Hungarians 
now crowded into little Austria? They will be given "top priority" — if they can meet 
the Canadian Government's immigration requirements. Additional airline flights will 
be provided for them — if they can show they will not become a charge on the public 
purse. 
For shame! In its response to Hungary's tragedy, the Government of Canada 
has displayed the warmth and generosity of a codfish. 
How about the people of Canada? We believe they want bold action on the 
refugees. We believe they are willing, eager, to go the whole way. Believing that, we 
propose the Ontario Government rescue Ottawa from its hypocrisy — as the Ontario 
Government did once before. 
Nine years ago. Ontario chartered a fleet of United States and Canadian airplanes to 
fly Britons to new jobs, new homes, new hopes in this Province. We say: Re-
establish that airlift! 
We propose that Ontario charter all the aircraft and shipping necessary and 
bring here, at its own expense, every Hungarian refugee who is able to travel and 
wishes to come. If they need sponsorship under Ottawa's cold-hearted immigration 
rules, let the Ontario Government be the sponsor. 
Let Ontario feed and house them initially, as Austria is doing now. Then let 
them filter into the lifestream of this wealthy and expanding Province. They will 
represent a meagre 1 per cent of its population. 
Will they be good citizens? They have proved their worth as citizens in one 
of history's classic struggles. They have fought for freedom bare-handed against 
tanks. 
Young or old, sick or well, skilled or unskilled — there is room in this 
Province, there are care and love and opportunity in this Province, for all of them. 
Let the Ontario Government tear away every artificial barrier as the Hungarians tore 
at the Russian tanks. Let it fling the door wide, wide open. 
Saturday, November 24, 1956 
Action! 
We warmly applaud the Ontario Government for the quick action it has taken to 
implement our proposal-made in a front-page editorial on Saturday — that this 
Province should accept as immigrants, and bring here at its own expense, every 
Hungarian refugee who is able to travel and willing to come. 
At Premier Frost's instructions, the Ontario Agent-General in London, Mr. J. 
S. P. Armstrong, is flying to Vienna to make preliminary arrangements. There will be 
problems-getting aircraft appears to be difficult but we are sure they will be 
overcome. They have got to be overcome for-as is evident by the flood of letters this 
newspaper received over the weekend-the people of Ontario are most anxious the 
Hungarians should come here, and are willing to pay whatever it costs to bring them. 
Those who can work will find plenty to do in this rapidly expanding 
Province. Those who cannot, will be looked after by the many organizations which 
exist for that purpose. Young or old, sick or well, let them come as many as possible, 
as soon as possible. They will get the biggest welcome we ever gave anybody. 
Monday, November 26, 1956. 
Appendix II 
John Yaremko?s Report on his 
Mission to Austria 
ONTARIO LEGISLATURE, DEBATES 
Report on Hungary Refugees 
MR. J. YAREMKO: Mr. Speaker, The mission on which I embarked on December 3, 
1956, was brought about, as the hon. Prime Minister has said, by a series of events 
which, I believe, will form a shining chapter in the history of the peoples of the 
world. 
October 23, 1956, a group of students and workmen in the city of Budapest, 
Hungary, demonstrating against Communist oppression, were fired upon, and a 
rebellion flared up. 
The news broke upon the world — that a small nation had not only stood up 
against, but was willing to "take on", the Russian Communist juggernaut — yes, a 
small nation, indeed, of 10 million people, occupying only 26,000 square miles, 
which is about the same size as the state of Ohio. In comparison, Ontario has 260,000 
square miles of land area alone,... 
Daily, the news of the heroic struggle came to us, until, on November 1st, it 
seemed that the rebelling people of Hungary were in control. 
Then, on November 4th, the Kremlin ordered its siege guns to smash the 
rebellion. Then began that epic struggle, which the world was able to see for the first 
time, of hands battling against tanks, rifles against siege guns. On November 14th the 
rebellion was smashed. 
But the people of Hungary have continued the struggle. It continues even as 
we meet here today, and as the history of Hungary has shown it will continue. 
But although they were beaten, they had shaken the system of Communism 
to its core, and in one stroke they had ripped a good-sized piece from the mask of 
Communism so that the world could again see the evil which lay behind it. 
We in the western world have been fortunate. We have lived only in the 
shadow of the threats of Russian Communism; but there are tens of millions of 
people who have suffered directly from Communist oppression — the peoples of 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, East Germany, Roumania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, 
Byelorussia, and others. We have heard the rumblings through the years, and in 
Hungary the rumblings flared up into a wide open struggle. On November 14th the 
rebellion was smashed, and as deportations, and the threats of deportation increased, 
the mass exodus of refugees began... within the first 10 days some 60,000 had 
crossed into Austria. 
As the hon. Prime Minister [Leslie M. Frost] has pointed out, a wave of 
sympathy and of responsibility swept through Canada. In Ontario, the hon. Prime 
Minister, the great humanitarian that he is, set up the machinery. On November 26th 
the hon. Minister of Planning and Development (Mr. Nickle) and his staff went into 
action. On November 28th the hon. Prime Minister announced that I would be 
Vienna-bound; on Thursday Mr. Bottlik was selected; on Friday and Saturday travel 
arrangements were completed; and on Monday we were at the airport on our way to 
Vienna. 
I should like to say a word or two about Mr. Bottlik,... 
Mr. Bottlik, as a very young man, came to Canada some 7 years ago. He 
completed his education at the University of Toronto on a scholarship, graduating in 
the honour course in philosophy and psychology. Prior to his arrival in Canada he 
had served with the International Refugee Organization in the welfare department, 
and at the time of his selection he was associated with the Hungarian Relief Fund. He 
is a man who is very fluent in languages — Hungarian, English and German. He 
proved of invaluable assistance to me not only as an interpreter but as a direct 
assistant. 
From London we were joined by the Agent-General for Ontario, Mr. James 
P. Armstrong, who is so well-known to so many hon. members of this House, and to 
whom I should like to pay tribute. His knowledge and experience proved invaluable. 
His staff attended to the administrative details superbly. Mr. Armstrong mercilessly 
drove himself to make sure that we got all the facts expeditiously and thoroughly. 
Prior to and during our trip, Mr. Speaker, many persons rendered a great 
deal of assistance. I am limited by time alone in spelling them out. 
After conferring with [Norman A. Robertson] the [Canadian] High 
Commissioner in London we proceeded to Bonn, Germany, where we met with [Jack 
Pickersgill] the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, who had only the day 
before arrived from Vienna. He told us of the situation as he had seen it, and 
described to us the new arrangements that he had made. 
We took leave of him and went on to Vienna. At the airport in Vienna — we 
arrived late that afternoon — a remarkable coincidence occurred. Waiting at the 
airport for the first TCA [Trans Canada Airlines] plane to take them to Toronto, 
Ontario, were a group of refugees, and the plane they were waiting for was the same 
plane one that had flown us across the Atlantic. 
Mr. Speaker, as you will recall, this was the group which, because of 
weather conditions, landed in Windsor and were driven to Toronto for their 
reception. 
It was very heart-warming indeed when I returned to Toronto to see in the 
newspapers pictures of the men, women and children to whom I had bid bon voyage 
at the airport. 
At the airport, I learned from a TCA official that these refugees had been 
waiting all day very patiently without a mid-day meal. It was my pleasure at that time 
to arrange for a light meal to he made available for all of them; and I am sure that 
every hon. member of the House would have done the same. 
The next morning, in Vienna proper, we visited the offices in order to gain 
as much background material as possible. Quite naturally we visited, first of all, the 
visa section of the Canadian Embassy legation there. As we approached the building 
we saw outside a long queue of some 100 persons waiting to get in. We entered into 
discussion with them, and they showed us their eagerness to go to Canada. Some of 
them had envelopes with addresses of people in the province of Ontario. 
We proceeded into the building and were able to see the visa officers going 
through the procedure of processing the refugees. The administrative procedures had 
been shortened quite drastically over the weekend by the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, and the officers were very expeditiously dealing with refugees. 
It was a coincidence — and a very handy coincidence — that almost every 
Hungarian refugee carried, as they do in police states, an identity card which, in some 
respects, is quite similar to a passport, so that the examining officers were able, in 
very short order, to obtain the necessary details. 
We saw in an adjoining office an officer of the Inter-Governmental Com-
mittee on European Migration, and he was very expeditiously arranging the 
allocation of visaed refugees to transport, present and future. 
We also visited another office — a very large hall that had been taken over at 
the time — where a great many refugees were being very speedily examined and 
processed. 
From there we proceeded to the office of the League of the Red Cross 
Societies, where we met Mrs. Marguerite Wilson, a Canadian who is seconded to the 
League from the Canadian Red Cross for liaison purposes. She described to us the 
facilities and the machine that had been installed — a Telex machine — whereby the 
name, age and sex of each immigrant — each refugee — could be very rapidly trans-
mitted to Geneva and to Toronto. 
Mrs. Wilson described to us at that time the arrangements that were being 
made for the League of Red Cross Societies to take over the care of many of the 
camps. Just before 1 left the continent, a great number of nations, including our 
Canadian Red Cross Society, had taken over camps, and they had managed to 
arrange for the care of half of the refugees. 
From there we went to the offices of the Inter-governmental Committee on 
European Migration — commonly known as ICEM — which handles transportation 
matters for the governments which are members and which want to make use of its 
facilities. They handle al! the bus transportation to and from camps and in Vienna. 
They handle the trains from Vienna and some other towns in Austria; the planes; the 
booking of ships and the berths on ships. 
The ICEM is a very efficient organization created for the job it is doing. It is 
so efficient that within 3 days after Canada decided to make use of its facilities, 
ICEM was able to arrange transportation for 3,545 refugees, which was the full quota 
that Canada had set for the month of December. 
It was seeing the inter-governmental committee in operation which led me 
to believe in the efficiency of a world organization dealing with a world problem on a 
world basis — in this case, transportation alone. 
That afternoon we visited Mr. Herman Czedik of the Ministry of the Interior 
of Austria. It struck me very forcibly that he assumed quite casually the tremendous 
burden which Austria had assumed. To him, there was no other right thing to do 
except what Austria was doing. The generosity of Austria is phenomenal, when yon 
consider that on the map it would fit in between Toronto and Windsor. It had 
permitted 150,000 refugees to cross the border and was trying to cope with all of the 
problems of care and housing that ensued. 
Mr. Czedik was very pleased at the action that Canada had taken that week 
end, and his face lighted up when I told him of the interest of the people of the 
province of Ontario. 
We visited with the Deputy High Commissioner of the United Nations who 
was dealing with refugees. He, too, was extremely happy about the action taken by 
Canada that week end. He told us of the great shortage of funds. 
Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of the record, I would like to state that we 
were scrupulously careful not to interfere in the slightest degree with the work of any 
office that we visited. We did it only at their convenience and not at ours. 
That night we visited the Hungarian-Austrian border. We arrived there 
shortly after midnight, at a point called Klingen Bach, because we heard that it was 
one point where the refugees would he crossing in the evenings. It is about 200 yards 
within the Austrian border. 
We found a small barrack-like hut in which there were, indeed, 13 refugees 
who had arrived earlier that night. We saw them as they lay there on mattresses on 
the floor. We had just come up to the barracks and it was cold, windy and pitch dark. 
I am sure the rural hon. members of this House are fully familiar with what it means 
to be alone in an area which is in pitch-black darkness. 
A little distance away, the Austrian guards were huddled over their stove at 
their sentry hut. 
We wondered how people could subject their bodies to travelling across a 
pitch-dark area of mud and swamp, through bush, across [ploughed] fields, because 
they certainly were not travelling along the highways. 
I recall an incident we had heard the day before, which indicates the extent 
to which people were willing to go. A mother had crossed with a small child, and in 
order that the cries of the child might not arouse attention, she had given the child a 
sedative. It had been too strong; and it was only because she had crossed at a point 
where medical attention was immediately available that the child's life was saved. 
There these people lay on the floor, exhausted, sound asleep. We did not 
disturb them. Their clothes were piled at the sides of their mattresses. Their weary 
bodies were at rest. 
The Austrian guard within this little barracks showed us the food that was 
available — a very thin soup, some pieces of bread, and apples. 
We tiptoed out of that barrack hut, Mr. Speaker, and I may say that the trip 
back to Vienna in the small hours was a very quiet one, because each of us was 
rapped in the thoughts of what we had seen at two o'clock in the morning on the 
Austrian-Hungarian border. 
Let me say a word at this time about the movement of refugees within 
Austria. The border itself is about 168 miles long, and it is about 120 miles from 
Budapest to the border, and another 50 miles from the border to Vienna. About 90 
per cent, of the crossings are made during the night. 
As I have described, the refugees crossing the border are tired and 
exhausted, and they end up in these little points of refuge — in this case a barrack hut 
at Klingen Bach — which are along the border. Such a point may be a church, a barn, 
a village hall — whatever type of accommodation is possible; and when the people 
get across the border, they rest. 
The next day they are taken inwards usually to a village where a number of 
them may be collected; and from there, with transportation by carts or buses, they are 
taken to the first line reception centre. The refugees are then able to dry their clothes, 
get new clothes, be medically examined to some degree, and have a little better food. 
Subsequently they are taken to another camp, Camp No. 2, with slightly 
better quarters, where they get warmer clothing, and are probably able to wash for 
the first time. 
These people wait to be moved to Camp No. 3 where ICEM, the inter-
governmental department, takes over, and the countries that are interested send their 
visa officers to examine the refugees and issue the visas. Also, some from that camp 
might go to a holding camp such as there is in Wiener Neustadt for those who wish to 
emigrate to Canada; a holding camp is for people who have been visaed but who are 
waiting for future transportation. 
This is a system which was set up of necessity because the refugees were 
crossing the border in a continuous stream. The procedure had to be kept up to move 
them further and further away from the border as the new refugees arrived. 
The next day, we visited one of these first-line reception centres at a place 
called Eisenstadt; through which by that time some 55,000 refugees had passed. 
Because refugees passed through so quickly and in numbers far exceeding its 
capacity, conditions there were appalling. 
As we entered the gates we, of course, were met by many refugees who 
began asking questions and asked us to assist them. The guard at the gate told us that, 
if we wished to proceed through the camp with any expedition at all, we should 
remove our arm bands in order to be able to move in and out. 
There were groups of refugees everywhere. The place was jammed to the 
hilt, and although it was late evening we were told that no more could be taken in 
that night. We went into the buildings where the beds were crowded side by side so 
that there was scarcely any room to move. We listened to the welfare officer tell us 
some pathetic stories. 
We saw 4 young lads with very long faces standing in a corner. Upon in-
quiring what was the trouble, we were told that although accommodation was 
available for these young boys at Salzburg, some 200 miles away, because they were 
students, they were unable to go because no money was available for transportation. I 
may say that each one of the four of us reached in our pockets and paid out 100 
schillings apiece, the equivalent of $4, in order to pay for those boys' transportation. I 
wish the, hon. members could have seen how the faces of those boys lighted up when 
they were told what had been done. 
We proceeded through the halls where people were lined up for the 
distribution of clothing, and it was so crowded we could scarcely pass. 
We walked into a room which I shall never forget — a room that was filled 
with tubs and basins, and with clothes for the children and babies, on tables. This was 
where the babies were washed. Babies, throughout the trek in their mothers' arms, 
had no opportunity of any cleanliness at all; yet in the frightful surroundings of these 
camps they were able to get the attention and care that every mother wants for her 
child. 
We saw the staff working, and you could see they were weary almost to the 
point of collapse. We saw the food being handed out — very rough in form. 
Everywhere, as soon as people — refugees — knew who we were, they asked 
questions and asked for assistance. 
Gradually we passed through the refugees within the building and went out 
into the fresh air; and it was good to he able to breathe that fresh air, and for us, from 
Canada, it was difficult to understand why it is that human beings should he 
subjected to such conditions. 
As we were leaving the camp the refugees followed us up to the gates, 
asking questions and requesting assistance. 
Earlier that day we had visited two other camps that were in the process of 
being readied for occupation. The one at Trieskirchen, although not yet completed, 
was already overcrowded with 4,000 refugees; and the camp at Wiener Neustadt, 
which Canada was taking over as a holding camp, although it was in a very 
uncompleted stage. The first bus load of refugees was driven up while we were 
visiting. 
Those camps are typical of those I saw in Austria — some 65. Of these, only 
about 6 or 8 are actually habitable. 
The word "camp" may lead to a little misconception. They are not camps as 
we understand them. They are old public buildings, old army barracks, or old 
buildings left from Hitler's occupation. Some have been unused, perhaps for many 
years. They include buildings of almost any kind that have been unused and ignored 
through the years; and suddenly they have had to be made usable. A great many of 
them had been occupied by the Russian occupation forces in Austria, and prior to 
their evacuation from Austria they had ripped the "guts" out of every building they 
had occupied — ripped out the electricity, plumbing, water and heating systems-and 
all this had to be replaced in order to make the place even livable. 
The accommodation in these camps is as I have described. In the first-line 
camps the refugees sleep on floors; the second-line camps function as I have told 
you; in the third-line camps there is some separation of families and a little more 
room to move. 
The staff is made up of Austrian civil servants, Red Cross organizers, volun-
teer workers and members of international agencies. 
The discipline in the camps we saw was very good. The refugees were 
participating in the work around the buildings. We were told that they cooperated and 
were very honest. 
In Trieskirchen, although it was crowded, there was a very large room 
which had been set aside as a chapel for the use of all denominations. At the time we 
were there, a very large class was in progress. 
Everywhere in the camps electricians and plumbers were doing their best to 
beat the winter season which was rapidly closing in. I may say that the sights in the 
camps made a tremendous impact on me. Seldom have 1 suffered such an emotional 
impact, and I am sure that any hon. member of this House or any citizen of Ontario 
would have had the same emotional impact. I am sure that the policy of the United 
States of America will he influenced by the fact that Vice-President Nixon has visited 
the camps. 
Early in the course of the trip we had heard of the Hungarian University of 
Sopron, about 7 miles from the Austrian border. After the revolution had been 
quelled, a decision was reached, and the university as a whole — staff, students and 
dependents — crossed the border en masse into Austria and were stationed as a unit 
near Salzburg. 
We proceeded to Salzburg to see them; arriving there, we stayed overnight, 
and in the morning made our way to the building in Strohl where the students were. 
As we opened the door, the most surprising thing of the whole trip hap-
pened: sitting at the entrance to this door were the 4 young lads for whom we had 
provided transportation back in Eisenstadt. 
Again, these lads had the longest of faces. As we walked in they jumped up 
in amazement and besieged us with words. Gradually we were able to make out the 
story. They had been misdirected and should not have been in this camp at all, 
because it was for the university alone. Staff, students and dependents would soon he 
dispersed, and no provision could he made for the lads to stay on. 
We assured them, as we felt some personal responsibility for their welfare — 
after all, we had paid their transportation to that place — that we would see what 
arrangements could be made for them. 
We then discovered the university staff were quartered some 10 miles away. 
We wished to see them first, so we drove to their quarters. At that very time 
arrangements were being completed for the Faculty of Forestry to go to British 
Columbia. Many had already left for England, Switzerland and Sweden. These 
mining professors were, of course, wondering where they would end up. 
We had long chats with them, and many questions about Canada and On-
tario were asked, and then we took our leave of them — however, not before asking 
the senior professor to check to see where these 4 boys were supposed to have gone. 
We discovered they should have been directed to a camp for high school 
students 20 miles on the other side of Salzburg. We had agreed to take care of the 
boys and make sure they arrived safely. 
As we walked out of the building who should be sitting on the side of the 
road but the same 4 youths, with desperate looks on their faces. Somehow they had 
travelled this 10 miles; it was a mystery how they got there, but they had the idea we 
were their only single hope. We assured them that if they stayed on the spot we 
would pick them up and look after them. 
Then we proceeded to the camp where the students were assembled, and we 
had lengthy conversations with them. As it was getting late we bid them good-bye 
and wished them the best of luck no matter where they might end up, and proceeded 
back to St. Wolfgang. 
Stopping at St. Wolfgang, we picked up the 4 lads and drove to Salzburg. 
We left them at the bus station and gave them a few schillings for their fare, and 
watched as they cheerfully walked up the street. I have since often wondered about 
them, and sincerely hope they indeed did find a place of refuge. 
As to the statistics on the refugees themselves, those which I have are, of 
course, as of December 10th, and since then have increased. In order to give you, Mr. 
Speaker, some conception of the problem at that time, these are the figures: 
As of December 10th, some 122,000 had arrived: 48,000 had left, and 
74,000 still remained in Austria. They were crossing the border at the rate, at that 
time, of 2,000 to 3,000 a night, and departing from Austria at the rate of about 3,000 
or 4,000 a day. 
The immediate problem, of course, was to move the refugees out of the 
small country because of the vast numbers coming in, and the neighbouring nations, 
as the hon. Prime Minister has pointed out, began to admit them. I give these figures 
from recollection, but I believe that Switzerland immediately took 10,000, Holland 
5,000, France 5,000, Italy 4,000, Germany 6,000, the United Kingdom 11,000, and 
the United States of America, of course, was then committed to 21,500. 
The intake was fluctuating at that time depending on how tightly the 
Russians were patrolling the border, and as soon as they tightened at one spot, of 
course, the refugees moved on to another spot. It is difficult to have a guard along 
108 miles. 
However, at the time we were there it dropped overnight, and it was dis-
covered the Russians had erected a false Austrian border within the Hungarian 
border, with signs posted up, and then the refugees would think they had crossed the 
border, enter into the open, and then be taken into custody. At that time most of the 
refugees were coming from Budapest, but they were gradually coming from further 
back, behind and inland. 
The breakdown at that time as to type of refugees was this: about 70 per 
cent, were males around 30 years of age — either a little under or a little more — boys 
and single men. Only about 5 percent, were young, single women; about 15 percent, 
were married men with wives and children, and some 10 per cent, were married 
women and children. About 5 per cent, were over the age of 50, and of these only 2 
per cent, were really medical cases. 
The refugees were, in the main, young-looking and healthy, very poorly 
clothed, and most of them carried very few personal possessions. Very few spoke 
other than Hungarian. Many were labourers, these were of many skills and many 
trades. The women appeared industrious, were very quiet, and very much concerned 
about their children. The long period of oppression with no freedom and no 
economic future, and the fear of deportation, explains the type of refugees who were 
in Austria at that time. 
Parents in Hungary were sending their children out of the country, and there 
were many young people between the ages of 11 and 15 who joined other refugees 
and crossed the border with them. It is these, generally speaking, who will present a 
particular problem to the nations of the world. Who is going to look after their 
education, and find foster families for them ? There were, of course, as the hon. 
members know, very few children available for adoption because most of them had 
parents in Hungary who had sent them across the border to freedom. 
These statistics were gathered by myself in a very hurried fashion and, of 
course, are not up to date. The total figures exceed to date, I believe, 150,000. The 
hon. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration the other day filed very accurate 
statistics on those who had been visaed for Canada, and I am sure his department has 
up-to-date statistics for Austria. 
Mr. Speaker, upon my return to Toronto I made a statement, the gist of 
which was as follows: 
The most vivid impression I had of the Hungarian problem was its magni-
tude. You can see large figures presented in the newspapers: I can use the figure 
150,000, but it is only when by sight you can translate that number into 150,000 
human beings that the figures have any significance at all. 
The second impression 1 had, Mr. Speaker, at the time was the urgency of 
the situation. Austria was faced, of course, with grave political and economic 
problems, including that of getting the refugees out very quickly in order to make 
room for new arrivals. It would have been a tragedy — a disaster for the western 
world — if Austria had been forced, because of being unable to cope with the 
refugees, to close her borders. Of course, the refugees there even now are living in 
what to us are intolerable conditions. It is difficult to know how long such refugees, 
living under those conditions, will be able to keep up the healthy condition most of 
them are in at the present time. 
Because of the magnitude of this problem, in my initial statement to the hon. 
Prime Minister — giving him a general impression — I expressed my opinion that a 
special arm, a special international agency should he formed under the aegis of the 
United Nations. This should he done in order to correlate all the work which 
individual members of the United Nations were doing. If it were not feasible for the 
United Nations to create such an agency, then perhaps it could be handled by that 
other body, NATO, of which most of the interested nations — those participating in 
the movement — are members. 
When a layman sees the very efficient way in which the inter-governmental 
commi ttee on European migration operated, and, of course, its only concern was with 
transportation; when one sees the splendid way in which supplies were being taken in 
as a whole and distributed by the League of Red Cross Societies then, when it is 
recognized that there are special problems such as what will happen to the young 
people between the ages of 11 and 18; when it is borne in mind that a great many 
people in many countries are in temporary camps, and some future will have to be 
provided for them it gives him reason to suggest, as I did, that an inter-governmental 
committee of some kind be set up. 
Such a committee could be similar to the International Refugee Organiza-
tion of postwar days, because it would have to deal with the emergency at hand, the 
long-term overall planning, and be prepared for any sudden crisis aggravating the 
present situation by a further large exodus of refugees. 
If one were to start at the international level and work through the national, 
state, provincial and municipal levels, right down to the individual, I am convinced 
that there would be no problem at all too difficult to be solved. 
In trying to describe the Hungarian refugees it is a most difficult task to try 
to describe a group of people as a whole. If I were asked to describe the people of 
Ontario I could say that they were freedom-loving, religious, industrious, law-
abiding, desirous of standing on their own feet; I could say that quite properly, and 
yet might there not be the exception 
If we were to take a block of 150,000 residents of Ontario, and out of that 
150,000 take 10,000, might we not get the exceptions at the same time as we would 
get a large number of those who fulfil the general description? So it is with any large 
group of human beings, and so it may be with the refugees. 
As the hon. Prime Minister has pointed out, we in Canada have had decades 
of experience with newcomers. Canadians have never attempted to shut out others 
from what we call the "Canadian way of life"; indeed, the "Canadian way of life" is 
based, in part, on the admission of those who wish to be a part of that way of life. On 
the other side of the coin, newcomers have shown a desire to become part of that 
national life and, indeed, again it is the fulfilment of that desire which is another part 
of our "Canadian way of life." 
Mr. Speaker, the only difference between what is happening now and what 
has been happening through the years is the circumstances that surround the 
migration; circumstances created by the special situation and the urgency, as I have 
pointed out. 
There may be difficulties, but difficulties have never before "fazed" either 
the people of Canada or of Ontario, and that part which we may be called upon to do 
is not indeed beyond the realm of our possibility. 
There is needed only the understanding and co-operation of all — all levels 
of government and citizens as groups and individuals and, of course, the refugees. 
This can be a noble undertaking that we have been called upon to do as a 
nation, as a province, and as citizens. 
That which we have achieved in Canada — freedom and security — we have 
not achieved because of individual self-interest alone. It is because we have acted on 
the premise that our own well-being depended on the well-being of our fellow men. 
That principle, applied internationally, has given Canada the stature it 
possesses in the world, and, domestically, that principle has provided us with what 
we have at home. 
The whole refugee problem has posed questions for each of us as Canadian 
citizens: 
Do we believe that a blow for freedom against Communist oppression, by 
anyone on his own behalf, is also struck on our behalf? 
Who are our neighbours in distress? Are they the people next door, in the 
same city, in the same country, are they these alone, or are our neighbours also those 
who, although thousands of miles away, live in a world that can be spanned in less 
than 45 hours? 
Do we believe that Canada... with its vast land area, its untapped resources, 
its great future, can achieve its destiny with the human resources we now have and no 
more? 
I believe that the answer to these questions will guide each citizen's opinions 
in reference to the refugees. 
Mr. Speaker, after my return to Toronto, I have had occasion to visit the 
West Lodge and the Barnardo Home reception centres. Last week I had occasion to 
visit the centre on Jarvis Street, and it was very heart-warming indeed to see some of 
the faces of the professors and students whom, only 6 weeks ago, I had met with and 
talked with in Strobl. There they were under the aegis of The Department of Educa-
tion, huddled over their basic books, learning English as rapidly as they could. 
I am hopeful — and I am sure it will be soon — of carrying on a conversation 
with them in the English language. There again we can look to something in the 
future, not only the benefit from the technical careers, but also for the leadership that 
they will provide in our community as a whole, and especially in that segment of the 
community which the people of Hungarian origin will form. 
Integration is not an easy process; it is not a quick process. Adults take a 
little while. This particular group will, I feel sure, be integrated very rapidly, and I 
am hopeful that they, as young teens and women, will be the catalyst which will 
enable the earlier integration of all. 
I visited the West Lodge, and I congratulate the hon. Minister of Planning 
and Development and his Deputy Minister, and all his staff, on the tremendous and 
magnificent job that they did in making that reception centre what it is today.... I 
congratulate all the departments on what they have done.... 
As a citizen of the province, I thank the hon. Prime Minister for the action 
he took.... 
May I close, Mr. Speaker, with the following: Not for fa] long time has 
there been the opportunity for all to put into practice the thought of those great 
words: "I was a stranger and ye took me in." 

A Document* 
Ontario's Hungarians Respond 
to the Revolution and the Refugee Crisis: 
The Fund-Raising Drive 
Audrey Wipper 
The news of the outbreak of a revolution in Hungary had an electrifying 
effect on Ontario's Hungarian-Canadian community. The members of this 
community immediately undertook a range of frenzied activities, all aimed at 
furthering the cause of their co-nationals in the mother country. One of the 
activities that they undertook was a fund-raising drive. At first they collected 
funds to help the people of Hungary. When the news came that Soviet forces 
had crushed the Revolution and that thousands of Hungarians were streaming 
across the Austrian border, the community's efforts were re-focused on 
helping the refugees. 
The Hungarian community in Ontario prior to the fall of 1956 was a 
small ethnic group. Although individual Hungarian immigrants to Canada or 
small groups of them had started settling in Ontario's cities during the early 
part of the twentieth century, their arrival there in larger numbers did not start 
until the second half of the 1920s. Most of these newcomers were agricultural 
immigrants who had originally been directed to the Canadian prairies by 
immigration officials but they found conditions there not to their liking and 
moved to other parts of the country, including cities such as Hamilton, 
Brantford, Windsor, Welland, and Toronto. There they began to establish 
their immigrant institutions: their ethnic organizations and parishes, self-
* This study has been excerpted from chapter seven of the author's 1958 in 
part eyewitness account entitled "A Study of the Reactions of Hungarian Canadians 
to the Hungarian Crisis, with Special Emphasis on Activities in the Toronto Region." 
The report was prepared for the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 
Research Division, Citizenship Branch. The four introductory paragraphs to this 
paper were added by this volume's editor. 
help organizations as well as social clubs. Their progress was hindered by the 
conditions inflicted on Canadian society by the Great Depression. Chronic 
unemployment and poverty did not begin to lift for Ontario's Hungarian 
communities until about the third year of the Second World War. 
From the early years of the Depression to the end of the War 
immigration from Hungary to Canada had virtually ceased. During the late 
1940s the country's doors were once again opened to Hungarian newcomers. 
The new immigration of Hungarians differed in many ways from the pre-1930 
one. Although Canadian authorities wanted to make sure that people who 
were admitted were predominantly menial workers, the newcomers who came 
were more likely to have had better training and schooling than the interwar 
immigrants. Many of them were of middle-class or even upper-class 
background and were members of the professions, including the military. 
Many of them had been leaders and soon after their arrival, they tried to 
assume leading roles in the immigrant communities they joined. Relations 
between the newcomers and the old immigrants was often strained. 
1956 was not the first time that Ontario's Hungarian community 
undertook a fund-raising drive for the benefit of their less fortunate 
compatriots in Europe. Such a drive had been mounted at the end of the 
Second World War.1 One would assume that in 1956 the lessons learned from 
that effort would have been available to the fund-raisers of that time. But they 
were not, or not entirely. The reasons for this were numerous. Most important 
was the fact that the leadership of the community had changed over the 
decade that had passed. The war-time and immediate post-war campaign was 
undertaken by the leaders of the "old" immigration, while many if not most of 
the participants of the drive in 1956 were members of the post-war wave of 
Hungarian immigrants. In any case, the collective memories of any ethnic 
group doesn't tend to last long. It is not surprising under the circumstances 
that the campaign to raise funds to help the 1956 refugees encountered all 
kinds of difficulties. 
Studies of Canadian philanthropic organizations have shown that large scale 
philanthropy puts to benefit the social organization that a community has 
developed in its business life, its residential arrangements and the voluntary 
associations of its people. The Hungarian group, without the ramified 
membership of a large urban community, plunged into fund-raising. Lacking 
experienced personnel and adequate facilities, they were confronted with 
many difficulties. An examination of their activity points to the way in which 
an ethnic group — individuals who have a common heritage but not a 
complement of metropolitan institutions — may be called upon to perform 
tasks which normally are assigned to the leaders of highly differentiated 
population aggregates of considerable size. The following materials show a 
boy doing a man's work: a few individuals who had at their disposal the 
facilities of a few ethnic associations and who tackled a task for which the 
institutional forces of a large urban community are usually mustered. The data 
that will be presented here are not meant to give an exhaustive account of 
difficulties; they are rather used illustratively to support the view that a small 
ethnic group in a large urban setting lacks an organizational structure 
commensurate with the needs of organized philanthropy. 
The Absence of an Organizational Structure 
Confusion was the keynote of the philanthropic campaign. It began without 
the support of a specialized institutional framework. A public relations person 
called in to help stated: "These last few days have been the most confused in 
my entire life. There is no skeletal framework for radio, television and the 
newspapers. They are standing by, waiting for directions from us." Incorrect 
news releases stated that the fund had been called off. The Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation could not go ahead with the publicity until a 
national committee had been formed. The national chairman, when he was 
finally appointed and arrived on the scene several days after the campaign had 
begun, commented: "I do not see that you have gotten anywhere. I was told 
that I would be heading (the campaign) in a nominal way. If I may make one 
observation, the campaign has not progressed very far. I do not see any 
semblance of a national organization." 
Pleas for aid brought a surplus of help and the presence of many 
added to the confusion. The absence of an organization, prepared to train 
volunteers and to utilize effectively a variety of skills and a large number of 
part-time helpers, resulted in wastage. Ethnic identification and willingness to 
help, rather than technical qualifications, were the chief criteria on the basis of 
which voluntary services were accepted. Emotional predispositions, that 
impeded rather than promoted efficient organization, were frequent adjuncts 
of willingness to serve. And without a system of authority whereby tasks and 
areas of responsibility were assigned, people were too free to engage in any 
task regardless of their qualifications and to assume unwarranted authority 
themselves. This led to both inefficiency and conflict.2 
Officials of the Canadian Hungarian Federation tried to give 
leadership, but as one worker said: "It's like one subway car trying to take all 
the passengers." A tremendous number of demands were being placed on a 
group whose activities prior to the crisis had consisted only of arranging one 
or two yearly social gatherings. The Federation's right to speak for a number 
of ethnic organizations was also questioned. A minister commented that some 
groups would not send in the money which they had collected because their 
members did not approve of the Federation's leadership. He explained: "I said 
at the meeting, when they asked why the money was not coming in, it's 
because these groups do not recognize the Federation. The Federation is a 
nominal head of the Hungarians, that is all." 
A tremendous number of letters stockpiled, as there was insufficient 
staff to answer them. Many required an answer from a person in authority and 
scarce people with authority and linguistic ability were involved in other 
tasks. Canadian volunteers became engaged in a campaign where much of the 
everyday communication was in a language which they did not understand. 
The first organizational blue print for the campaign called for a 
national committee composed of a chairman and one co-chairman from each 
of the provinces. Each co-chairman would head a provincial committee whose 
job it would be to co-ordinate efforts provincially. In this way, the 
organizational structure would extend its branches to all levels of the 
population. However, co-chairmen could not be secured. The campaign had 
been underway for several weeks when, in desperation, two Federation 
officials assumed the posts of honourary secretary and Ontario co-chairman. 
An official representative of both the Federation and the relief fund, while 
attending to their regular jobs during the day, they were in exceptionally great 
demand. 
When the structure was finalized, it consisted of a purely nominal 
national committee and an unspecified number of local committees. National 
business was carried out by the Toronto committee. The suggestion of 
disbanding the Toronto committee at the end of the local campaign brought a 
worried reminder from a Federation official: "But ladies, there is no national 
committee!" To take care of formalities, the Toronto committee was dissolved 
while the same personnel continued to work as before but then in the name of 
the national campaign. The frailty of the organizational framework was 
epitomized by a remark of one volunteer who had carried the campaign 
activities quite single-handled. She commented: "You know, I suddenly woke 
up one night and said to myself, 'you realize that you are not only running the 
city campaign but also the national campaign'." 
A professional in public relations work was assigned to publicize the 
national campaign. But the untiring efforts of one expert were hardly a match 
for the mammoth task. Directives sent out in the name of the Canadian 
Hungarian Relief Fund asked local Hungarian organizations to set up a 
campaign in their community. The Canadian Red Cross Society sent 
directives to its local units, asking them to co-operate with the groups. In 
communities where there were no Hungarian Canadians, it was hoped that 
another ethnic organization or a group of citizens would carry on. The 
campaign had to depend mainly on its national publicity to reach communities 
where there was no local organization. Sometimes, committees worked on 
their own without any knowledge of the national campaign. During a period 
of four months, one campaign would be in its last stage when another would 
only be starting. Although the campaign initially was meant to have the 
character of a Blitzkrieg and December the 15th had been set as the deadline, 
because of the slowness with which campaigns started in many centres, it was 
mid-February before the objective was reached. 
With little machinery of co-ordination and no systematized plan, 
fund-raising depended solely on the initiative of individuals and individual 
communities. The magnanimous gestures of individuals and groups from all 
strata of the population must not be overlooked or minimized. The campaign 
was barely underway when donations poured in. A businessman sent a cheque 
for $10,000; an elderly Hungarian Canadian sent her bank-book with her 
entire savings of $700; an office-girl canvassed banks during her lunch hour 
and collected several thousand dollars; and, the individual efforts of a Latvian 
immigrant gained over $7000. People who had experienced Soviet domi-
nation were particularly generous and helpful. Ethnic organizations, especially 
those of Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, gave large donations and 
engaged in various money-making schemes. Many towns and cities, sparked 
by the initiative of their citizens, carried out successful campaigns. Churches, 
service clubs, women's organizations, children's groups, and many others far 
too numerous to mention, gave financial support generously. Nonetheless, in 
this day of organized philanthropy, causes which have far less dramatic appeal 
employ far more powerful tactics and achieve much higher monetary 
objectives. 
The Need for Community Sponsorship 
To be successful, a philanthropic campaign must be supported by people of 
prestige. The Red Cross was asked to administer the fund because, according 
to one source, a top government official had stated that he wanted it under the 
auspices of a reputable concern. Another source said: "Until there was a 
national chairman, we had to use the Canadian Red Cross, as it alone had 
enough prestige." The chairman of a meeting called together to organize the 
campaign suggested the names of a former Prime Minister and of another 
prominent Canadian to head the Toronto campaign. "Either," he stated, "would 
be acceptable to people in every walk of life." 
The Canadian Red Cross Society can boast of an important roster of 
patrons, among them: Her Majesty the Queen; His Excellency the Governor-
General; The Right Honourable Prime Minister of Canada; Major-General the 
Earl of Athlone, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.G.C.O., D.S.O., A.D.C.; and 
Field Marshall the Right Honourable Viscount Alexander of Tunis, K.C., 
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., LL.D. Not only is the patronage of 
the highest officialdom in Canada extended to the Red Cross but also that of 
the supreme office in the British Commonwealth. 
When people are asked to donate money, they must be convinced first 
that the cause is worthy. Hence, the backing of the right people is essential to 
a campaign. The Canadian-Hungarian ethnic group, composed mainly of 
immigrants and a few second-generation citizens, did not have within its own 
ranks the people who would have been influential nationally. 
Secondly, the fund-raiser must be absolutely trustworthy. And that is 
something the newcomer never is. He has not been in the community long 
enough for its residents to have gained as much confidence in him as they 
have in one of their own. 
When the campaign is compared with the aforementioned model there 
are a number of differences: 
The main criterion of recruitment was ethnic identification rather than 
criteria that advanced the organization's goals. In this identification there were 
a number of elements that deterred from rather than promoted the attainment 
of the objective. 
Since there was no screening, everyone was supposedly welcome. 
The services of volunteers were, however, to a large extent wasted because of 
the lack of a training system and of an organization into which to fit people 
with a variety of skills. 
Wide gaps occurred in the organization's structure. A purely nominal 
national committee and a haphazard assortment of local committees with a 
void in between left much to chance. The channels of communication were 
inarticulate, the authority structure, and areas of responsibility were 
undefined. 
The organizers had to go beyond their own ranks to recruit people. 
They had no technical experts or people of power and patronage who were 
willing to place financial and other resources at the campaign's 
disposal. 
Entirely inexperienced in the intricacies of fund-raising, as well as 
having only recently arrived in Canada, the Hungarian Canadians lacked both 
"know-how" and the "know-who," two essentials in the game of fund-raising. 
Amateurs Invade an Area Belonging to Professionals: 
The Character of Red Cross Work 
The Canadian Red Cross is part of a Federation of Red Cross Societies of 74 
nations designed to establish a "co-ordinated system of international relief 
throughout the world". More specifically, the Red Cross is organized: "To 
furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armies in time of war... In 
time of peace or war to carry on and assist in work for the improvement of 
health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout 
the world.... To give home and help to people everywhere regardless of 
colour, creed or political belief." 
One of the routine functions of this professional humanitarian 
organization is to handle emergencies, situations that are crises in the lives of 
others. In Canada, for instance, catastrophes such as floods and fires claim the 
attention of the National Disaster Services Committee. In addition to its 
full-time staff of qualified specialists, it can call upon a trained volunteer staff. 
An official explained why it could mobilize rapidly: 
You see, we are set up to handle a campaign. We have the 
administrative staff, the warehouse facilities, the voluntary force. 
Our personnel know what to purchase and where. We have 
stenographers, typewriters and office equipment. We can hire 
extra stenos if we need them. If the government had to set up an 
organization to handle a campaign, it would involve tremendous 
costs. With us, it does not mean, having to change anything. Every 
department assumes extra duties. I carry on with my own work but 
work on the campaign in addition. And when the operation is 
completed, we just close the doors. If the establishment had to be 
set up, it would be difficult also to dissolve the organization. It 
would take many months.... 
When fund-raising came under the jurisdiction of the Red Cross, it became an 
activity in an organization where action is governed by a body of rules and 
regulations, a set of guiding principles, and is carried out by a hierarchy of 
persons each with his own specified tasks. 
The goals and tactics of operation are clearly defined; definite systems 
of communication and authority prevail. Ideally, every series of action 
promotes the organization's goals. Relations among personnel tend toward a 
certain formality, since stable sets of expectations are built up and interaction 
is restricted by previously defined roles. 
Heterogeneous Pursuits and Unexpected Occurrences 
Hungarian Canadians began relief work without professional help. A state of 
high excitement prevailed at the time. It was reflected in the atmosphere of 
hustling informality at relief headquarters. The couches were usually filled by 
men carrying on discussions while women did office work. Delegates from 
relief organizations outside Toronto visited the headquarters. Committee 
meetings and press conferences were frequently in session. One worker 
remarked at the time: "There's lots of good company." A group of workers 
would suddenly discover at nine o'clock that they had not eaten and adjourn to 
the corner restaurant for long conversations over dinner. 
This was the period during which enthusiastic volunteers attempted to 
co-ordinate relief activities by themselves, without the help of a professional 
staff like that of the Red Cross. Attempts at organizing were continually 
frustrated by unexpected events that made each day at the relief centre a 
surprise package. A multitude of projects, schemes and stratagems were afoot 
in Toronto and in the rest of the country which eventually found their way to 
the Toronto headquarter offices. Much time was spent advising and 
channelling the deluge of individual effort. Much of the work had to be done 
at night, since volunteer helpers had daytime obligations. The account which 
follows is a harried relief-worker's description of an evening at the fund 
headquarters. It emphasizes the heterogeneity of the pursuits in which the 
volunteers were involved. 
She had received a message stating that two Hungarians 
and a flag were wanted in Barrie the next evening. She did not 
know where to locate the flag and could not find the person who 
would know. 
A wife had telephoned trying to locate her errant, re-
lief-working husband. 
A young man, an alleged captain, had dropped by to 
explain excitedly that he had evidence which proved that a person, 
who professed to be organizing an army, was actually backed by 
Communists. The Communists, he said, were supporting him as 
discreditable propaganda. He had another theory that the person's 
aims and personality clashed. 
Three persons had called to see a Hungarian-Canadian 
leader. On learning that he was not there, they had refused to give 
their names but left the message that "three gentlemen from Latvia 
had called", adding that he would understand. Later on. she had 
found one of the three men, who had been assumed to have left, 
with "his ear to the wall" in an adjoining room. 
During this episode, a Hungarian Canadian, oblivious to 
all, had composed a letter which he wanted checked. He had 
written "due to the mangled details of the campaign". Did he mean 
the "manifold details"? He did. Close surveillance of his work was 
necessary. It had been necessary to suggest to him that, in writing 
the national chairman, one omits telling revelations — such as, "the 
last few days, it has been a madhouse around here" and "in spite of 
the publicity, only eight hundred people showed up" — and uses 
idioms other than "fat cheques".... 
People devised their own projects, since Hungarian Canadians and 
others were interested in doing many things besides raising funds. Some 
carried them out without any consultation with the relief office, while others 
presented them for approval. An elderly spinster, several weeks before the 
refugees began to arrive, appeared at the headquarters, said that her house was 
ready for a family, and inquired as to where she could obtain a cradle and a 
Hungarian-English dictionary. A retired Shakespearian actor volunteered to 
read Shakespeare to the refugees and to give public readings to raise funds. 
Several individuals, who were not affiliated with drug companies, began 
taking orders for drugs to be sent overseas. 
Three Canadians who were not of Hungarian descent, weeks after the 
fighting in Budapest had ceased and when even Hungarian Canadians had 
abandoned the idea of military aid, hatched a plan whereby they would be 
parachuted into Hungary. Their plan caused one of the organizers of the 
volunteer army proposed earlier, The Legion of Freedom, to remark that 
"Canadians are crazier than Hungarians". In the midst of a scene of 
pandemonium, an official of a welfare organization remarked: "Every time 
that we have a campaign, every crackpot in town wants to get in on it." 
Another person, without military experience or any apparent group 
sponsorship, set out to recruit an army for Hungary. He collected more than a 
thousand dollars in donations, recruited about a dozen followers and placed 
large advertisements in the newspapers.3 In explaining the purpose of his 
organization, he said: 
This organization is a completely personal organization of mine. 
Its aim is the formation of a free army of volunteers, to help 
actively the Hungarian people in its fight for freedom. I cannot say 
whether this organization can really help. 1 believe in the necessity 
of starting it because no one will lift a finger for the Hungarian 
people. I intend to do anything I can, as far as the Law permits. 
He wrote several letters to the Federal Government, notifications of his project 
and requests for financial help. His letters to Ottawa brought lengthy replies 
and enclosures of the speeches given by the Minister of External Affairs 
before the United Nations Assembly on the Hungarian situation. He was 
accused of having collected funds under the guise of a priest several years 
before but the charges could not be substantiated. He aroused the suspicions 
of several people, nonetheless, and they joined his organization in order to 
watch him. Hence, this one individual caused numerous other people to take 
action, as well as some officials of the Canadian Red Cross, the Department of 
External Affairs and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
Excitement produced many unforeseen occurrences. Enthusiasm 
spread, and, fanned by the events in Hungary, a kind of chain reaction brought 
more and more people unto the scene. The complications which filled each 
day made it extremely difficult to follow a plan of operations or to designate 
work to volunteers. They were unfamiliar with the situation and unguided as 
to which activity was sensible and legitimate. 
Hungarian-Canadian leaders were called to the public stage, for in 
giving its support the public also made its demands. Their presence was re-
quested at numerous meetings, at civic and fund-raising functions. One leader 
remarked that they spent so much time attending meetings that they never had 
a chance to do anything. Three of the original Toronto committee were sent to 
Vienna. Some of these people appeared to be swept quite unwillingly into the 
vortex of activity. It was said of one of the leaders: "Poor X., he would like to 
get out of all this! He does not like publicity." 
The snowballing effect of mass excitement carried certain individuals 
along with it, left others in its wake and gave many an opportunity to define 
their own roles. It crystallized the issue of leadership: the Red Cross 
Headquarters building was regarded as the centre of relief work and the 
Federation, the publicly acknowledged representative of Hungarian Canadi-
ans. Yet, this period, when activity was not cast into an institutional mould, 
provided scope for individual action. The nature of the situation, characterized 
by mass enthusiasm and anxiety, lent itself to the manipulation of individuals 
in a variety of ways. Some were accused of seeking publicity and of 
exploiting circumstances for purely selfish motives. Others saw themselves 
only performing special tasks: individuals appeared to desire leadership roles 
that had given them satisfaction in the past and others settled for fantasy roles. 
Most volunteers, however, not knowing what to do, wanted simply to be 
directed into useful activity. 
A Threat to the Reputation of the Red Cross 
Having contracted to look after the campaign's finances, Red Cross personnel 
and other professionals viewed the tactics of the "disorganized Hungarians" 
with dismay and with increasing alarm. 
Radio and television announcements referred to the fund by a variety 
of names, including that of the Canadian Red Cross Hungarian Relief Fund. 
This, and many other issues, had to be clarified. Bound by its principles to 
help all peoples, the Red Cross could not be linked with the partisan interests 
of any group. The Red Cross received a letter offering $10,000 to the fund on 
certain specified conditions. The letter was filed away in the fund office 
without being answered, and located only several days later on the inquiry of 
a Red Cross official. 
The variety of ethnic leaders proved distracting to those who had to 
work with them and to assume responsibility towards welfare organizations. 
One such official said: 
Hungarians are divided amongst themselves. There are religious 
and political differences. All Hungarian groups have been 
collecting money: the R.C. church started its fund, the others 
wouldn't go along;.... The Catholics will not give to the Protestants 
nor the Protestants to the Catholics. A Hungarian would go to the 
radio station, saying he represented the group, and make an an-
nouncement. The next morning, another Hungarian would arrive. 
The radio people would say: '"What does this mean? We had an 
announcement last night:" They would be told: "Oh, them? They 
are not doing anything. We're the real group running things." They 
are completely disorganized. All have their headquarters in this 
building. It's neutral ground for them all. 
Members of the ethnic group continually apologized for their lack of 
organization. One said: "We're emotional. Probably, we do things of which 
the Red Cross does not approve." And another said: "We were not organized 
for this kind of campaign; we are all working people. Some had used up all of 
their holiday time on relief work and others had taken so much time from 
work that they were afraid of losing their jobs. 
Amateurs in the presence of professionals, they felt ill at ease and 
rationalized in a variety of ways their inability to cope with the situation. At 
first, Red Cross personnel regarded the Hungarian Canadians with super-
cilious tolerance. They were watching inept novices fumble at work that was a 
professional prerogative. Then, highly disturbed over the amateurs' confusion, 
the professionals voiced their consternation and took action. 
A Red Cross official stated that the Red Cross simply could not 
continue to work with such a variety of people. "I am terribly worried about 
the reputation of your organization and ours, she said. I have not been home 
one night since this began. You will have to get organized." Another official 
said that the campaign was going in circles. "More a clash of personalities 
than anything else, he said. I gave them jolly old hail Columbia. I told them 
they had to stop this bickering and organize." And in another community with 
similar difficulties, a newspaper reporter said : "I told the Mayor that I 
wouldn't do anything until they got organized." Comments were frequently 
voiced, such as "I have never seen an organized Hungarian". As a first step 
towards organization, radio pleas for help, that brought a surplus of novices, 
were stopped. 
The campaign placed other strains upon Red Cross staff. Several 
departments, especially the financial, were given much additional work, given 
departments that did not share any of the work load were affected indirectly. 
Red Cross personnel in the office adjoining the fund's headquarters found 
their telephones continually in use and arrived in the morning to find evidence 
of the occupancy of their desks the night before. Finally, doors were installed 
between the relief office and the other departments; the fund-raisers were 
requested also to limit their calls to their own telephones. 
Volunteers and Red Cross personnel had different attitudes towards 
the campaign. The former worked at their regular jobs during the day and 
devoted their evenings to the campaign. This was an opportunity that would 
not come again for them and it was their duty to do their utmost. Personnel 
from the Red Cross regarded the campaign as part of their work: an additional 
job that should be fitted into the workday — even though they often willingly 
worked nights — and one to be handled with their customary efficiency. The 
Red Cross had much at stake in maintaining its high repute. It regarded the 
Hungarian Canadians simply as another group that required its facilities and 
help for a short time. In writing its local branches, the National Red Cross 
stated that, "in addition to its usual function of accepting and administering a 
designated fund, the Canadian Red Cross Society is, in this instance, taking 
some action to assist the Canadian Hungarian Federation in the organization 
of the Canadian Hungarian Relief Fund but is doing so unofficially and 
anonymously." 
The prospect of a mishandled campaign appeared as a real threat to 
the Red Cross. A reputation, among the public upon whom it is financially 
dependent and a collegial circle of professional organizations, had to be 
safeguarded. When the objective had not been reached at an advanced stage of 
the campaign, the Red Cross assigned to one of its public relations experts the 
task of "getting the campaign over the top". 
Imposing a New Definition 
Once fund-raising cane under the auspices of a professional organization, the 
goal was made explicit. The original, all-embracing and vague objectives were 
simplified and brought within reach. A one-goal humanitarian objective was 
meant to replace multiple-goal militancy. The following excerpt is an official 
statement by the Federation of the fund's objective. 
The Canadian Hungarian Relief Fund has now been organized by 
the Canadian Hungarian Federation in co-operation with the 
Canadian Red Cross Society. The objective of the Fund is to 
collect money for giving aid to the victims of the tragic events in 
Hungary. The amounts collected will be used exclusively for 
Hungarian humanitarian purposes in Hungary as well as among 
the refugees in Austria.... The Canadian Red Cross is to make ar-
rangements for the proper use of the funds in Hungary and among 
the refugees who managed to escape to the West. 
Policy was defined. The Federation notified local organizations of the 
procedures that were to be followed. 
The Canadian Hungarian Relief Fund collects money only. 
Clothing, drugs, food, etc., can be readily bought in Europe thus 
saving the cost of transportation. Please, do not collect used 
clothing since the Red Cross cannot undertake its distribution.... 
The next step should be the establishment of a close liaison with 
the local or closest branch of the Canadian Red Cross Society.... 
The branches of the Canadian Red Cross Society will take 
no official part in the local committees, but will be most helpful 
and efficient in assisting you in every way.... In your local 
publicity, you cannot refer to the Red Cross as the sponsor of the 
fund. You can say that the Fund is administered by the Red Cross 
Society. 
Individualistic activity now met with institutional and sometimes even 
physical blocks. Instructions were given: "Stress no used clothing. It's of 
absolutely no value." Political meetings within the Red Cross premises were 
forbidden. "Tell (a Hungarian Canadian) to carry on his political meetings 
elsewhere; this is an office for the fund-raising campaign only," a volunteer 
ordered. The uninhibited flow of people was stopped by rearranging office 
furniture so that the reception desk would barricade the entrance. Closing the 
office during the evenings stopped its use as a major meeting place. Near the 
end of the campaign, a non-Hungarian volunteer was able to say: "This office 
has ceased being a madhouse." 
Efforts were made to centralize and channel communication. A 
professional was assigned the job of co-ordinating national publicity. The 
Federation issued a directive to its organizations, that "all statements or 
appeals on a nation-wide scale must be handled by our headquarters in 
Toronto". It was suggested to stop the daily newsletter written in Magyar by a 
member of the Federation to its organizations. A Hungarian Canadian, who 
wanted to obtain the services of a European reporter, was told that the stories 
would not be used because there was no guarantee as to their authenticity. At 
first, there was no control over incoming telephone calls and all calls related 
to relief work were directed to the fund headquarters. Later, calls not 
concerned with fund-raising were directed to other agencies. 
One factor, the involvement of Hungarian Canadians in refugee work, 
contributed more than any other to the change in atmosphere at fund-raising 
headquarters. It was not due to the efforts of organizers but to external 
circumstances. With the arrival of the refugees, the public's and the Hungarian 
Canadians' focus of interest changed. The services of Hungarian Canadians 
were needed at the reception centres. The spontaneous and unanticipated 
occurrences that had eluded organization at relief fund headquarters now 
occurred at the reception centres. The fund-raisers found that they were able to 
cope with relative ease with the regular campaign tasks. 
On December the 15th, a one-day fund-raising Blitzkrieg, the last 
official appeal of the Toronto campaign was made.4 
Toronto Hungarian Relief Day was well named because it was an al l -
Toronto effort. With the professional services of a public relations expert, 
prominent clubwomen secured the co-operation of service, welfare and 
business organizations, newspapers, radio and television, and help from 
officials of the Red Cross, Toronto City Police, the municipal government and 
the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. 
Character of the New Sponsorship 
A complete changeover in personnel had occurred from the first all-Hungarian 
committee, under the chairmanship of Father Simon of St. Elizabeth is 
Church, to the succeeding committee, a roster of Canadians that represented 
wealth, social prestige and influence. The committee members were on a first 
name basis with each other and with many of the city's notables. They 
commanded a ready supply of voluntary help, from such groups as the 
I.O.D.E., the Junior League and the Catholic Women's League. It was under 
the personal influence of committee members that some business and 
corporations gave generous donations.4 
With a narrowing of the objectives of relief activity, the whole 
population was asked to contribute. Before this could take place, leaders from 
the larger community had to enter the movement. They brought with them the 
framework of relationships that an urban community possesses but which a 
small ethnic group lacks. People with prestige and administrative experience 
came on the scene to give the campaign legitimacy and orderliness. 
The fact that the agents and representatives of the larger community 
were able to organize relief activities better than they had been so far must be 
credited in part to their prior administrative training for such tasks. It must not 
be forgotten, however — and this is their major advantage over members of 
the ethnic group — that their prior business and social training had placed 
them in a position to draw upon the facilities of the urban community. The 
new leaders were a highly selected group, in terms of their knowledge of the 
community's social and economic structure and of the claims which they 
could make on important people who themselves had claims on others.6 They 
were not people rapidly selected among a small social group because of their 
ethnic identification and their willingness to serve. It is in contrasting those 
people, their experience and the network of institutional relationships at their 
disposal, with Hungarian Canadians, their experience and their ethnic group's 
lack of a social structure, that we can most fairly account for the organizing 
ability of our representatives and the disorganization that highlighted much of 
Hungarian-Canadian activity. 
Opposition to the New Definition 
The implementation of a new goal and policy brought clashes with the already 
established ways and activities. Even though fund-raising for humanitarian 
purposes was the goal agreed upon, the Hungarian Canadians were still 
interested in all measures that would help Hungary. At times, they had to be 
reminded that their multiple goal and provocative effort were no longer 
appropriate. The following incident illustrates this fact. 
At a meeting of representatives of government, welfare and 
service organizations, a Hungarian-Canadian leader produced a 
telegram to the Minister of External Affairs that he wished the 
meeting to endorse. The telegram urged sending a United Nations' 
Force into Hungary. The chairman asked if the suggestion was 
practical, in the light of Hungary's refusal to allow the entry of 
neutral observers. The Hungarian Canadian replied that 
practicality did not matter; it was something that ought to be done. 
"If there were anything they could do, they should try." A Red 
Cross official spoke up: '"We are here today to help needy people. 
Greater powers than us look after the political situation." And the 
chairman added: "The best contribution we can make is to help 
you set up a Toronto committee." 
Since the Federation's authority was not unquestionably accepted, 
however, a disagreement over goals meant that individuals and groups 
pursued their own. Individual projects were not abandoned. If a person 
wanted to organize an army, he did. If the public wanted to send him money, 
they were free to do so. Individual orders of drugs and other supplies were 
sent overseas, although the Red Cross and the Federation stressed that only 
Red Cross supplies were legally admitted into Hungary. They also issued 
instructions that used clothing was not to be collected but clothes still came 
into headquarters. People simply deposited used clothing which they had had 
cleaned and refused to take it elsewhere. A Hungarian Canadian stolidly 
continued his own clothing drive. He had been a refugee once himself and he 
know that warm clothes were needed. 
Heterogeneous pursuits were given impetus by the external scene. A 
newspaper story reported that a priest had his own methods for getting 
supplies into Hungary. Several airlines stated that they were prepared to fly 
used clothing. A Canadian returned from visiting refugee camps and reported 
that supplies were not reaching the refugees. Another asked on his return that 
individual parcels of magazines and personal supplies be sent to the camps. 
The relief fund itself was an issue over which there was discord. The 
agreement between the Federation and the Red Cross had been that the latter 
would administer the fund. Writing all Divisional Commissioners, the Red 
Cross stated: 
All moneys collected under the aegis of the Fund will be handed 
over to the Canadian Red Cross Society for administration.... 
Before the Fund was officially launched, the Hungarian churches 
were accepting donations and issuing church receipts valid for 
income tax purposes. In Toronto, these donations have been turned 
over in bulk to the Canadian Red Cross Society and one receipt 
was issued to each church bringing collections. Hungarians 
throughout the country have been instructed by their Federation to 
take similar action. 
Such a measure, however, would interfere with local autonomy. Groups that 
did not recognize the Federation's authority had started their own funds and 
jealously guarded their independence. The Relief Fund, consisting of a 
nominal national committee without intermediary machinery between itself 
and the local groups, had no means of enforcing its decision and could do 
little about recalcitrant groups. 
"The Red Cross had agreed to administer the fund, a Hungarian 
Canadian said, but there had been no agreement on its expenditure." A 
number of local committees required money for what they considered to be 
two justifiable reasons: to cover expenses incurred in the campaign and to 
help refugees who had arrived in their community. The Red Cross could not 
rescind the fund's declared purpose. Money collected for one purpose could 
not be used for another. Local committees, however, circumvented this 
regulation simply by earmarking certain sums for their own use and handing 
in the balance. Informing members at a meeting that he had spent some 
money on the refugees, the chairman of one relief committee said that he 
would inquire later from the Red Cross about the regulation. A minister on a 
local committee said: "We shall have to get in touch with the Red Cross. We 
don't want to send (the money) overseas, we shall have a lot of people here to 
look after. We want to be able to spend it here. The government looks after 
room and board but there are many other expenses." 
Even among the group who had negotiated the agreement with the 
Canadian Red Cross Society, there was disgruntlement over their lack of a 
voice in the spending of the funds. They complained that the Red Cross 
regarded the money as its own. It was said: "We should have kept the Fund in 
our own hands. The Red Cross could have lent us a person." Speculations 
arose as to how the Red Cross would spend the money. One person believed 
that the Red Cross, having donated a large amount from its own stock at the 
beginning, was replenishing its treasury by taking an equivalent amount from 
the fund. 
Hungarian-Canadian leaders of the fund-raising campaign felt some 
resentment toward the professional organization that had taken away some of 
the roles which they had played in providing early leadership. It was said of 
an organizer: "X. thinks the Red Cross has sold him down the river. They are 
sitting back and doing nothing. They took the Hungarians in — but the 
Hungarians have to do all the organizing. Now, the Red Cross is getting all 
the publicity." 
Misunderstandings arose also over the methods of managing the 
campaign. Differences in views with respect to the procurement of campaign 
supplies illustrate this fact. At the beginning, many supplies had been given 
gratuitously. A printer twice had run off several thousand cheque forms 
without charge. When ten thousand more were needed, he could not print 
them immediately but promised to have them ready in a few days. A 
professional insisted that they were needed at once. "Pay him!" she demanded. 
A volunteer explained that, after what he had done, one could not turn around 
and order him. The volunteer was noting that, once a relationship had been 
established on a benevolent rather than a business basis, it could not be 
changed even if the professional's emphasis on efficiency demanded it. 
Concomitant with the established ways of operating, there were a set 
of social relationships that complicated the straightforward perusal of a new 
line. A volunteer told of an instance when she did not know how to face a 
minister of her acquaintance. He had come into headquarters with a refugee 
seeking information about how to obtain passage from Austria for the latter's 
family. "How could I tell him that we are only fund-raising? she asked. He 
was standing there with sweat on his brow; and he had been coming in during 
the whole campaign." The volunteer had worked previously in an undefined 
situation, characterized by informality. Then, policy had imposed a set of 
formal relationships that were incompatible with previous modes of 
interaction. 
In summary, it may be said that the imposition of a new definition did 
not mean that it was readily accepted. Although some activity was 
institutionalized, other more obstreperous activity was not so malleable. 
Individuals and groups resisted an outside authority that suddenly invaded 
their domain and told them what to do. When the rules appeared stringent and 
unreasonable, and the new definition far removed from actual problems, 
groups, with the backing of their leaders, developed the norms which to them 
seemed in keeping with the exigencies of the situation. This applied mainly in 
the area of inteipersonal relationships. When policy is defined in the abstract, 
with little knowledge of the area of social relationships upon which it 
impinges, it may be unrealistic to expect its observance should it conflict with 
these relationships. 
Conclusions 
In trying to organize a fund-raising campaign, Hungarian Canadians were 
confronted with a set of problems. Some originated from their status as 
novices and some from the fact that it was not a large community, but a small 
ethnic group, that was embarking on this venture. Inherent in a crisis situation 
and concomitant with collective excitement and mass enthusiasm, there were, 
furthermore, a number of unpredictable elements that complicated the task at 
hand. Allowances had to be made for a host of extraneous and time-
consuming tasks. The unplanned occurrences overwhelmed the fund-raisers' 
improvised scheme of operations. Some of these even defied the 
organizational powers of the Red Cross, although such an organization is not 
only experienced but has the facilities and personnel to cope with crisis 
situations. There is no doubt that some of the organizational difficulties 
stemmed from the fact that the community, under the pressures of a small 
ethnic group, was handling a crisis situation and not a routinized activity such 
as the United Appeal's yearly campaign. 
A great deal of attention has been given in this chapter to the fact that 
the original sponsors of relief activities were not an organized community but 
an ethnic element of small size and low status. It could not enlist important 
individuals, large business concerns, national welfare agencies, nor important 
voluntary associations. These organize society into a web of formal and 
informal relationships and have to be mobilized for full communal action. No 
doubt, some important people and organizations came to the group's help, 
assumed the co-ordination of activity, and assured the success of the venture. 
Quite often, however, leaders and functionaries of non-ethnic organizations 
spoke and behaved as if it should not have been necessary for them to provide 
their services to the extent that they did. They gave the impression that they 
had not realized what are the limitations of a small ethnic group that is 
scattered within a large metropolitan community. It is for this reason that the 
point is emphasized here. 
It must be noted also that, when the Hungarian Canadians organized a 
fund-raising campaign, they entered in competition with some long-
established institutions. Philanthropic organizations are intent on safeguarding 
their exclusive mandate. They are the appointed awakeners of the social 
conscience and protectors of the community against exploitation. Such an 
organization as the Canadian Red Cross Society could not permit novices to 
assume its job and once it had accepted responsibility it could not afford to 
have its record marred. Therefore, in order to protect its own interests and 
those of its public, it tried to modify the variety of efforts to coincide with its 
own legitimate goals. 
This study has described the meeting of unorganized and of insti-
tutionalized activity. W e saw in the materials presented that spontaneous 
forms of individual and collective activities were suddenly thrust into the 
domain of organized action. Through a process of redefining, sharpening and 
pruning, much of the activity was made to fit the requirements of a 
bureaucratic organization. A definite set of goals and tactics were imposed on 
a situation that had hitherto been characterized by informality, diffuseness and 
individual efforts. Some endeavours could be channelled, others could not. 
Especially resistant to change, were the social relations that had developed 
during the early stages of the movement. 
NOTES 
1
 [Editor's note]. On this see N. F. Dreisziger et al., Struggle and Hope: The 
Hungarian-Canadian Experience (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 176-79. 
2
 The following three cases illustrate this point: 
A post-war immigrant, who considered her ability to use English far 
superior to what it was, decided to answer letters from Members of Parliament and 
other notables who had written expressing sympathy. Because they had given ardent 
support, she felt that she had to convey to them the Hungarian Canadians' equally 
strong emotions and appreciation. "We must come behind them and let them know 
we are there," she expounded. Her letters used jumbled concepts, over-elaborated 
ideas and extravagant words that gave them such a pompous flavour that they were 
comical. She called for "unification to annihilate the colossus of Communism for 
humanity and Christianity, to see that the president of the United States pledges to 
take action that apathy cease." Her faithfulness to her task sustained a prodigious 
output, which proved terrible to another worker, fluent in English, who had to rewrite 
all the letters eventually. When the worker discovered that none of her prose had 
been sent out, greatly offended she withdrew her services. 
The mere presence of another volunteer at a gathering added an element of 
disorder to it. He continually talked in a loud and excited voice and gave orders to 
every one within his range. Perpetually confused, he exacted a trying toll on the pati-
ence of co-workers. When the refugees began arriving, it was suggested that his 
talents were too valuable to be wasted in the relief office. He agreed and stationed 
himself at the airport to welcome the new arrivals. This proved to be a solution that 
was useful all around. 
A worker, with a mania for launching undertakings that he never finished, 
arranged with a publicity agent, and without the committee's approval, to handle a 
project. When asked how the professional was to be paid, he shrugged it off by 
saying that he would contact a firm and asked them to pay the fee as their 
contribution to the campaign. Since his interests extended to the international scene, 
he was in Vienna when the committee was faced with finding a thousand dollars to 
cover the professional's fee. 
1
 Examples of his campaign's advertisements, not to be confused with those 
of the Legion of Freedom, are shown in one of the appendices. 
See the announcements in the Toronto Globe and Mail and the Toronto 
Daily Star of 14 Dec. 1956. 
5
 After a meeting, one evening, the chairman of the relief committee was 
invited to drive home with a businessman who headed a large corporation, he asked 
her to name the sum that would be appropriate as his firm's contribution to the 
campaign and she suggested ten thousand dollars. After the matter was taken up 
formally by the businessman at a meeting of his colleagues, the suggested amount 
was given. 
6
 This campaign, however, was not important enough to the whole Canadian 
population or the community of Toronto to draw out as its leaders our male 
representatives of both power and prestige, except in a purely nominal capacity. It 
was run mainly by important women. Another proof of the fact that the Hungarian 
crisis did not muster unrestricted support has been given above, when it was 
indicated that the national committee could not find the provincial co-chairmen that it 
needed. 
The leaders were aware of the fact that they did not represent the commu-
nity's most powerful figures, its leaders of industry, its presidents of large 
corporations, people whose word brings action. When a newspaper columnist 
expressed anti-Hungarian views, the committee would have liked to stop him. Its 
members did not possess, however, the necessary kind of influence to do it. During 
the Community Chest Appeal, when this same columnist had spoken against that 
campaign, a committee member commented, "Several big businessmen went down, 
had a talk with him, and he changed his tune." Another member, looking at 
committee colleagues, said: "Yes, but they had people who were influential enough 
that he would lose his job if he didn't shut up. I doubt that we have anyone like that 
here." 
It may be hypothesized here that the major leaders of Canadian philanthropy 
were saving their good-will, a most important asset, for other philanthropies. 
Appendix 
A Chronology of Events 
Tuesday, 23 October: 
Revolt breaks out in Hungary. 
Wednesday, 24 October: 
Canadian Hungarian Federation calls a meeting of the leaders of 
eleven Hungarian organizations. Meeting sends a telegram to 
national leaders urging their support of Hungary. 
Rakoczi Association distributes a handbill with a picture 
symbolizing Hungary's desperate plight. This picture, enclosed 
with a telegram to national leaders, urges their support of 
Hungary. 
Mutual Co-Operation League sends a letter to the United States' 
Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, and to Canada's Minister of 
External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, urging the United Nations intervene 
in Hungary. 
Friday, 26 October: 
A meeting of Hungarian leaders at Hungarian-owned and operated 
Centrum Press draws up plans, first, for a brigade to fight in Hung-
ary and, second, to set up a blood bank. 
A special prayer service is held at Hungarian United Church. 
Hungarians are milling on a street corner; two are arrested when 
police disperse crowd. 
Saturday, 27 October: 
A delegation of Hungarian officials meet with: Mr. Pearson to 
urge the United Nations' intervention in Hungary. 
Hungarians and members of other ethnic groups parade to Civic 
Square for a wreath-laying ceremony. 
Mutual Co-Operation League sends a telegram to five world 
leaders asking their help in Hungary's fight. 
An announcement is made that donations for a relief fund are 
being received at St. Elizabeth's of Hungary Church. 
Blood donors are asked to assemble at 10 a.m. on Sunday at St. 
Elizabeth's Church. 
Sunday, 28 October: 
Toronto Hungarians rally with Hungarians in Ottawa. They join in 
a motorcade past the Russian Embassy and later congregate at the 
National War Memorial. 
Six hundred people register for blood bank in auditorium of St. 
Elizabeth's Church. 
Hungarian delegates meet with Red Cross officials to discuss 
sending plasma to Hungary. Blood bank is cancelled, Red Cross 
has an adequate supply. 
Requiem Mass at St. Elizabeth's Church for Hungarians slain in 
revolt. 
Committee of Church and Federation officials plans the 
establishment of a regular relief fund. 
Monday, 29 October: 
Telephone call by Canadian Hungarian Federation to Austria 
reveals that the frontier is open for the movement of refugees. 
A committee is set up to aid in clothes collection. 
A Hungarian doctor submits a plan to set up a field hospital on the 
Austrian border. 
Legion of Freedom begins recruiting volunteers. 
Tuesday, 30 October: 
Hungarian Canadians gather at Malton and see an aircraft leave 
with a cargo of drugs for wounded in Hungary. 
Thursday, 1 November: 
A rally takes place at Massey Hall. 
An announcement is made that clothing is being collected. 
Friday, 2 November: 
A Hungarian Canadian starts a chain of telegrams to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. More than a thousand telegrams 
jam telegraph facilities. 
Members of Hungarian House hold a special meeting to set up an 
emergency aid programme. 
A Hungarian-Canadian delegation sees Mr. Pearson. 
Saturday, 3 November: 
Hungarians and members of other ethnic groups hold protest 
demonstrations at Civic Square. 
Handbills distributed urge money donations. 
Monday, 5 November: 
Main resistance collapses in Budapest. 
Social activities cancelled at Hungarian House. 
Hungarian churches hold Requiem Services. 
Saturday, 10 November: 
Hungarian and Polish Canadians join in march to City Hall in 
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The Kadar Regime's Secret Agents 
and Canada's Hungarians, 1956-1989 
Christopher Adam 
Hungary's state security agency maintained a keen interest in Canada 
throughout the Cold War, partly due to the North American country's close 
ties to the United States, as well as because it was home to one of the largest 
populations of Hungarian ex-patriots after 1945. While the post-1956 detente 
between the two superpowers helped ease Cold War hostilities, the activity of 
Hungarian intelligence officers in Canada actually increased during this 
period, in large part as a response to the more aggressive and systematic 
tactics used by Canadian counter-espionage units in an effort to uncover 
agents from the Eastern bloc countries.1 Hungary's state security agency used 
informants and intelligence officers, as well as the assistance and cooperation 
of Hungary's diplomatic missions, to gather information on Hungarian 
communities in Canada, collect data on individuals seen as either "friendly" or 
"hostile" to Hungary's communist regime, ascertain if these immigrants had 
any prominent contacts in Hungary and to determine Canada's political and 
military position in the Cold War. 
Following the 1964 establishment of the Hungarian Embassy in 
Ottawa, this mission played a central role in Hungary's intelligence operations 
in Canada. Informants and agents often met with embassy officials, and 
diplomats sometimes communicated the findings and results of investigations 
with authorities in Hungary. In 1969, for example, a number of Hungarian 
agents travelled to Hamilton where they spoke with a local Hungarian priest 
who had served as the embassy's contact for several years.2 Several informants 
and agents that worked in Canada would be summoned to the embassy on 
occasion, for debriefing, or to deposit any material they gathered, which 
would often be transmitted to Hungary by courier, rather than by regular mail. 
During the 1950s, especially in the years preceding the 1956 
revolution, Hungary's state security was most interested in gathering intel-
ligence on former DPs (displaced persons, i.e. post-World War II arrivals), 
members of the country's interwar gendarmerie and those involved in the 
Canadian branch of the World Federation of Hungarian Veterans (Magyar 
Harcosok Barati Kozossege, hereafter MHBK). Hungary's state security 
agency, for example, became aware of the establishment of the Canadian 
branch of the MHBK in 1952 and that the organization's Hungarian-Canadian 
members were in "close contact" with the MHBK headquarters in Europe, 
which allegedly pursued "active intelligence activities against the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of Hungary."3 According to the report, the 
Canadian branch had its own "counter-espionage unit," headed by L.D., a 
former veteran of the Hungarian army, and mainly as a result of these 
activities, authorities in Hungary felt the need to "uncover and block" the 
organization. As part of this mission, state security compiled a basic list of 
those who played lead roles in the MHBK's Canadian branch. The list 
included personal and physical information on leaders whenever this data was 
known.4 
One informant in particular, who used the pseudonyms "Millott" and 
"Janos Benedek," provided authorities in Hungary with the most detailed 
information on the activities of Hungarian veterans, and former members of 
the interwar gendarmerie. Benedek's decision to cooperate with state security 
by reporting on Hungarian-Canadians was largely motivated by fear. The 
agent was approached by the state security agency in early 1957, at which 
point he was coerced into active service after being confronted with 
"incriminating evidence" against him.5 Benedek had been a former member of 
the gendarmerie during Hungary's interwar regime, and this compromising 
past led the informant to live a secluded life from 1950 onward, until he was 
"discovered" by the state security service. 
Janos Benedek was hardly the only one coerced into cooperating with 
Hungary's state security agency. The unexpected "discovery" of compromising 
evidence against someone, which could lead to a conviction and a prison 
sentence, was a tactic frequently used against people that the state security 
agency wanted to recruit. Another informant who ended up cooperating with 
state security in much the same way as Benedek was "Karoly Furedi," also 
known as "Floguet," who worked as an electrician in Budapest. In 1951, 
Floguet was stopped by state security officers in Budapest on his way home 
from work and after asking for his identification, the officers took him to a 
nearby police station and charged him with sabotage and collusion with the 
Americans. After hearing the accusations, Floguet was given the option of 
"making amends for his mistakes, by proving his loyalty to the people's demo-
cracy."1 Floguet did end up serving as an informant during the 1956 
revolution, but then escaped to Italy in 1957. Officials tried to contact him and 
con vince Floguet to move to the Federal Republic of Germany and serve as an 
informant there. Floguet, however, refused and relocated to Montreal in 1958. 
Hungarian officers spent the next six years trying to track him down, as they 
feared that Floguet's silence meant that he had been hired by a Western 
intelligence agency. Hungarian intelligence officials tracked down four of 
Floguet's home addresses in Montreal, but even with the active assistance of 
the Hungarian Embassy in Washington DC, they failed to find him and finally 
gave up looking in 1966.7 
Unlike Floguet, Benedek cooperated with state security for several 
years and received a very comprehensive assignment before he was sent to 
Canada. This involved collecting information on MHBK's Montreal branch, 
as well as on other right-wing organizations established by Hungarian 
veterans and members of the gendarmerie. He was also directed to befriend 
those individuals who were "engaged in direct or indirect hostile activity" 
against Hungary.8 The informant's own interwar past, as well as the presence 
of his uncle in Montreal, who was a leading figure among right-wing 
immigrants, allowed Benedek to obtain inside information on the affairs of the 
MHBK and similar groups in Canada. Benedek's orders involved taking part 
in the activities of the local Hungarian community, but he was to do so in such 
a way as not to attract too much attention or suspicion. On a grander scale, the 
state security people also asked that Benedek observe any political and 
military cooperation between Canada and the US, and uncover the locations 
of ammunition depots.9 
Benedek was provided with a contact, "Zoli," to whom he addressed 
most of his letters, which contained detailed observations on Montreal's 
Hungarian community, as well as more brief observations on communities in 
Toronto, Hamilton and Calgary. All correspondence, however, was written in 
a friendly, colloquial manner, so as not to draw attention or suspicion. The 
majority of Benedek's reports seemed "benign" in nature, as he tended to argue 
that the veterans and former gendarmerie officials in Montreal were largely 
inactive, ageing and exhausted. When reporting on his uncle, Benedek painted 
a portrait of a "tired, old gentleman, who approaches his past in Hungary's 
gendarmerie as nothing more than a nice memory," and shies away from overt 
politicizing.10 Yet Benedek's reports do provide information on tension and 
conflict within the Montreal community, and even among veterans and former 
gendarmerie officers, which was often based on a hostility between lower and 
higher ranking officers." 
Benedek reported that there were five separate groups of former 
gendarmerie officers in Canada and their total membership stood at around 
250, but many of them were not believed to have been active within the 
community.'" In general, however, Benedek seemed to avoid polemical 
language when describing the Hungarian community in Montreal, perhaps in 
part because he did not want to implicate his elderly uncle, or other people in 
the community who were oblivious to his true role and had learned to trust 
him. Politically, Benedek portrayed Montreal's Hungarians as having been 
comprised of relatively reasonable people who rejected the extremist, fascist 
politics that had existed in Hungary during World War II. For example, 
Benedek noted how the Hungarian Committee of Montreal decided not to 
elect G.D., the MHBK's local leader, due to his "Arrow-Cross gravitations" 
and his "widely known connections with Ferenc Szalasi," Hungary's late 
Arrow-Cross leader.13 Ultimately, Benedek's reports on Hungarian-Canadians 
led state security to open dossiers on four people affiliated with the 
gendarmerie and veteran associations.14 
One of the first major studies written by a Hungarian state security 
agent on Canada's political, economic and socio-cultural fabric, and 
Hungarian immigrant communities was by an informant known as "Du 
Garde." Du Garde, a former Communist party functionary from Baranya 
County, left after the 1956 revolution and agreed to cooperate with Hungarian 
state security and collect information on his friends, family and acquaintances 
in Canada and the United States, in exchange for being allowed to return 
home.15 Du Garde recorded his experiences while in Canada four months 
after having relocated to Vienna in November 1963. Having spent six and a 
half years in Montreal and Toronto, Du Garde's observations are among the 
most detailed of any Hungarian state security agent, especially as they relate 
to Canadian party politics within the context of the Cold War, everyday life in 
Canada and the activities of Hungarian communities, as well as his 
relationship with colleagues, friends and acquaintances. When writing about 
the Liberal Party, Du Garde observed that it was a "right-wing, civic move-
ment" and that it served as a "tool in the hands of American capitalists aimed 
at taking control of political power in Canada."16 While Du Garde felt that of 
all political parties, the liberals "best represented the interests of American big 
money and the aggressive powers," the agent saw the Conservatives under 
John Diefenbaker in a much more benign light, noting that rather than being 
associated with US interests, the party had stronger ties with Britain, included 
within itself the "pacifist tendencies of certain Protestant religious sects," and 
that it was more inclined to sell grain to China and to the Eastern Bloc 
countries.1' 
Not surprisingly, the left-leaning New Democratic Party (NDP) was 
portrayed in the most sympathetic light. Du Garde observed that under its 
leader, Tommy Douglas, the NDP was closely linked with Britain's Labour 
movement, that it supported entering into dialogue with the Soviet Union, 
called on the banning of atomic weapons and enjoyed the support of the 
Communist Party of Canada in those ridings where the latter did not field its 
own candidates.18 Du Garde also took note of what he felt was an 
over-complicated and disunited political system in Canada, where the 
make-up of provincial legislatures did not represent the composition of the 
federal parliament in Ottawa. The Hungarian informant suggested that these 
extenuated political, ideological and regional conflicts could be used to the 
Eastern bloc's advantage, especially in terms of getting the West to support 
"peaceful co-existence" with the Soviet Union and to slow down the "advance 
of American imperialists."19 
In addition to taking advantage of political and regional tensions 
within Canada, Du Garde also suggested that the country's Protestant churches 
— several of which supported pacifist causes — be used to promote a ban on 
atomic weapons and to develop peaceful co-existence between the two sides 
in the Cold War. The agent felt that the Unitarians and the United Church of 
Canada were most open to these causes. Du Garde became very familiar with 
the United Church, as he joined Toronto's Deer Park congregation in 1961 and 
became an active member of the local men's association.-0 Du Garde stood out 
not only as the church's only Hungarian, but also as the sole immigrant, in a 
congregation dominated almost exclusively by people with English and 
Scottish heritage. The informant suggested that he earned the pastor's trust in 
part because of this.21 The story that Du Garde used when explaining his 
arrival to Canada to Pastor John Wilkie and others at the church, was that he 
was forced to flee Hungary in 1956, due to the country's communist regime. 
He also played devil's advocate by challenging Pastor Wilkie in terms of his 
belief that the West must learn to co-exist with the Soviets and that it must 
take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament. Du Garde argued that this 
was unrealistic, because the Soviets would not reciprocate by also banning 
atomic weapons. Yet it becomes clear from his reports, that Du Garde was 
impressed by Wilkie's answer when the pastor noted that "Christ would never 
allow the use of these weapons."2- The agent saw in Wilkie someone who 
could potentially be used to help propagate these ideas and he was keen on 
contacting the pastor upon his return to Canada. 
Although Du Garde identified himself as a secular Jew, he explained 
his decision to join the United Church by noting that he believed it would help 
further his application for Canadian citizenship and Pastor Wilkie did, indeed, 
serve as one of his references.23 Du Garde also tried to get closer to Wilkie by 
enrolling his son in the Sunday school where the pastor taught, and 
encouraging his child to befriend the pastor's own son who was of a similar 
age. 
As was common practice with other agents, Du Garde regularly 
modified his immigration and arrival story, depending on the people he met. 
For example, while members of the United Church were told that he tied 
Communism, when he met with A.D., a Polish Jew with whom he worked for 
six months at a store in Scarborough, Du Garde explained that he had to 
escape in 1956, because "fascists once again rose to prominence during the 
revolution and that all Jews had to leave the country."24 Only a handful of 
people knew of his past membership in Hungary's Communist Party and those 
that did had sometimes been members themselves. After Canadian authorities 
once visited his apartment to inquire about his past, Du Garde observed that a 
female acquaintance of his had also been a party member, but received 
citizenship without any problems and with no questions, apparently because 
Canadian authorities were not interested if women were once party 
members.25 
Du Garde believed that by "sending in the appropriate people, these 
religious organizations can offer fertile ground to propagate the politics of 
peaceful co-existence."26 Du Garde also singled out Jewish congregations and 
observed that despite the presence of a "strong Zionist influence" — which he 
found to be entirely disagreeable — left-wing groups could still propagate their 
values within these organizations, especially by working together with those 
rabbis that opposed the development of nuclear weapons." 
Some of Du Garde's most important observations were on Canada's 
Hungarian communities, even though his general views on the different 
cohorts of Hungarian immigrants to Canada reflected the beliefs widely held 
by most officials in Hungary. Du Garde presented those primarily peasant and 
working-class Hungarians who immigrated to Canada during the 1920s and 
1930s in the most positive light, noting that the majority of them "remain 
patriotic and feel a sense of nostalgia for Hungary."2X According to Du 
Garde's observations, most of these immigrants were also positive about the 
more recent developments in Hungary, such as the post-1945 land reform and 
even the nationalization of factories. As such, this group of Hungarians (some 
of whom were, indeed, members of Communist organizations, or subscribed 
to the Kanadai Magyar Munkds [Canadian Hungarian Worker] weekly 
newspaper) were classified as being "friendly" to the new regime. 
The way in which post-World War II immigrants were presented by 
Du Garde, however, contrasted starkly with the portrayal of the interwar 
generation. Those who immigrated between 1945 and 1956 were scorned, and 
those that came between 1945 and 1946 (many of whom were DPs) were 
classified as "enemies" of the new order in Hungary. According to Du Garde, 
"this group forms the Hungarian immigration's most reactionary core, and 
they are strongly anti-Communist."2" Yet Du Garde felt that this group posed 
a very limited threat to Hungary's interests, despite the fact that a range of 
veteran and far-right associations existed well into the 1960s, such as the 
"Hungarist Legion." Most of these organizations, however, were relatively 
small, they had limited financial resources and Du Garde felt that their 
membership was slowly dying out, as most of them were well over 50 years of 
age.30 
Du Garde's attitude towards those who fled Hungary after the 
suppressed 1956 Revolution was mixed and ambivalent, and this closely 
reflected the views of most Communist officials in Hungary. The fifty-sixers 
were seen as being the most heterogeneous of all immigrant cohorts, in terms 
of profession, class, educational background and ideological beliefs. 
According to Du Garde, "there are many valuable people, who integrated into 
Canadian society — albeit with difficulty — and distance themselves from all 
propaganda directed against Hungary.1' At the same time, the agent also 
reported that there were "many common criminals" among the fifty-sixers, 
some of whom were serving prison sentences.32 This was also in line with 
what officials in Hungary tended to proclaim about those who fled in 1956. 
Yet Du Garde suggested that the "majority" of recent immigrants who had not 
succeeded economically in Canada, who felt disappointed and did not join 
Hungarian community organizations, could be brought into closer contact 
with contemporary Hungary.33 Du Garde also noted that the Hungarian-
-Canadian Communist community — largely based around Toronto, Hamilton 
and Ontario's Tobacco belt — could not be counted on in its current form as 
being of any assistance in this venture, as their newspaper (the Kanadai 
Magyar Munkas) suffered from a declining readership, while affiliated 
associations were "sectarian" and unwilling to reach out to disenchanted fifty-
-sixers.34 Yet at the same time, Du Garde recommended the establishment of a 
"progressive mass newspaper, as the immigration's most reactionary groups 
are demoralized and are in the process of falling apart."3' 
Du Garde suggested that the best way for Hungarian agents to weaken 
"enemy" groups within Canada's Hungarian communities, was to take advan-
tage of already existing rivalries and conflicts and to exacerbate them 
whenever possible. This was the approach he suggested when dealing with 
Canada's most influential Hungarian weekly papers — Magyar Elet and 
Kanadai Magyarsdg — both of which were generally right-wing and anti-
communist, but were also in fierce competition with each other. Their 
respective editors, Marton Kiss Kerecsendi and Istvan Vorosvary, occasi-
onally initiated lawsuits against each other, as well as diatribes on the pages of 
their papers.36 
Du Garde produced reports on approximately 27 friends and acquain-
tances in Canada, as well as two relatives, five acquaintances in the US, eight 
in Austria and one in Israel. This is an addition to the names of Hungarian 
community leaders and members he mentioned in his lengthy reflections on 
his experiences in Canada, as well as brief lists containing the names, employ-
ment information, home addresses, family situation and date of immigration 
of 121 Hungarian engineers in Ontario.37 Similar lists were also compiled for 
13 Hungarian engineers in Montreal,^ as well as 17 professional engineers 
working for government agencies in Ontario.39 The vast majority of written 
material was created between 1964 and 1967, during which time Du Garde 
lived in Vienna. The informant reported his findings to his superiors at the 
Interior Ministry when he visited Budapest in March 1967.40 
Du Garde followed a detailed set of guidelines when compiling 
information on his friends, colleagues and acquaintances. In each case, he 
would try to find out about any connections they may have in Hungary and 
abroad, as well as information on their political and party affiliations, their 
ideological beliefs, association memberships, business connections, their 
circle of friends, personal data relating to their place of birth, citizenship, 
ethnic and religious origins, marital status, home address and current 
employment.41 Du Garde was also interested in the level of knowledge that 
people he was observing had in terms of domestic and international politics 
and specific beliefs on key issues, such as world peace, the Cuban crisis, the 
fate of Berlin, anti-fascism and racial or ethnic questions.42 
While the majority of people that Du Garde reported on were either 
community leaders, businesspeople, or prominent members of cultural and 
religious organizations, a few of his reports focused on Hungarian Canadians 
with no such prominent position. For example, G.H. and E.H. were two sisters 
who rented an apartment together in Toronto. They had fled Hungary in 1957 
and worked as seamstresses in a garment factory and in other low paying 
jobs.43 Du Garde became acquainted with the two women in 1957, when he 
worked at the same garment factory in Toronto. The informant reported that 
both were "reactionary" and that E.H. may have been involved in the 
Arrow-Cross movement in Hungary, during World War II, although she 
would have been very young at the time.44 Despite having produced a detailed 
report on the sisters, and while a certain level of trust and friendship had 
developed between the three of them, he felt that upon his return to Canada 
there would be no compelling need to remain in contact with them, due to 
their low societal standing, unless the two could be of help "as part of a 
special assignment."4^ Du Garde arrived at the same conclusion in the case of 
another working-class couple from Toronto, J.T. and Z.T, both of whom fled 
Hungary in 1956 and who the informant classified as "remarkably 
reactionary."46 The only difference was that unlike the sisters, J.T. and Z.T. 
were aware of Du Garde's past as ajxirty functionary in Baranya County, as 
they originated from the same area. Yet Du Garde rapidly determined that 
they were not likely to "out" him, as the couple lived a secluded life, had few 
friends and thus posed no risk. 
Perhaps due to his friendship with Pastor Wilkie and his warm 
reception at the Deer Park United Church, Du Garde placed a special empha-
sis on maintaining contacts with prominent members of this Protestant 
community, and gathering information on them. This is why he suggested that 
upon his return to Canada, he might "further develop his relationship" with 
Mrs. A, who left Hungary in 1956 and worked for the United Church's main 
offices in Toronto.48 Du Garde believed that although Mrs. A and her husband 
were both conservative, they did not make hostile comments about the regime 
in Hungary and Mrs. A in particular maintained important ties with United 
Church leaders, such as Pastor Wilkie and other key figures. Yet it appears as 
though those reading Du Garde's report were unsure of what to make of the 
fact that he mentioned how he maintained "especially warm contacts" with 
Mrs. A, even after he left Canada. A question mark in the margins of the 
report and the underlining of these words suggest that officials in the Interior 
Ministry may had felt that there was more motivating Du Garde's intentions 
and interest in Mrs. A than met the eye, especially since the agent was in the 
process of getting a divorce from his own wife at roughly the same time.49 
Du Garde returned to Canada in 1965, and visited the recently opened 
Embassy of the People's Republic of Hungary in Ottawa, where he met with 
"B," and furnished him with several lists of names and addresses of 
individuals that the informant thought might be of interest in the future, as 
well as a directory of groups that Hungarian state security could keep in 
contact with.50 These lists included the directory of the Deer Park United 
Church, the leaders of Toronto's Hungarian Jewish Alliance, as well as the 
North Toronto Business Association's list of members. Yet B was not 
interested in these lists, noting that the latter had almost no value, as the data 
was completely legal and publicly available. B was, however, interested in 
five individuals that Du Garde had reported on, and asked him to try to follow 
leads in each case. 
One of Du Garde's final assignments involved producing a detailed 
guide in 1967, geared towards helping future informants immigrate to, and 
settle in Canada. The eleven page, typed document examined all aspects of 
arrival and integration in Canada, including passing through customs and 
passport inspection, renting an apartment, finding employment and even the 
importance of joining a community club, as well as the "necessity" of being a 
member of a church.'^1 "In Canada you must belong to a church, whether you 
want to or not. Which church you decide to join does not matter, but you must 
belong to one."52 When Du Garde's superior in Hungary read the report, he 
felt that the agent "exaggerated" the central role of churches in Canadian 
society, but noted that the document could be useful when sending new 
informants to Canada.53 The existence of such an extensive study suggests that 
Hungarian state security had every intention of sending agents to Canada, 
even in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Tensions between Canada and Hungary continued unabated during 
the late sixties and early seventies, with the RCMP keeping tabs on people 
suspected of colluding with authorities in Hungary and Hungarian officials 
increasingly concerned that Canada was stepping up its counter-espionage 
activities. When E.L., the Montreal-based Hungarian Trade Commission's 
secretary and a citizen of Hungary, unexpectedly quit her job in January 1969, 
vanished from her apartment and only contacted her workplace after a week 
had elapsed, in order to inform her employers that she has been permitted to 
settle in Canada and was given a work permit, Hungarian officials presumed 
that she had been in contact with Canadian counter-espionage officers for 
years.54 
Hungary closely monitored changes in the way in which Canada 
conducted its counter-espionage activities in 1969-70, partly because 
Hungarian officials working at the embassy in Ottawa, as well as at the trade 
commission in Montreal, reported that they were being much more closely 
watched. One Hungarian official visiting Montreal found that his hotel room 
had been thoroughly searched while he was out and that his wife had been 
followed by Canadian officers.55 Around the same period, two RCMP 
officers visited the workplace of a Hungarian immigrant who was a close 
acquaintance of a Hungarian intelligence officer, affiliated with the Trade 
Commission in Montreal. The acquaintance noticed that the RCMP officers 
produced a complete list of all people associated with the Trade Commission 
during the meeting and many of the questions had to do with the end of the 
current consul's mandate and his return to Hungary in August 1969.56 
Although it was seen as standard practice for the RCMP to increase its interest 
in the work of an Eastern Bloc country's mission when high-ranking 
diplomats were preparing to leave, authorities in Hungary were finding that 
activities of Canadian counter-intelligence officials was becoming more 
systematic, orderly and thorough.57 
The Hungarian Embassy in Ottawa soon learned this first-hand when 
on January 10, 1970, Janos Hegedtis, the mission's First Secretary in charge of 
commercial affairs, found himself accused by the RCMP of espionage and 
was promptly expelled from the country.58 Hungary ended up "retaliating" 
soon after, by expelling a Canadian diplomat who worked at the Canadian 
embassy in Budapest. Hungarian authorities continued to closely monitor the 
activities of Canadian diplomats in Budapest even into the early 1980s, by 
interviewing neighbours in their respective apartment blocks and rummaging 
through their garbage.59 
When it came to the activities of Hungarian diplomatic missions in 
Canada, the RCMP was correct in suspecting that the Hungarian Trade 
Commission in Montreal was involved in collecting intelligence and that 
several of its high ranking employees were, in fact, in contact with Hungarian 
State Security. The most prominent was A.S., who was also referred to as 
"Maclou." Maclou originally served as the director of the state-run Kultura 
Foreign Trade Corporation, which dealt with the sale and distribution of 
Hungarian books and magazines abroad. The state security contact first visited 
Canada and the US in 1959 with instructions from his superiors to engage in 
research on subjects that may be of use to future agents, such as the 
relationship and cooperation between Canadian and American intelligence 
officers, how business circles viewed the detente between the US and the 
Soviet Union, and the degree of influence that the Hungarian immigration's 
"fascist and progressive movements" each have within the host country.611 
Yet Maclou's relationship with Hungarian State Security was 
ambivalent and strained from the start. Although he was not an official 
intelligence officer, Maclou did serve as one of the agency's official contacts. 
He did, however, place limits on his cooperation and noted that he would only 
participate in assignments that did not endanger him, or his foreign trade 
activities in any way.61 
Despite this condition, Maclou was well respected and intelligence 
officers in Hungary felt that since he was discreet and cautious, he could 
handle the task at hand. Perhaps this explains why Maclou was chosen to lead 
the Hungarian Trade Commission in Montreal, when it was first established in 
1964. The Trade Commission was meant to play a key role in Hungary's 
intelligence operations in Canada and authorities felt that this new office could 
help gather sensitive information on Canada and the US.62 Initially, the 
Montreal Trade Commission was to have three employees, including a trade 
counsel, an administrator and a secretary, but the government of Hungary and 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) agreed, that additional staff 
members would be added in the future. 3 Maclou was appointed to lead the 
Trade Commission and he began his mandate in October 1964. 
Hungarian authorities miscalculated when they appointed Maclou to 
head the commission. The commissioner provided the Interior Ministry with 
virtually no useful information and refused to cooperate with the Hungarian 
Embassy in Ottawa. In 1965, "B" from the embassy complained that when he 
invited Maclou to Ottawa, the commissioner was "secretive" and that he "did 
not accept any advice given to him, nor did he heed warnings."64 Even more 
troubling was that Maclou regularly went on official trips without consulting 
with the embassy before hand, often spent his weekends with 1956 dissidents 
in Montreal who he had befriended and even called into question whether 
Canadian authorities were engaged in counter-intelligence work against the 
embassy and the trade commission.6^ According to B, Maclou "wanted to 
avoid providing a detailed account of his work and stated that although he 
knows many people, he only has basic information on them, but nothing that 
would be of interest" to the embassy.66 Maclou, it appeared, was intent on 
providing "benevolent" reports on individuals, and was not comfortable 
releasing too much information to embassy officials in Ottawa, nor to 
authorities in Hungary. In the end. B informed Maclou that he intended to 
travel to Montreal in the near future, and that he expected to discuss all his 
Canadian and Hungarian acquaintances, but the commissioner was not at all 
enthusiastic about the idea.6 
The situation at the Trade Commission continued to unravel when 
I.K., a military attache and informant, was assigned to Canada and asked for 
Maclou's help should he stumble upon any problems or face challenges while 
getting accustomed to his new posting.6h Maclou was unwilling to help and 
"prohibited" I.K. from providing any information to the embassy in Ottawa on 
the Trade Commission's programs and plans, because the commissioner 
would "only communicate what he sees fit."69 When Maclou demanded to see 
the operational reports that I.K. had written, the latter refused, which led to a 
heated argument and "scandalous scenes" at the Trade Commission.70 
Hungarian authorities gave up on trying to acquire valuable intel-
ligence from Maclou in March 1967, noting that the commissioner was only 
willing to "maintain the most basic levels of official contact" with the Interior 
Ministry.71 Maclou's unwillingness to cooperate and provide compromising 
information on his acquaintances in Montreal demonstrates that informants 
did enjoy a certain level of autonomy, and what information they passed on to 
their superiors was, at least in part, their personal choice. 
Despite Maclou's unwillingness to cooperate, Canadian authorities 
recognized that the Trade Commission's original purpose was, in part, to 
gather intelligence. Hungarian officials in Ottawa and in Budapest were 
convinced that the RCMP was actively involved in counter-espionage activity 
directed against the embassy and the commission, well into the late sixties and 
seventies. For example, Hungarian authorities believed that when on 
September 20, 1965, the Trade Commission was broken into — but the 
intruders only seemed interested in searching through the files and papers — 
the RCMP was behind the action and that it also kept the embassy's building 
under direct surveillance that same night.72 
Hungary's heightened interest and concern regarding what it saw as 
increased and more effective counter-intelligence activity on the part of the 
RCMP led authorities at the Interior Ministry to prepare a report on 
intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in Canada in 1981. The 
material in the report was partly based on Soviet findings and included 
detailed information on how the RCMP monitored the activities of Eastern 
bloc embassies and how the unique characteristics of specific cities — such as 
the relatively depopulated streets in downtown Ottawa — were used to their 
advantage. 
Even if Canada stepped up its counter-intelligence activities, Hungary 
was not dissuaded from sending informants to Canada during the 
mid-eighties. "Istvan Kovacs," for example, was one such informant, who 
visited Andrew Laszlo, the editor and publisher of Magyar Elet (Hungarian 
Life), a weekly newspaper printed in Toronto but distributed widely 
throughout Canada and the United States. The paper had a reputation of being 
both conservative and staunchly anti-Soviet, and Laszlo also seemed to have 
contacts in President Ronald Reagan's administration. Kovacs spent one 
month in Canada, in November 1982, and his assignment was to gather 
information on Laszlo, his paper, and Hungarian immigrants in the editor's 
entourage, as well as to detect differences and tensions within the community, 
especially among those who found the editor's politics and style too extreme. 4 
Kovacs was systematic in the way in which he collected information and his 
report aimed to shed light on what he believed were Laszlo's connections with 
underground opposition leaders in Hungary, his contacts with Hungarian 
immigrants living in Western Europe, and plans that he and other immigrants 
may have had to weaken the Hungarian regime and the Soviet Union's 
authority in Eastern Europe by funding or otherwise supporting the 
opposition. Despite the fact that Laszlo did not fully trust Kovacs, the 
informant was able to gather a significant amount of information which 
interested Hungarian authorities. Laszlo claimed that Magyar Elet received 
funding from Canadian and American governmental sources, as well as 
directly from the "secret service," due to the paper's reputation for being 
strongly anti-Soviet and broadly supportive of US foreign policy, especially 
under the Reagan administration.7' According to Kovacs's report, Laszlo's 
daughter, "Dudu" was responsible for keeping in touch with the "Secret 
Service."76 
In addition to his political contacts in the US, Western Europe and 
with opposition figures in Hungary, Laszlo also claimed to know a significant 
amount of information on the Hungarian Embassy in Ottawa, and asserted that 
"only spies work there," specifically referring to "Sz," one of the more 
prominent diplomats, who was apparently being closely watched by the 
RCMP.77 Kovacs painted a disturbing image of Laszlo, noting that he had an 
"important role in the Hungarian immigrant community."7S Kovacs's findings 
led Hungarian authorities to follow up on the intelligence and verify some of 
the most controversial statements, such as the alleged public funding that 
Magyar Elet received and Laszlo's contacts with opposition figures in 
Hungary. 
Kovacs's reports on Hungarians in Canada and Magyar Elet in 
particular may be best characterized as "malevolent," especially when com-
pared with the relatively harmless and mundane observations produced some 
other informers. Several of the agents assigned to Canada were themselves 
victims of coercive tactics used by Hungarian state security, but a few 
demonstrated a significant degree of agency, by writing "benign" reports that 
would not likely cause problems for people being named and providing 
officials in Hungary with limited and selective information. At times, this lack 
of'useful' information frustrated Hungarian authorities, but it did not dampen 
their interest in Canada during the Cold War. Canada's position as America's 
northern neighbour, its close political, economic, social and military ties with 
the US, as well as the existence of large populations of Hungarian immigrants 
in major urban centres like Toronto and Montreal, made it fertile ground to 
gather information of significance in relation to both international politics 
during the Cold War, and also to issues of domestic interest to Hungary. 
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Entrepreneurship is one of the newest fields of study in the management sci-
ences. The phenomenon of entrepreneurship, however, is far from novel — it 
is one of the oldest activities of mankind. To identify new business 
possibilities and to exploit them in new ventures for economic gain has always 
been important in human life. 
The use of the concept of "entrepreneurship" goes back a long time in 
both the French and English languages. "Entrepreneur" was originally a 
French word. It appeared for the first time in the 1437 Dictionnaire de la 
language Frangaise. The most common meaning of the word was "celui qui 
entreprend quelque chose," alluding to a person who is active and achieves 
something. Medieval French authors referred to the entrepreneur as someone 
who is tough and prepared to risk his own life and fortune. For a long time no 
similarity to the French entrepreneur existed in the English language. In 1755 
A Dictionary of the English Language used the following definition: 
"Adventurer, he that seeks occasion of hazard, he that puts himself in the hand 
of chance." The 1956 Hungarian refugees were entrepreneurs in this classical 
sense of the term. Many of them risked their lives and fortunes during the 
revolution; they faced hazards, took enormous risks and put themselves in 
harm's way when they crossed Hungary's border. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the subject of entrepreneurship 
and the 1956 Hungarian refugees. First, the elements of entrepreneurship in 
light of the experiences of five 1956 Hungarian refugees who became 
successful entrepreneurs, will be illustrated. Next, the 1956 Hungarian 
refugees will be compared to a highly entrepreneurial ethnic group of the 
United States: the Cubans. The paper will analyze Roger Waldinger's 
interactive model of ethnic business development in the context of the 1956 
Hungarian refugees. Finally, opportunities for Hungarian ethnic 
entrepreneurship research will be discussed. 
Recent entrepreneurship research is characterized by a long standing 
difficulty of how to define the central concepts within entrepreneurship and 
small business research and to define the entrepreneurial domain. Many of the 
elements of entrepreneurship are multifaceted and heterogeneous, and difficult 
to qualify and quantify. Different studies have used different approaches, 
depending whether viewed from an economic, management or psychological 
perspective. The theoretical study of ethnic entrepreneurship is based 
primarily within the field of sociology. The early attempts at measuring 
entrepreneurship were shaped by the focus on firm size that was mostly 
decided by number of employees. In this context, entrepreneurship was 
mostly identified with the number of Small Medium Enterprises. 
Self-employment figures were also used as a measure to reflect the level of 
entrepreneurship. Later studies such as Paul Reynold's postulate that entre-
preneurship is defined as individuals who are in the process of establishing a 
company or who have recently started a company (within the last 42 months)/ 
In our paper the terms entrepreneurship, the starting of a company, and small 
business will be used interchangeably. 
Small businesses have been vital for the growth of an economy. In 
2003 the Bank of Montreal Financial Group estimated that small to medium 
enterprises or SMEs (defined as business with fewer than 500 employees and 
the self-employed) accounted for nearly 63% of all jobs across Canada in that 
year. Since 1983, the SMEs' employment figures have grown at 2.4% 
compound annual rate representing a cumulative 3.7 million increase. 
Meanwhile, employment at large enterprises has grown at a rate of 1%, 
representing a cumulative increase of 1.0 million. Since 1983, SMEs have 
created more than 78% of all new jobs in Canada.3 Small to medium firms are 
leaders in innovation. Most Canadian exporters are small to medium firms 
(85%), and entrepreneurship has become the number one choice for 
Canadians as a rewarding career path (41%).4 
Traditionally, studies of entrepreneurship have focused on the 
individual characteristics of successful entrepreneurs such as personality, 
educational attainment, work experience, and ethnic origin. Personality 
studies have found that the prototype entrepreneur is opportunistic, innova-
tive, imaginative, an ideas-person, and agent of change, restless, adventurous, 
proactive and is someone who adopts a broad financial strategy.' 
Entrepreneurial vision and family traditions are also associated with entre-
preneurship.6 
The '56-ers as Entrepreneurs 
Frank Hasenfratz, a 1956 refugee from Hungary, recognized a business 
opportunity in the auto parts industry. "He was working in the machine shop 
of a company whose products included fuel pumps for Ford Motor Co. 
Almost a quarter of the pumps were defective, which so frustrated Hasenfratz 
that he quit the company and landed the contract to supply the pumps himself. 
It was an adventurous move for a young breadwinner with two small children. 
In 1965 the sectoral free trade introduced under the Canada-U.S. auto pact 
came into effect, and Hasenfratz started getting more and more contracts from 
Detroit. His auto parts business, Linamar took off."7 In 2006 Linamar, with 
close to 11,000 employees in 36 manufacturing locations, generated sales of 
nearly 2.3 billion Canadian dollars. 
William Mihalik who came to Canada after the 1956 revolution, was 
imaginative; he anticipated and foresaw a demand for used clothing among 
the newly arrived Hungarians. Because in the beginning the refugees could 
not find a job in their fields of expertise, many of them took entry-level 
employment in the hospitality industry. "Mihalik took a chance in 1958 on a 
shuttered used-clothing operation at 54-56 Kensington Ave. He committed to 
a $50 monthly rent and named it William's Clothing Store. He started his 
operation by taking gifts of bottles of scotch to Toronto's Goodwill and other 
thrift stores. He made each store manager an offer, call me first if you get 
white shirts, black pants, tuxedos and fur coats, and I will bring you another 
bottle. Soon, he was doing good business supplying a generation of 
Hungarian waiters with work clothing".,s In 1981 his son Tom bought the 
business from him, and it became Tom's Place. In 1998 Tom's Place sold 
about $8 million worth of designer clothing. His sales per square foot, a key 
measure in retail, top $1000, more than twice the industry average.9 
Anna Porter, another 1956 Hungarian refugee, the founder of Key 
Porter books, is an ideas person. The success of her publishing company in 
the small margin industry is due to her approach to writers and their writing. "I 
suppose coming from a country where freedom of speech was a serious 
problem and writers tended to be imprisoned, I have always valued the 
freedom to ask the writer, what is on your mind, even if it is critical of our 
government, as most writers are" said Anna Porter.10 Key Porter Publishing 
had such an excellent reputation among authors, that some of the finest writers 
in Canada, such as Farley Mowat, Allan Fotheringham and Margaret Atwood 
chose to publish their works with it." By the time Anna Porter sold her 
publishing company in 2005 it was the largest Canadian-owned publishing 
house in the country. 
Entrepreneurs are considered successful, in part, if they visualize a 
future not seen or thought possible by others in their industry. Robert Lantos, 
a 1956 Hungarian refugee, had an ambitious vision. He wanted to stamp 
Canada on the entertainment-world map. By convincing American TV 
executives that Canadian products would play on their networks he had TV 
series and telefilms in development at every U.S. network by 1995. His 
company, Alliance Communication Corporation was the largest producer and 
distributor of Canadian and International films and TV shows in Canada, 
exporting over $130 million worth of products in 1994. In 1998 he sold his 
controlling interest in Alliance to focus on the creative process.12 
Andrew Sarlos, a Bay Street investor and a 1956 Hungarian refugee, 
adopted a broad financial strategy when he started his investment company. 
With an initial $500 investment, in 1974 he set up his personal holding 
company, Donbarn Investments Ltd. and went out to find a financial backing. 
He approached businessman Max Tanenbaum and told him: "Look, I have 
reached the point in my life that I no longer want to work for someone else, I 
want to be on my own, I believe my nature no longer suitable to be an 
employee, but I have background, I have experience, I have capability and I 
believe you and I can work together as long as I don't work for you and I am 
independent." When Max Tanenbaum asked Sarlos how much money he 
wanted, he answered boldly, $250,000. In a very short period of time 
Tanenbaum gave Andrew Sarlos the money without any security.11 Andrew 
Sarlos knew how to play the odds. In 1977 alone the value of stock in his 
investment trust, HCI Holdings Ltd., more than tripled and at one point so 
many people wanted to buy shares in his firm that trading on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange had to be halted for four hours.14 
Individuals are more likely to be self-employed if there is a family 
tradition of self-employment and if they had worked at part time jobs as 
children.15 After Robert Lantos and his family left Hungary, his mother made 
dresses, and his father sold factory textiles at a market stall and Robert's first 
job was to help his father.16 Tom Mihalik also worked in his father's clothing 
store during his school year. Anna Porter's grandfather, Vilmos Racz, was a 
well-known editor and publisher in Hungary. In late 1945 Andrew Sarlos' 
father had a serious accident, which made him incapacitated. Sarlos had a 
part-time job at the age of 14 to help out the family.1 
The revival of small business has been widely accompanied by the 
infusion of ethnic groups into the ranks of proprietors. Self-employment has 
accounted for a substantial share of employment among newcomers to Canada 
and to the United States over the last few decades. Borjas. using U.S. census 
data from 1970 and 1980, examined the propensity for immigrants and native 
born groups to be self-employed, finding that the likelihood of being 
self-employed is 11.7 percent for native-born, versus 16.5 percent for 
immigrants.lfs The historical record also shows considerable disparities in 
self-employment among various immigrant groups. In the United States 
Hispanic-owned businesses account for the largest category of minority-
owned firms. Although Cubans represent a small percentage of the Hispanic 
population, they have achieved a remarkable growth in ethnic entre-
preneurship in Miami. The literature attributes a central role to the influx of 
Cuban immigrants to the transformation of Miami, which has been called the 
capital of Latin America, from a stagnant city to a booming economy.'9 The 
golden exiles, the immigrants who left Cuba after Castro took power, are very 
similar in characteristics to the 1956 Hungarian refugees. 
Before the 1959 Cuban refugees arrived to the United States there 
were three waves of exodus from Cuba. The first wave of immigrants came in 
the mid-1800s. Cuban political exiles plotting to overthrow Spanish rule took 
refuge in three U.S. cities, New York, Key West and Tampa. Several 
entrepreneurs in the cigar industry moved their operations from Havana to the 
United States in the 1860s and 1870s, providing additional employment to 
new Cuban immigrants. In the 1930s a large number of immigrants came to 
Miami, fleeing the effects of the revolution against Geraldo Machado.-0 
By 1956 Canada already had three waves of Hungarian immigration. 
The first wave came during the turn of the twentieth century. They were 
driven from their homeland by poverty, rural overpopulation, and economic 
dislocation.21 The second wave of Hungarian immigrants was "pushed" by 
political upheavals: revolution, counter-revolution and territorial dismem-
berment of the country during and after the First World War. The third wave 
left Hungary near the end of World War II because of the country's imminent 
conquest by the Red Army. 
On January 1, 1959, the Cuban rebels triumphed, dictator Batista fled 
to the Dominican Republic, and Fidel Castro took control. Castro transformed 
Cuba into a communist state, nationalizing industry and confiscating private 
property. As a result tens of thousands of Cubans left their homeland. A 
communist regime was also the cause of the exodus of close to 200,000 
Hungarian refugees in 1956 and 1957. Both Cubans and Hungarians left with 
the knowledge that going back to their home country was not an option. Both 
groups faced a language barrier in their new countries. The Cuban immigrants 
of the 1960s were doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, judges, bureaucrats, 
merchants and skilled workers. At the time on the CBC News Eric Sevareid 
characterized the Cuban exodus, as "the biggest brain drain the Western 
Hemisphere has know".22 Professional elements were over-represented among 
the 1956 Hungarian refugees also; about half of them were high or technical 
high school graduates, a great many of them were engineers, medical doctors 
or technicians. J.W. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 
1956, summarized: "I think we got as fine a group of immigrants as ever came 
to Canada in the whole of our history."23 
There were many similarities in the characteristics of the two groups, 
but their image in their new countries was very different. While the 1956 
Hungarian refugees enjoyed overwhelming support both from the 
governments and the public, the Cuban exiles had to face hostility. 
The Miami city authorities made it more difficult for Cubans to live in 
their city than did any other municipality in the United States. Miami's City 
Hall did not issue business licenses anywhere North of Eighth Street to people 
who did not speak English. To ease the problems of Miami, the federal 
authorities undertook a massive effort to relocate the Cuban refugees to New 
York and New Jersey. The American media was predicting ethnic frictions 
and social disorder. We should add that in 1959 the Cuban refugees had 
arrived to the United States during an economic recession compounded by a 
period of unusually bad weather. In 1956 the Hungarian refugees had come to 
Canada during a period of economic prosperity. However over the years the 
Cubans not only pulled themselves up from poverty, but they turned the 
economy of their adopted city around. Cuban entrepreneurs opened numerous 
car dealerships, construction firms, textile and leather goods manufacturing. 
Miami's Cuban population was large enough to sustain Cuban grocers, 
clothiers, barbers and other tradesmen. By 1985 there were some 18,000 busi-
nesses owned and operated by Cubans in the city."4 The success of the Cuban 
exiles in Miami is a much-studied topic in ethnic entrepreneurship. Com-
paring the group characteristics and the circumstances of the migrations it is 
safe to speculate that the 1956 Hungarian refugees made a similar contribution 
to Canada's economy. 
The question why some ethnic groups do better in business than 
others is pivotal to academics, businessmen and politicians. Pioneers in the 
study of ethnicity and entrepreneurship, Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich 
and Robin Ward tried to answer this question using a framework based on two 
dimensions: the opportunity structure in the host country and the charac-
teristics of the ethnic group. 5 Waldinger and his co-researchers identified two 
opportunity structure conditions that are essential for the development of 
immigrant business: market conditions and access to ownership. Market 
conditions that favour products or services that are aimed at fellow ethnics, or 
an economic environment in which a wider, non-ethnic market might be 
served, coupled with opportunities for ownership, are conducive to ethnic 
business development. Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward argue that predisposing 
factors such as: selective migration, blocked mobility and aspiration levels, 
combined with the ability to mobilize resources, are the most critical ethnic 
group characteristics that determine the success of self-employment. Close ties 
to fellow ethnics, the networks of kinship and friendship and favourable 
government policies are the conditions out of which ethnic entrepreneurship 
may arise. Waldinger and his associates classify the conditions that influence 
the self-employment process for an immigrant group into three categories: (1) 
pre-migration characteristics, (2) the circumstances of migration and their 
evolution, and (3) post migration characteristics. The Waldinger, Aldrich and 
Ward model is dynamic; it is the interaction of the two dimensions that creates 
the ethnic enterprise. 
One purpose of this study is to demonstrate, using the "Waldinger 
model," that the 1956 Hungarian refugees as a group were predisposed to self-
employment. By mobilizing critical resources, they thrived in an 
entrepreneurial environment. The method of our analysis will be qualitative, 
and our approach will be analytical. Our examination of the experiences of the 
1956 Hungarian refugees will be based on the existing literature on Hungarian 
Canadians.26 
Pre-migration Characteristics 
The Waldinger et al. model is designed to explain immigrant entre-
preneurship. Although the 1956 Hungarians were refugees, they shared 
several characteristics with other entrepreneurial economic immigrants.2' They 
were skilled, educated, came mainly from urban centres, and were often from 
the middle class of their country. One can assume that at least the potential for 
entrepreneurship existed among them. However, because they were refugees, 
they were in many ways distinct from other immigrant groups. While 
economic immigrants often make extensive plans to start a new life in another 
country, learn the host country's language, and collect capital, the 1956 
Hungarian refugees had no opportunity to learn English before they left their 
homeland, and coming from a communist country, none of them had any 
capital. Economic immigrants select the country of their destination on the 
basis of where their skills will be in most demand. The 1956 Hungarian 
refugees had little choice as to where to go. Those among them who chose 
Canada were grateful that at least one country was willing to offer them a 
home. While economic immigrants often retain trading relationship with their 
country of origin, and may return there to arrange deals or to borrow money, 
the 1956 Hungarian refugees had no access to their homeland. Some of these 
characteristics had special implications for their involvement in the 
self-employment segment. 
Selective Migration 
Leaving one's home to take up a life in a new society is self-selective. 
Emigrant workers tend to be more motivated and more inclined towards risk, 
which gives them an advantage in the entrepreneurial competition.~s The 
events that led to the coming of 37,656 Hungarian refugees to Canada started 
with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's historical "secret" speech in February 
of 1956 denouncing Stalin and his crimes. In June a worker's uprising was 
crushed in Poland, but in that country a more liberal communist regime 
surfaced. Unrest soon spread to Hungary. The Hungarian Revolution began 
on October 23, 1956, when in Budapest students met to express solidarity 
with the new Polish regime, which advocated a greater freedom of speech and 
worship. The repression of this protest by police led to rioting, which in turn 
led to swift intervention by Russian troops and tanks from Soviet bases from 
inside Hungary. Some units of the Hungarian army joined the revolutionaries. 
By the end of October the Revolution seem to had triumphed when the Soviet 
leadership decided to intervene once more, this time with large forces sent in 
from the Soviet Union. Resistance was soon crushed. There was much 
destruction in Budapest. Altogether some 2,500 Hungarians lost their lives in 
the fighting and 20,000 were wounded.21' Hunger began to stalk Budapest. 
Terror returned as the arrest and deportation of thousands to forced labour 
camps started. After mid-November, tens of thousands of Hungarians began 
leaving their country through the Austrian and Yugoslav borders. 
Most of the 1956 Hungarian refugees made the decision to leave their 
homes in an instant. Many of those who ended up in Canada never even 
contemplated leaving their homeland until they found out that the police were 
looking for them, presumably because of their role in the revolution. During 
the revolution Andrew Sarlos had joined the National Guard, the newly 
formed volunteer militia. Their arsenal was limited and his comrades-in-arms 
were untrained youngsters. Within a week after the second Soviet intervention 
all resistance ceased. Anna Porter had been at school when a friend told her 
that there was a demonstration going on that day, October 23rd, 1956. 
Excitedly, the young teenagers headed out to the event and joined what grew 
into the Hungarian revolution, all the while not quite clear on what was 
happening. Anna even got hold of a gun when they were handed out from the 
back of a Hungarian military vehicle. When the revolution had failed, Anna's 
mother collected some money by selling their paintings and gathered what 
belongings they could take and headed to the border. (l During these days 
Frank Hasenfratz was elected a revolutionary council member. He took part in 
the fighting, and his unit destroyed two Soviet tanks. When he saw that the 
chain of command broke down, he knew the revolution was near the end.31 As 
a refugee he ended up in the French port Le Havre. In Le Havre he signed on 
to a freighter for a passage to Canada in exchange for work. The 1956 
Hungarian revolution was an entrepreneurial self-selective process. During the 
events of the revolution and after its defeat, the 1956 Hungarian refugees 
demonstrated their entrepreneurial spirit, their willingness to take risks, and 
their ability to adapt to new circumstances. It is not surprising that J. W. 
Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 1956, called the group 
"an Immigration Minister's dream."32 
Blocked mobility 
The blocked mobility or relative disadvantage thesis argues that the barriers 
experienced by immigrants due to their lack of language skills, non-
recognition of their credentials, unfamiliarity with the social, economic and 
legal structure of the host society cause many to turn to self-employment as an 
alternative to wage labour. Immigrants' limited range of income generating 
skills spurs them into business as well. The Hungarian communist system in 
the early 1950s deliberately and systematically isolated the country, and 
within it the individual citizens, from all Western influences. Most of the 
refugees knew very little of their new country and few of them knew English. 
In the late 1940s in Hungary, Marxist-Leninist dogma was imposed 
on the country's political and economic system. All institutions became 
controlled by the state, itself run by the all-powerful Communist Party. 
Thereafter the economy was centrally planed without respect for market 
forces. Generally accepted economic principles were ignored, the economic 
system was characterized by unmet demands, inferior quality consumer 
goods, and arbitrary treatment of employees and customers. 
In terms of education the 1956 Hungarian Refugees as a group were 
highly qualified. Although in Hungary a large number of them — both men 
and women — had been employed in technical and skilled occupations, their 
talents were not readily marketable in Canada. In many cases the refugees' 
technical expertise was above the Canadian standards in their respective 
fields, but in addition to their inability to communicate, the refugees lacked 
the knowledge of basic Canadian industrial practices. Lacking the opportunity 
for appropriate career employment, one could argue that a number of 1956 
Hungarian refugees were more likely to strike out on their own. Some 
Hungarian refugees would perhaps enter small business, because it allowed 
them to earn a living while limiting interaction with the unfamiliar culture of 
the host-country. 
Andrew Sarlos graduated in economics at the Karl Marx University in 
Budapest, but he had no papers to prove it. When he came to Canada he 
started as a clerk at a small accounting firm for $25 per week, and to 
supplement his wages he was also working in a soft drink bottling and 
imported gourmet food business. William Mihalik was unable to find steady 
work at first; to support himself, he opened a clothing store in Toronto's 
Kensington Market. When he arrived to Canada young Hasenfratz ended up 
working on a farm near Guelph. 
Aspiration level 
Immigrants' social origin also influences the way they perceive their chances 
of getting ahead. They view their job's status, as well as their economic 
rewards differently than members of their host country. William Mihalik had 
worked in clothing and furniture sales before he left Hungary; in Canada he 
ended up doing the same line of work — he became a shopkeeper. His son, 
Tom Mihalik, an immigrant himself, had a hard school life. "He did not know 
English, was teased for his accent, for his looks, he was just different. He took 
refuge is his father's store." "When I was 12 years old," remembers Tom 
Mihalik, "I knew I wanted to run a clothing business like my father. And I 
wanted a Cadillac Eldorado."33 A young man born in Canada and aspiring to 
work as a manager behind a desk in an office might find the idea of taking 
over a small store less than ideal. For a 1956 Hungarian refugee being self-
employed could be a dream fulfilled. For a Hungarian citizen in communist 
Hungary the opportunity of owning a small business was very slim. By the 
beginning of the 1950s all banks, mines and strategic big businesses had been 
nationalized and almost all small-medium enterprises had been forced into 
collectives. Existing small business owners were intimidated, in some cases 
they faced physical violence and even their families were discriminated 
against.34 Since some of the 1956 Hungarian refugees would know somebody, 
who before the communists had taken power made a respectable living as an 
owner of a small business, and maybe because being self-employed had been 
all but prohibited in their home country, some of them were eager to give it a 
try in Canada. "I had a dream many years ago to have a small machine shop 
with a few employees," said Frank Hasenfratz.35 
The 1956 Hungarian refugees were predominantly young people, 
only about 5000 of them were over the age of 45. Because of their age, their 
perceptions of job hierarchy were different than that of a more mature group's. 
It could be argued that the 1956 refugees were more concerned with economic 
mobility than with social status. Taking over or starting a small business was 
in their view probably a positive alternative to working for someone else, as 
well as the best way of getting ahead. 
Circumstances of Migration 
Migration scholars increasingly agree that whether newcomers arrive as 
temporary migrants or permanent settlers, makes a great difference in their 
propensity to seek a life of self-employment. Immigrants who plan to return 
home, or visit home regularly and assess success in terms of their pre-
emigration standard of living, are more interested in instant financial rewards, 
and will likely work for someone else. Permanence is likely to add an edge to 
the settler's quest for opportunity. If a temporary migrant does not succeed in 
the country of his destination, he or she can return home. For newcomers who 
come to their new homeland for good, success is a must as for them there is 
no going back. It is for this reason that permanent immigrants tend to be more 
self-assertive, which is a requirement of entrepreneurial success. 
As soon as the 1956 refugees crossed Hungary's borders they knew 
that there was no returning. They were aware of the violent reprisals that the 
newly-established Kadar regime inflicted on its real or perceived enemies. 
After the fall of 1956 many thousands in Hungary were imprisoned and 
thousands were executed/16 For many years after 1956 the Hungarian refugees 
faced prison terms if they returned. When it became obvious to Andrew 
Sarlos that the revolution could not go further, he felt that he was left with 
little choice. Staying in Hungary would mean prison, and with his record, 
probably death. For Sarlos the decision to leave was relatively easy to make. 
For him the evil he knew was far worse than the uncertainty he faced."17 Frank 
Hasenfratz knew that for his membership in the revolutionary council he 
would either end up in Siberia or be executed. The Hungarian refugees, 
knowing that they had to make a future for themselves in emigration, were 
probably more interested in long-term economic progress than short-term 
financial success; and dead-end jobs might have spurred them into starting up 
a business of their own. Setting up a business is a risky endeavour. Immig-
rants who plan to return home with some capital would take the safer option 
and work for someone else, while the entrepreneurial Hungarian refugees 
would plan for the long run and might take the risk to start a small business. 
Another condition of successful immigrant business activity is 
settlement pattern. Permanent immigrants usually arrive with immediate 
family members; temporary immigrants often leave family members behind. 
Therefore temporary immigrants must send funds to support families living at 
home, while permanent settlers can use the money to start up a business. 
Family members can also be sources of cheap labour to maintain economies 
of scale. Generally, the single immigrant has the propensity to accumulate 
financial capital, the foundation of any enterprise, at a higher rate. Should a 
married refugee decide to become self-employed, he or she may rely on his or 
her spouse for financial support needed to enter into ventures, or help with 
running a small business. Most of the 1956 refugees did not leave family 
behind. More than half of them were single and most were male. The next 
largest group, about 40 percent, were married, and the rest were divorced, 
widowed, or were children.38 The refugees as a group had family statuses that 
were conducive to venturing into entrepreneurship. Frank Hasenfratz, Robert 
Lantos, Anna Porter and Andrew Sarlos left Hungary as singles. William 
Mihalik left his wife and son at home, they joined him in 1968. 
Post-migration Characteristics 
Another factor that has a strong effect on the outcome of self-employment is 
the environment where the immigrants settle down. A great deal of research 
suggests that cities and well-defined geographic regions are incubators for 
entrepreneurship.39 Cities function as "open systems" to attract talented people 
from various backgrounds and stimulate their creative capacities. 0 The 
majority of the 1956 Hungarian refugees came from cities, in particular from 
Budapest. It is not surprising that most of them established themselves in 
Canada's major metropolitan areas. Refugees who arrived by ship at Halifax 
and St. John and were supposed to proceed by train to their appointed 
destinations in the West, rather disembarked in Montreal. It was estimated that 
over 40% of each trainload got off. Only the installation of a few railway 
guards around the station stopped the slipping out of the Hungarian 
refugees.41 Nearly half of the refugees settled in Ontario, Toronto receiving 
the largest number of them, nearly 8,100. Ottawa and Montreal also received 
large number of Hungarian immigrants. It has been estimated that close to 
7,000 Hungarian Jews entered Canada after the revolution.42 They were a 
highly urbanized group, and there is every reason to believe that the over-
whelming majority of them settled in Montreal and Toronto, the main centres 
of Jewish-Canadian life. By living in Canada's economically and socially most 
diverse, open, innovative regions, Toronto and Montreal, the refugees largely 
increased their chances of entering into the entrepreneurial stream. Another 
characteristic of a supportive environment that is critical for an immigrant is 
that the know-how of running a business can be acquired through on-the-job 
training. What is at work is the principle of cumulative social advantage: 
members of an ethnic group whose characteristics favour self-employment 
will be more likely to be hired by someone from the same ethnic group. 
Through their employment they will be more likely to be able to learn the 
business skills needed to eventually venture out on their own. 
Immediately after their arrival in Canada, the 1956 Hungarian 
refugees were generally well treated by members of the three previous groups 
of Hungarian immigrants. Although the previous generations had very 
different immigration experiences, which led to some ill-feelings and friction, 
for the most part the old Hungarian community tried to help the refugees. First 
hand knowledge about the workings of ownership also gives an advantage to 
the would be entrepreneur. It is safe to speculate that among the three waves 
of immigrants there were a few Hungarians who had already established 
businesses and were willing to hire the new-arrived refugees. Probably the 
jobs were at an entry level, but it gave the newcomers an opportunity to learn 
by observation, laying the foundations of self-employment. After all, in a 
restaurant, working in the kitchen, is the logical occupational bridge to 
becoming a restaurateur. 
Resource Mobilization 
William Peterson, one of the best-qualified scholars in the field of ethnic 
studies in the United States, defines the word ethnic as an adjective that refers 
to differences between categories of people. When it is linked to the noun 
"group", it implies that members of that group have some awareness of group 
membership. Members of an ethnic immigrant group are able to rely on 
support based on mutuality; they can also create resources that offset the 
harshness of the social and cultural environment they encounter. The social 
structure of an immigrant community tends to breed organizations both formal 
and informal. These informal and formal structures tend to provide ethnic 
entrepreneurs with resources that give them competitive advantage in the 
business world. Ethnic entrepreneurship is the formation of enterprises by an 
individual who uses some type of support, instrumental and/or expressive, 
from the ethnic community whose member he or she is.44 
Resource mobilization focuses on the social structures through which 
members of an ethnic group are attached to one another and the way these 
social structures are used. Such structures consist of two parts: the network of 
kinship and friendship of the ethnic communities and the interaction of these 
networks within the larger economy. Many of the formal Hungarian 
organizations that came into existence with the influx of the 1956 refugees 
were defined by the revolution. After their defeat, freedom fighter organiza-
tions went into exile. Some established "branches" in a number of countries, 
including Canada. Another Hungarian refugee organization was the Federa-
tion of Hungarian University and College Students of North America, with a 
member association in Canada. Just as important were the artistic and 
professional groups founded after 1956, most of which were brought about by 
refugee artists, musicians or professionals. Such an organization was 
Toronto's Kodaly Ensemble. Examples of new organizations were the 
associations of engineers, writers, agronomists, teachers and so on. Many 
informal organizations came into existence as well. With the addition of 
thousands to the Hungarian community, many activities that were not feasible 
before became realities. Ethnic schools were organized, where parents could 
meet informally, soccer teams were formed. Both Toronto's and Montreal's 
Jewish-Hungarian community also became very active. The 1956 Hungarian 
Refugees revitalized Hungarian community life. 
As the refugees settled into the networks of Hungarian groups, it 
became more likely that within these networks business related support and 
the spread of relevant information would take place. The 1956 refugees' social 
networks probably provided the opportunity for obtaining credit that was 
important to start a business. In addition to capital, through these 
organizations the owners of small businesses could rely on sources to obtain 
information about permits, laws, regulations, management practices, sites and 
reliable suppliers. Through the Hungarian community, partners could have 
been also secured. Partners are crucial to small business development, because 
they enable the immigrants to pool capital, reduce the need for outside labour, 
and reduce costs, which is essential to maintain the competitive edge. The 
informal Hungarian organization probably helped its members to connect to 
Hungarians in higher positions. These connections would have given an 
opportunity to secure loans and maybe money partners. 
An important issue facing small businesses is hiring employees. 
Unlike native-born Canadians, the 1956 refugees who started small businesses 
probably did not face difficulties in labour recruitment. In immigrant firms, 
ethnicity provides a common ground on which the terms of employment are 
negotiated, conflicts are resolved. Usually when an ethnic owner retains a kin 
or friend for employment, there is an understanding that the employment 
relationship is reciprocal.43 The relative ease of finding employees through the 
immigrant networks gives new enterprises viability. 
An informal gathering place for the 1956 refugees in Toronto was the 
area on Bloor St. between Spadina Ave. and Bathurst St. nicknamed 
"Schnitzel Row" because of the number of Hungarian restaurants and delis 
which could be found here.46 Another location was the Spadina Ave. and 
Kensington Market area. In the late 1950s and early 1960s one was as likely 
to hear Hungarian spoken in these two areas as one would English. 
"Kensington back then still had a lot of Jewish stores and a lot of Hungarians," 
remembers Tom Mihalik. "Most of the stores were family businesses, the 
owners lived on the second floor and the store was on the main floor. There 
was a real Hungarian community here. We had our own church, theatres, 
butchers and grocers. Kensington Market was haven for me. William's 
clothing store was a gathering place for Hungarians in the market. William 
Mihalik would cook breakfast in the store, and would play chess with the men 
who came by in the morning."47 Should a refugee need some help, job, 
information, maybe a little money or just psychological support, it was in 
these places that he or she would look and find them. Small business owners 
would also frequent these places to find reliable employees, to meet potential 
suppliers and customers or just for news. These areas would significantly 
increase the competitive advantage of Hungarian small businesses. 
It is safe to speculate that common ethnic ties allowed the 1956 
refugees to enter into business transactions within the fairly large, established 
Hungarian community. When small firms trust each other, the cost of 
transactions between them is likely to be lower, which would increase their 
profit margin. Regular cooperative transactions between entrepreneurial 
Hungarian suppliers, subcontractors and customers would have increased 
efficiency and ultimately the staying power of the Hungarian small business. 
Governments vary substantially in the level of economic assistance 
they provide to immigrants and ethnic minorities. On the political scene both 
the Canadian federal and provincial governments took exceptional measures 
to facilitate the settlement of the refugees. In 1956 Canada opened its doors 
and lowered existing barriers to immigration more quickly, and behaved more 
magnanimously, than during any previous refugee emergency. This country 
took in over 37,000 Hungarian refugees, almost 20% of those who had 
reached Austria, compared to the 38,000 admitted by the United States.48 
Neither the Prime Minister nor the Cabinet placed any explicit ceiling on the 
number of Hungarian to be admitted. The Cabinet established no formal 
guidelines regarding financial expenditures or any other related matters 
involving the movements of Hungarian refugees.4' In many cases normal 
immigration procedures such as screening for health, securities etc. were dis-
pensed with. 0 Canada not only accepted every Hungarian refugee who 
wanted to come, but it also paid for the refugees' passage as well. There were 
complex negotiations between the federal and provincial government 
regarding their acceptance of specific number of refugees, and their response-
bility for health and other care.51 
The 1956 Hungarian refugees arrived to their final destinations in 
Canada as fast as the government was able to bring them in by ship, plane and 
train. Clearly, they were not facing any restrictive conditions with respect to 
opening small businesses. On the contrary, they enjoyed unprecedented 
support from both levels of government. The economic conditions in Canada 
were also in favour of the 1956 Hungarian refugees. The country had 
prospered during the decade since World War II. Generally, Canada's gross 
national product and rate of unemployment suggested that the economic boom 
would continue.52 In light of prosperity and the need for skilled workers, it 
seemed that the economy would be able to absorb rapidly the large influx of 
refugee workers. The media and public opinion climate were overwhelmingly 
positive as well. A small northern Ontario town expressed reservation about 
the refugees, stating publicly: "We don't want them." Canadian public and 
media disapproval was so swift and emphatic that the town was forced to 
issue an official apology.53 As a result of the overwhelming Canadian support, 
the 1956 Hungarian refugees who contemplated to open up a small business 
should have felt encouraged. 
Conclusions 
The Waldinger et al. model implies that no single characteristic, whether pre-
migration or post-migration experiences or circumstances of migration, will 
determine the level of self-employment, but what will is how these various 
characteristics interact with one another and with the local opportunity 
structure. The 1956 Hungarian refugees were endowed with abundant 
predisposing factors: they were risk takers — highly motivated, well prepared, 
and able to adjust. They were ready and willing to build a new life in Canada. 
Probably for many of them the quest for the "good life" was using their 
entrepreneurial spirit and starting a small business. Circumstances also helped 
the formation of small enterprises. Both fellow Hungarians and Canadians 
welcomed them. Canadian cities acted as an incubator for the active 
Hungarian social networks, entrepreneurial creativity and innovation. The 
governments at both levels encouraged them, at least indirectly. There is 
every reason to believe that as the 1956 Hungarian refugees ' predisposing 
factors and their opportunities for resource mobilization interacted, it gave rise 
to many successful Hungar ian entrepreneurs. The case study literatures and 
anecdotal evidence substantiate this hypothesis. 
Whi le entrepreneurship and the Cuban exile experience have a varied 
voluminous academic literature, the 1956 Hungarian refugees as ethnic 
entrepreneurs is an unresearched academic subject. Potential entrepreneurs, 
policy makers and academics would largely benefi t f rom the scholarly s tudy 
of the rich experiences of the Hungarian refugees who ended up as 
entrepreneurs. But t ime is running out: many of them, including Will iam 
Mihalik and Andrew Sarlos, are already gone. 
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Remembering 1956: 
Invited Immigrants — The Sopron Saga 
Marta Mihaly 
I am telling my story. I do not intend to speak for anybody else in my group, 
which numbered 289, the Sopron Foresters, with whom I landed on Canada's 
shores early in 1957. Memories fade and the narrative may change. There is 
one thing though I know for absolute certain: I never intended to leave my 
homeland. Yet I had to, under duress, first as a child from Szekelyfold in 
Transylvania, soon after World War II, and again in 1957.1 know also that the 
saddest day of my youth is the 4th November 1956, the day when the 
Hungarian revolution collapsed. Times, places and political regimes changed, 
but in my heart and in my tradition I remained a proud, Szekely Hungarian, 
free and privileged as a Canadian citizen. 
My father was a forester and in 1956 I was studying to be one, in the 
last year (5lh year) of my studies in Sopron, just months before my diploma 
dissertation was due in forest engineering. The thought of freedom inspired 
me, which also sustained our Revolution. I was sure of our Revolution's 
glorious victory. I believed in the rebirth of a free and independent Hungary. I 
know too that the hopes of the Hungarian nation were similar to mine. But 
ours was the dream in 1956. Cast out from my country by force and landing 
on the Canadian shores were the reality. 
In this paper I would like to tell my version of the Sopron foresters' 
saga as I remember it after 50 years. Most of it is engraved into my heart's 
emotions forever, even if the memory of the mind may fade. The Revolution 
and what followed for 50 years is a unique historical chapter in the annals of 
Hungarian immigration to Canada. 
On the 4lh of November, 1956, I walked across the border from 
Sopron into Austria. I was one of more than 500 from the same institution 
among over 80 of my classmates in the 5lh year of Forest Engineering. The 
500 were a mixed lot: students from three faculties (forest, mining, and civii 
engineering), a good number of professors, and family members. The Soviet 
tanks bearing down on us, the border unguarded from the Sopron side, the 
Austrians did not stop us. 
A good number from the Sopron group was brought together by the 
Austrians and stayed together first near the border in Judenau in the hopes that 
soon we shall go home. As the days passed, our hopes slowly began to fade. 
Soon, Dr. Drimmel, the Austrian minister of education, appeared with 
arrangements for us to move to a grandiose mansion at Ferienhort on the shore 
of picturesque St. Wolfgang Lake (the place is known from the Sound of 
Music film). Dr. Drimmel thought this was a good transitional environment 
for us wanting to study German and to rehash materials we covered in class 
before we returned home. As the weeks went by the political situation in 
Hungary worsened. Returning was a big risk that many tried with various suc-
cesses. Slowly the news of our existence at Ferienhort become known 
practically all over the globe. Immigration agents from different countries 
started to appear. We were an ideal target, we were young and educated. 
It was at that time, to be specific, the 4ih of December 1956, that J.W. 
Pickersgill, Canada's minister of immigration, and a certain "Mr. Cox," a 
government representative, appeared. They brought a credible invitation. 
According to this, we were to be guaranteed by the Canadian government to 
continue our studies in Canada in Hungarian with our professors, during the 
period from 1957-1961, until all members of the group graduated. We would 
be the Sopron Division of the Faculty of Forestry at the University of British 
Columbia in Vancouver. After graduation we were to receive an appropriate 
university diploma, so it would be acceptable, if we returned to Hungary. This 
last point was very important to me, still hoping for a return to my homeland. 
The invitation was many ways good news, but it provoked arguments for and 
against the move. Many opposed it, mainly my classmates in the 5th year; 
others thought that Europe would be better. Finally by ballot the Canadian 
offer won! I supported it. 
All in all 30 of the 5lh year students accepted Canada, some stayed on 
in Europe, and a good number returned home. A copy of our contract with 
Canada was sent back to the University in Sopron and an authenticated copy 
was placed for safekeeping in the Vienna Archives. 
The Canadian government's invitation may have been a unique event 
in the history of their immigration, but it was a very definite stand also against 
the Soviets. This made us a global sensation. All the leading papers and 
journals sought the story, their way, hoping to create controversy and 
sensation. We were pestered by journalists and had to resist. The excitement 
did not fade until months later, it continued on well after we settled down in 
British Columbia. 
Our decision was lauded by contemporary poets and writers. J. A. 
Michener, the well-known American writer, travelled to the Austrian border to 
witness the struggle of the freedom seekers, he felt sorry that the Sopron 
group did not go to America. "What a vital impulse Vancouver is going to 
get" he wrote in his book The Bridge at Andau in 1957. 
After enjoying for almost two months the Austrians' gracious 
hospitality, on the 29lh of December our Canadian journey began. 289 of us 
left Salzburg and travelled across Europe by train to Liverpool, England. In 
the harbour the luxury liner Empress of Britain awaited us. It was New Years 
Eve and well-dressed citizens were everywhere on the way to parties. Liver-
pool was in very festive mood. Close to midnight I located my four-person 
cabin and settled in. Since I had very little to put away, the settling in was 
quickly done. 
Mid afternoon on January 1st, 1957, we left Europe. I remember the 
small farewell celebration on the deck. These were highly emotional hours for 
me; I still find it painful to think of it. 
We arrived in St. John, in New Brunswick on the 8th of January 1957. 
Most of us were seasick. It felt good to be on land. We received a welcoming 
cable from ministers Pickersgill and Sinclair. We were given $8 per person 
and some toiletry. The city welcomed us and I felt very grateful. Exactly 10 
years before there was another arrival for my family, as Szekely refugees from 
Romania to communist Hungary. The Hungarian authorities did not want us 
in. 
We boarded the train on the 19lh of January in St. John on the east 
coast and began the journey west. We stopped for a warm welcome in 
Montreal, than in Ottawa where Pickersgill was waiting for us at the train 
station. He called our train, the "the freedom train". We crossed the snow-
covered country with stops and other welcomes in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and 
Edmonton and at our first destination, Abbotsford near Vancouver, in British 
Columbia. People, young and old of all nationalities came to the stations to 
greet us. The Salvation Army and the Red Cross were waiting for us at all 
stations. All with welcoming presents and smiles. I felt humbled and very 
grateful for the generosity. 
After a month stay in Abbotsford we moved on, arrived on the 20 of 
February to Powell River where we spent six months. We were given housing 
by the local paper and pulp mill. Well kept and well fed, we had time to rest 
and start in earnest to learn English. Our cost was covered by the $65 per 
month, the amount each person received from the Department of Immigration. 
This help lasted until the end of the year. 
The community of Powell River was a small factory town located on 
one of the fiords of the British Columbia coastline, not very far from Vancou-
ver. It was there that we had the first opportunity to see the famous coastal 
rainforest. What a magical experience it was. Very different from anything I 
saw before. The trees were very tall, as if reaching to the sky, covered with 
bryophytes attached to bark and branches, like a bridal veil, standing in the 
misty sunshine. The ground covered with heavy undergrowth of ferns and 
other luscious green plants and giant decaying tree trunks lying in a chance 
created pattern, made the forest appear impenetrable. This was virgin forest, a 
mysterious and secretive place. I knew it right away: the massive complexity 
of this forest and enormous biomass, a true dauerwald, defies my 
understanding of silvics and silviculture. 
We spent 6-8 hours a day learning English. It was very concentrated 
and most effective. We had the highly qualified personnel of the provincial 
department of education, who did not speak Hungarian at all. 
Spring arrived, and it was time to look for summer jobs. Very few of us found 
any, the ones who did, were very lowly jobs, with a minimum pay. We were 
very disappointed and convinced that all the low-paying jobs were reserved 
for the Sopron group in B.C. But we did not know the ways of the Canadian 
students. They were in fact happy to get any kind of job for the summer, even 
with low pay. They were able to save up their tuition fees and more, for 
expenses, during the usual four months summer break. This was contrary to 
our experience at home, with much shorter summer breaks, including four 
weeks compulsory forestry training and another four in military camps. The 
State placed us into positions, set our wages, and gave directions as the 
bureaucrats saw it fit. This arrangement of total control robbed us from any 
experience useful in search for work in Canada. We did not know how to 
bargain and how to say no. Then another thing, we had absolutely no 
experience in the inner workings of the immigration system. This system 
automatically delegates everybody, who does not speak English or French 
sufficiently well to the same level, regardless of education or know-how. This 
is fine to a point, but there is more to the system I did not know, until I met 
professionals who came to Canada before me, which I considered then and 
consider now immorally predatory. People with high-level training are enticed 
to come, but then when they arrive the same system that brought them here 
prevents them practicing their profession in the most ridiculous ways of 
exclusion. So, when I started to search to pinpoint the roots of our problems in 
the early years, I started to think of Canada as the country of Ph.D. dish-
washers and MD hospital orderlies. And I realized how much a mistake it is to 
encourage the brain-drain from other, much worse off societies outside, and 
wasting talent not utilized, once inside. 
At the beginning of September we all moved to Vancouver, rented 
student accommodations near the university, and began classes in Forestry. 
Our professors spent the summer to prepare for the new curriculum, adapted 
to Canadian principles. It was a tremendous undertaking, requiring dedication 
to the profession and first of all to the students. 
In spite of the lack of summer jobs, 210 of my fellow students 
enrolled in Forestry at the University of British Columbia. We all paid our 
tuition fee, exactly the same amount as any Canadian student, who took 
similar courses, and were given the same responsibilities and the same 
privileges. Nothing more and nothing less! Most of us had no money to pay 
the tuition fee, but we could apply and get a bank loan. I paid my loan back to 
the Bank of Montreal in two or three years. I remember once Laszlo, my 
classmate and husband, and we ran out of money, and the electricity bill was 
due. Laszlo went to the manager in the Bank of Montreal for a $10 loan. He 
gave him ten dollars. 
In April, 1958 I graduated. I received my university diploma for 
studies that began almost six years before. I felt sad that my parents were not 
with me. But it was my investment and my own treasure. I was proud and 
happy. It was a very high achievement in Canada for a female in 1958. There 
were no female forestry students at U.B.C. or female graduates at that time. I 
was among the first female to graduate from the Sopron division in Van-
couver. Nobody informed us of the non-existence of female foresters, before 
we came to Canada. It was a very sad discovery. Out of our 30 classmates, 27 
graduated. 
Life was a series of ups and downs for me and for all female 
graduates in those days in Canada. I could not get a professional position. So 
history was repeated: one more B.S.F. working in the lowest echelons on the 
job scale. It was a difficult beginning. Many of my classmates decided to 
continue studies for higher degrees out of dedication to the profession or 
perhaps due to the lack of proper professional opportunities. The others did all 
kinds of work, but we survived, until a better position came along. It was not 
easy, but we were young, totally free, and equal to all, full of hope for a better 
future. 
The Sopron Division closed its doors in the spring of 1961. The total 
graduates numbered 140. From the 5th year 27 students graduated, the 4th 37, 
the 3rd 33, the 2nd 20 and from the 1st 23. 57 colleagues received their 
diplomas at other universities, 13 left for private business. Our professors had 
to start from the beginning after 1961. Most of the older ones retired, others 
had difficulty in finding reasonable positions. 
I base some of my numbers on the reports of Laszlo Adamovich and 
Oszkar Sziklai,1 my former professors, and Kalman Roller,2 the one-time dean 
of the Sopron Division. Their data are from 15 and 25 years after the Sopron 
Division closed its doors and about as far back from the time when I am 
writing this essay. The results I see are most impressive. I feel very proud, 
because what the Sopron foresters achieved is not from inherited wealth. It is 
coming from search for knowledge, from consistent hard work and per-
severance against all odds. The achievements are the fruits of well-used time, 
well invested energy, and unwavering commitment. The higher the achieve-
ment the costlier it gets. 
What kind of achievements do I talk about? Usually 10% of a typical 
Canadian class go for a graduate degree. In the Sopron Division 25% of the 
graduates got a master degree and 11% earned Ph.D. About 25% received 
different kinds of financial help for their studies. My own class procured 
many higher degrees: 10 M.Sc. and 6 PhD. degrees, in total 60% of 27. 
But, in spite of the high academic achievement, the Sopron foresters 
had some unique difficulties on the outset of their forestry practice. They 
came from the European forestry tradition as practiced in a small country. 
They saw their role as protectors of the environment and frugal users of the 
forest resources. They knew a sustained yield silviculture that is intensive and 
continuity oriented. They were raised on the idea that the forest was there to 
nourish and protect in a conservationists sense, and take its products with a 
view to the consequences for the total environment. This view was not shared 
in the 1950s by the Canadian forest industry. They still operated on the basis 
of the 19th century doctrine, plainly speaking, they "mined" the forest as it 
were an inexhaustible supply of wood. The aim was to harvest as much timber 
as possible out of a forest and damn the consequences. This kind of logging 
operations was a total shock to me: high-grading with heavy machinery, 
leaving behind a devastated landscape. I could not understand the practice and 
all the waste of biomass disgusted me. They were not even willing to discuss 
what they were doing without painfully trying to point out our "naivete" or 
outright lack of touch with reality. Thomas Berry (1990) explains better than 
we could at that time the dreadful reality which is now clearly manifested, 
after many years of abusive management: 
In this disintegrating phase of our industrial society, we now see 
ourselves not as the splendour of creation, but as the most 
pernicious mode of earthly being. We are the termination, not the 
fulfilment of the earth process. If there were a parliament of 
creatures, its first decision might well be to vote the humans out of 
the community, too deadly a presence to tolerate any further. We 
are the affliction of the world, its demonic presence. We are the 
violation of earth's most sacred aspects." 
How right he is! Thomas Berry is the most provocative eco-theologian of our 
time. He dedicates his book, The Dream of the Earth, to nothing less of 
creation than "the Great Red Oak" beneath who's sheltering branches the book 
was written. 
On balance, I feel the Sopron foresters passed through those early 
formative years with flying colours. I dare to say, that they were effecting 
changes in the system. Whatever the reasons, but I suspect their presence as 
leading administrators, research scientists and educators had much to do with 
it. Now we see a much more regulated reforestation practice, less destructive, 
supervised logging, and better waste management. Their influence also awoke 
the need for a better and healthier forest as an environmental protection. 
The Sopron foresters' influence is easier to infer from the actual facts 
of their careers. Many of them are now retired from high position in 
government services, business, and academia. The Sopron foresters pointed 
the way to make the profession see lasting benefit in a colossal change: 
opening up the forestry schools and professional practice to women. Browsing 
through the Forestry Faculty's and student lists at U.B.C., I am happy to see 
the change. Female forestry professionals are now in responsible positions in 
every field of this lovely profession. I like to think that we were pioneers and 
had shone light on possibilities. 
We have well-known university professors among us. Several 
thousand of well regarded scientific articles, essays, and monographs that 
have appeared in recent decades were written by Sopron foresters. These are 
accessible in libraries and on the internet. I mention one example, my 
husband, Laszlo, whose work I know best, having been his research associate 
in many projects. His very early book of 1978 Multivariate analysis in 
vegetation research4 and his rise to full professorship after seven years out of 
graduate school is not a unique case among the Sopron foresters who, quickly 
moved to the fore front of their fields. My classmate, Dr. L. Paszner, 
university professor (U.B.C.), now retired, left his mark on forestry wood 
science as an inventor with patents on cement bonding of wood, wood 
hydrolysis to sugars and novel pulping methods of wood. Many of my 
colleagues received highly meritorious awards and through recognition by 
peers moved up into the highest echelons of their profession. 
The political situation in Hungary drastically changed after the 
Soviets left. People of the country began waking up to freedom, slowly 
coming into their life. The foresters at home were free to reach out. Many 
joint projects were proposed and consummated. Again I use Laszlo's case for 
an example, which I know best. In recognition of his contribution to theory 
and applications in his field, statistical ecology, he was elected into the ranks 
of academicians in the Hungarian Academy of Science in Budapest. Going to 
the induction ceremonies, Dr. Balint Zolyomi of the Academy met us at main 
entrance. By a friendly hug, he said: Welcome home Laszlo, son of our native 
land. Dr. Gabor Fekete introduced Laszlo to the members of the Academy and 
to the invited guests. It was an emotional gathering and a supreme testimony 
to the times: the contributions to science by a Sopron forester, exiled by the 
communist regime and recognized at home. What an honour it was! I also 
spoke at the inaugural, as wife and research partner, not realizing that I am 
breaking an almost two century's tradition of the Academy. A few years later 
our adopted land's highest scientific institution, the Canadian Academies of 
Science (a division in the Royal Society of Canada) elected Laszlo to its 
community of fellows. It was immense honour and also memorable occasion 
for a Sopron forester to take chair among Canada's scientific elite, under 
pomp and ceremony at the Parliament in Ottawa. 
We are students no longer, just retired foresters, but there is a fitting 
memento, to remember the time, long-long time ago, at the adopted university 
of U.B.C. It is an open gate carved of yellow-cedar, a native tree in the 
mountains overlooking Vancouver, in the Szekely tradition. This magnificent 
work of art is the creation of emeri tus research scientist, a Sopron forester, 
Laszlo Jozsa. It s tands by the Forestry building of U.B.C. , overlooking the 
memoria l park honour ing the life and work of another Sopron forester, a 
classmate, Gyula Juhasz . Inscribed on the open gate, in three languages is: 
"Our future is rooted in our traditions". The open gate invites all to look back 
into their tradition and draw strength f rom it. This gate is a thank you gift to 
the people of Vancouver and to all Canadians for their generosity in t ime of 
our need, in behalf of a 140 Sopron graduates. 
Another instrument well f i t t ing to characterize the strength of Sopron 
tradition is a periodical that links the members of the group through a life time 
and promotes camaraderie, is the Kapocs newsletter. W e are now spread over 
the globe, but we are connected by Kapocs, thanks to the hard work and good 
off ices of its editor, Laszlo Retfalvi, and his editorial board. 
I quote the text of Pickersgill 's final address to the Sopron foresters: 
Most of the countries of refuge wanted to receive Hungarians who 
could start to work immediately, but we in Canada alone 
encouraged students to come here to complete their studies. We 
believed, in the long run, their additional qualifications would 
increase their contribution to their new homeland. I believed that 
the Sopron faculty by staying together to complete their studies 
could make an even greater contribution to the development of our 
forest industry and our national life, in the quarter century since 
1957, Dean Roller and the professors and students from Sopron 
have exceeded my highest hopes. In every province and region of 
Canada graduates of the Sopron faculty are numbered among the 
leading citizens. The freedom fighters from Hungary... was as fine 
a group of immigrants as our country ever received. Among the 
very best were the foresters from Sopron. " 
There is no need for further comments by me. 
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On 11 August 1957, Michael Polanyi sent a collection of family documents 
to his older sister Laura, known affectionately as "Mausi." He addressed them 
to "the custodian of the family's traditions." (p. 190, note 148) Those traditions 
of achievement, he could assure himself, were worth preserving. He himself 
had had a distinguished career as a scientist and was beginning to make his 
mark as a philosopher as well. His older brother Karl was a social and 
economic historian whose book. The Great Transformation (1944), was 
recognized as a classic on publication. Several of their cousins, including the 
Marxist theorist Ervin Szabo, had made important contributions to the cultural 
life of fin de siecle Hungary. And as we now know, further distinction of the 
intellect and imagination lay in the future. 
Judith Szapor, herself Hungarian born, became interested in the 
Polanyis after being introduced to the "Great Generation" (bom between 1875 
and 1905) by Gyorgy Litvan, who has done so much to make that generation's 
story known. Litvan's guidance, along with her commitment to feminism, 
prompted her to write her dissertation on Laura Polanyi, but she soon 
discovered that that remarkable woman's life was deeply embedded in her 
family's history. As a result, she devotes a great deal of attention here to 
Laura's mother, Cecile Wohl, and daughter, Eva Zeisel. 
Laura Pollacsek, her maiden name until 1912 (we have Szapor to 
thank for authenticating the date), was born in Vienna in 1882. Her father, 
Mihaly Pollacsek, was, until misfortune arrived, a successful railway engineer 
of Jewish origin. He met Cecile Wohl, the daughter of a Vilna rabbi and 
historian, in the imperial capital and married her in 1881. Seeking even greater 
opportunity, Pollacsek moved his family to Budapest in the 1890s, by which 
time his wife had presented him with two sons, Adolf (b. 1883), who later 
pursued a career in business, and Karl (b. 1886). 
During her years in Vienna, Cecile had met Anna Klatschko, whose 
husband Samuel moved in a circle of emigre Russian revolutionaries. Excited 
by their Utopian dreams and clandestine activities, she was not happy about 
having to move to Hungary and never, despite linguistic gifts, attempted to 
master the Hungarian language. Bored, she began to open her home to young 
intellectuals eager to explore new ideas emanating from Western Europe. To 
members of the Great Generation such as Oszkar Jaszi, Gyorgy Lukacs, Bela 
Balazs, and Anna Lesznai, she soon became "Mama Cecile." 
There seems to be little doubt that Cecile hoped that her daughters, 
Laura and Zsofia, would pursue careers other than that of wife and mother. 
But as Szapor reminds us, educational and career opportunities for women in 
turn-of-the-century Hungary were not those of twenty-first century Canada, 
where she herself now lives and teaches. Nevertheless, Hungary's liberal 
government did make it possible for Mausi — if we may call her that — to 
enroll as a private student at the Lutheran Boy's Gymnasium before moving, 
in October 1896, to the National Women's Educational Association 
Gymnasium. In 1900, she matriculated in the University of Budapest's Faculty 
of Arts, where she studied Hungarian history under Henrik Marczali, a 
distinguished historian of Jewish origin. 
In 1904, before she had completed her doctoral work, Mausi surprised 
her family by marrying Sandor Strieker, a successful businessman, and 
making a conscious decision to place husband and — eventually — children 
ahead of career. No doubt her mother regretted that decision. Szapor certainly 
does; or perhaps it would be fairer to say that she regrets that Mausi could not 
have "had it all": husband, children, and career. This regret leads her to take a 
short detour from her narrative path through the thickets of feminist theory. 
Szapor also regrets the fact that Mausi was more of a radical — closer 
to the social democrats and the "bourgeois radicals" around Jaszi — than a 
feminist."A woman," Mausi once wrote, "is always in closer association with 
a man belonging to her economic class than with any other woman."1 And 
what is, to Szapor at least, just as depressing, she "remained silent on the less 
than stellar pre-war record of the Social Democrats and Radicals on the issue 
of women's vote." (p. 65) 
But however short she fell of the feminist ideal, Mausi did manage to 
complete her doctorate, help her cousin Szabo edit the Bibliographia Econo-
mica Universalis, and deliver lectures in which she issued calls for educational 
opportunities equal to those available to men. She made no attempt, of course, 
to seek a university appointment; family obligations alone militated against it. 
In order, however, to see to it that her own children were introduced to the 
progressive outlook on life and society, she founded an experimental 
kindergarten. 
From 1911 to 1913, Mausi and others of like mind instructed a small 
group of children, including two of her own and the six-year-old Arthur 
Koestler, in reading, writing, arithmetic, and eurhythmies, all within the 
context of a "secular moral education." That, indeed, was the title she gave to 
a piece she published in Szabadgondolat, the journal of the Galileo Circle, a 
radical student group for which her brother Karl served as first president. In it 
she called for the rejection of a morality based upon religion and the adoption 
of a secular morality based, in some way not clearly stated, upon natural 
science and conducive to human "cooperation." "Happy the school boy or 
girl," she wrote, "for whom this word is as familiar as the names of the 
Sacraments are to us."2 
Mausi had to close her school when her husband moved the family to 
Vienna for business reasons. In the last year of the Great War, however, the 
Strickers returned to Budapest, where she organized the women in Jaszi's 
Radical Party. After the fall of the 1919 Soviet Republic and the formation of 
a counter-revolutionary government, the Strickers, who risked being targeted 
by roving bands of anti-Semites, elected to remain in Hungary — while the 
Polanyi brothers, Karl, Adolf, and Michael (b. 1891), chose to leave. They 
were soon followed by the Strieker children — Michael, Eva, and Otto 
(George). 
Because of what one might call Mausi's internal exile during the 
interwar years, Szapor turns her attention next to Eva's misadventures in 
Soviet Russia. A gifted ceramist who had been perfecting her art in Germany, 
Mausi's daughter visited the Soviet Union in 1932, where, as she and other 
political pilgrims believed, a great social "experiment" was under way. She 
went first to Kharkov in Ukraine to join her fiance, the physicist Alex 
Weissberg, who was helping to "build socialism." At Mausi's insistence, she 
married Weissberg, and began work in the Soviet china industry. Recognizing 
her abilities, the Soviets entrusted her with important positions in Leningrad 
and Moscow, where, in May 1936, she was caught up in the Terror. 
In the middle of the night, Mausi, who was staying with her, woke her 
and whispered that the secret police were in the living room. They took her 
into custody and charged her with plotting to assassinate Stalin. Szapor has 
read her unpublished account of her sixteen-month ordeal and finds it 
disconcertingly inconsistent, though some of the details she provides match 
those she once confided to Koestler, who, over her objections, borrowed them 
for Darkness at Noon. Nor is Szapor impressed by Eva's attempts to explain 
why the Soviets eventually released her; that remains a mystery. 
Many pages later, and in a different chapter, Szapor picks up the 
threads of the Soviet story, and we learn that Mausi, her daughter's false arrest 
and brush with death notwithstanding, hoped to write a book extolling the 
virtues of Stalinism. Unlike her brother Michael, who, after meetings with 
Soviet scientists in Moscow, saw through communist propaganda, she "took 
Stalin's official line at face value." (p. 139) In a letter of 1943, she wrote this 
to a friend: 
It seems clear to me now that the policy to make a happy family 
[emphasis mine] of the Soviet people — nationalities, classes 
(workers, peasants, intelligentsia), generations, plants and kol-
khozes, believers and unbelievers — was not only set but was 
deemed of such first class importance that not even the 
consequences of the unforeseen murder of Kirov (in December 
1934) could prevent that 1935 was a year devoted to teach the 
people the pursuit of happiness, (p. 139) 
Mausi dreamed of a society that was a family writ large: she projected 
her own selfless attitude toward her family upon people living under Soviet 
rule. As a result, the fact that her daughter fell into the clutches of the Soviet 
political police did not dash her hopes for Stalinist society: like her brother 
Karl, she was one of those for whom socialism had become a religion. 
Whether or not she subsequently changed her mind about the Soviet Union, 
we do not know. It is unlikely, however, that she would have abandoned the 
social and political beliefs that had given her a sense of public — as opposed 
to private — purpose. 
That Mausi never wrote her planned study of Soviet family policies 
was due not to any disillusionment but to the fact that, as Szapor shows in a 
moving chapter on "the odyssey of the Polanyis," she had all she could do to 
help family and friends escape Nazi occupied Europe; she herself was briefly 
detained in Vienna, but, on the eve of the war, made it to New York, where 
she lived out her life. It must have broken her heart that neither she nor 
anyone else was able to save her sister Zsofia, her brother-in-law Egon Szecsi, 
and their child. 
Sometime in the early 1950s, an aging Mausi seized upon an 
unexpected opportunity. Bradford Smith was writing a biography of Captain 
John Smith, during the preparation of which he had come across an article by 
Lewis Kropf, a historian of Hungarian origin, according to which John 
Smith's account of travels in Hungary and Transylvania was fanciful. Because 
the Captain's veracity was of such importance to the early history of Virginia, 
Bradford Smith decided to seek a second opinion; Karl Polanyi recommended 
his sister for the task of historical investigation. 
She accepted the challenge eagerly and her subsequent research 
endures as a model of thoroughness and scholarly inspiration; she 
demonstrated conclusively that Smith's account was, in fact, remarkably 
accurate. As Szapor observes, however, Smith's rehabilitation "became a veri-
table obsession of Laura's last years." (p. 146) One reason for that obsession, I 
once suggested, was her admiration for an authentic "hero of the commoners 
and the commoner hero."1 Szapor thinks my explanation inadequate, and she 
is probably right. Mausi, she says, "identified with him because of the 
t remendous odds he had to face, both in his life and after his death." (p. 149) 
Mausi too had had to triumph over many odds and Szapor has done a f ine job 
of recounting them. After reading her book, one is left with a feeling of regret 
concerning her political illusions but of admiration for her devotion to family. 
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The Catholic Church in 
Interwar and Wartime Hungary 
Christopher Adam 
Leslie Laszlo. Church and State in Hungary, 1919-1945. Pannonhalma -
Budapest: METEM, 2004. 400 pages. Paper. 
The role of the Catholic Church in the evolution of Hungary during the 
Horthy era has been a neglected field of study among Western historians. Yet 
exploring the complicated relationship that clergy and Catholic intellectuals 
had with the country's conservative regime is central to understanding this 
period. Leslie Laszlo, a retired political science professor from Concordia 
University and currently an ordained priest in Ottawa, has tried to remedy this 
situation, by producing one of the most in-depth studies of Hungarian 
Catholic history ever to appear in the English language. A handful of Western 
historians and other academics have touched on the history of the Catholic 
Church in Hungary during this period, but most of these analyses were within 
the broader context of interwar European society and politics and, by their 
very nature, lacked the level of detail that characterizes Fr. Laszlo's study.1 
Although this work is based primarily on research conducted decades ago, as 
part of the author's PhD dissertation, the sheer lack of a similarly detailed 
English study on the subject means that the work has not lost its overall value 
as an informative survey of Hungarian church and state relations over a period 
spanning more than a quarter century. 
The author argues that while the Church was essentially conservative 
in its politics during the period following the end of World War I, it was not 
outright reactionary and did not attempt to resist all reforms that aimed to 
undo the vestiges of feudalism, which persisted in this primarily agricultural 
society. Church officials made their voices heard on issues of social justice, as 
Hungary moved ever close towards more comprehensive industrialization. 
The clergy and Catholic politicians were occasionally at the forefront in terms 
of the introduction of progressive legislation, such as limited land reform, 
protection for the industrial working class and basic social security programs.2 
Fr. Laszlo sees his book as a "case study" in the relationship between 
Church and state, in what he believes was an essentially "developing 
country." Since Hungarian society during this period was primarily agrarian, 
it is not entirely surprising that the Church played such a key role. Church 
officials enjoyed a close relationship with most political leaders and the 
clergy's position was strongest in the field of education, with the state 
providing parochial schools "lavish" financial support.4 
The author appears to have written his work within a tense Cold War 
political context; one in which he felt that the Church had been unfairly 
treated by both Marxist historians in Eastern Europe, as well as by western 
academics who focused on the Church's conservative tendencies and its failure 
to condemn all forms of anti-Semitism. As such, Fr. Laszlo argues that these 
studies have been one sided and failed to pay attention to Catholic efforts 
aimed at rescuing Jews during the Second World War. Fr. Laszlo envisaged 
his work as an attempt to "set the record straight," yet the danger inherent in 
this approach is that his book comes across as less critical and nuanced in its 
examination of the church's relationship with the Hungarian state during this 
highly contentious period in history.5 
This problem is perhaps most evident in Fr. Laszlo's in-depth 
discussion of Bishop Ottokar Prohaszka's anti-Semitism. Fr. Laszlo recognizes 
that Prohaszka was an anti-Semite, despite the bishop's repeated claims to the 
contrary.6 Prohaszka had spoken in favour of the numerus clausus and 
restricting admission of Jewish students to universities. The bishop also 
believed that the apparent over-representation of Jews in key professions, as 
well as their alleged gravitation to liberalism was "harmful" to Hungarian 
society.7 Fr. Laszlo observed that Prohaszka was willing to jettison values of 
individual equality, if he believed that this served the collective good. Based 
on a reading of the bishop's articles, Father Laszlo argues that Prohaszka's 
emphatic anti-Semitic statements were not the outcome of a "hatred" for Jews 
generally (even though the author recognizes that the bishop had a negative 
opinion of the majority of Hungarian Jews), but rather a "passionate love for 
his own Christian Hungarian people," noting that Prohaszka "pitied his well-
meaning but unbusinesslike people and feared for their livelihood in the face 
of the shrewder and more resourceful Jews."8 The author appears to accept at 
face value that the driving force behind Prohaszka's anti-Semitism was this 
well-intentioned, though strongly paternalistic concern for the majority 
population, based upon prevailing stereotypes of Christians and Jews. 
Yet if one were to read between the lines and take Prohaszka's own 
justification of his anti-Semitism with a grain a salt, it would be reasonable to 
suggest that the bishop was more concerned with upholding the existing social 
order in Hungary and resisting efforts to transform society into one based on 
liberal social and economic principles, such as meritocracy, free market and a 
more critical approach to institutions of authority. Liberalism seemed to 
propagate many of the values that Prohaszka (and other authoritarian 
conservatives at the time) found both disturbing and potentially threatening. 
These included the emphasis on individualism, secularism and the notion that 
one's social and economic status should be determined by personal 
achievement and professional success, rather than by one's family 
background, social class, or religious affiliation. Fr. Laszlo should have 
considered the possibility that the bishop's anti-Semitism was not necessarily 
out of a noble (if remarkably simplistic) concern for allegedly downtrodden 
Hungarians, but out of fear that liberalism — as represented by many urban 
elites, a section of the professional middle class and some Jewish Hungarians 
— was a threat to the Church's dominant position in society. The revolutions 
of 1918/19 represented a traumatic period for ecclesiastic leaders and the 
nobility. As such, it would not be overly cynical to suggest Prohaszka's 
socioeconomic views, and his anti-Semitism, were likely informed not only 
out of a sense of benevolent paternalism, but at least as much out of fear for 
the direction that much of modern industrial society was taking. 
Fr. Laszlo makes a valid point when he notes that even if Prohaszka 
and probably many other Catholic leaders held anti-Semitic views, their 
anti-Semitism was starkly different from the genocidal variant adopted by 
Nazis during the Second World War. The key difference was that Jews who 
converted to Christianity and were baptized were essentially welcomed into 
the fold, whereas Nazis offered no such opportunity.9 Fr. Laszlo also points 
out that this form of anti-Semitism hardly began and ended with the 
statements of Catholic Church leaders. Intellectuals such as Gyula Szekfii 
sometimes espoused a similarly fatalistic view of the alleged dominance of 
Jewish Hungarians vis-a-vis those of Christian origin.10 Nevertheless, one 
may conclude that the verbal, non-violent form of anti-Semitism espoused by 
Prohaszka and many others (which aimed to remove Jews from positions of 
influence through legislation) was only a few steps away from the 
annihilationist policies of Nazism. 
While the legacy of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust certainly 
overshadows the history of the entire period, this theme is not the direct focus 
of Fr. Laszlo's examination of church and state relations. The Catholic Church 
has often been labelled as reactionary for its support of an anachronistic 
regime — especially from the perspective of a modern liberal democracy, 
where the separation of church and state is a rarely questioned ideal. Fr. 
Laszlo makes a thought-provoking point by observing that the sudden 
removal of the church from the centre of society would have created a 
"spiritual vacuum," which could then be filled by totalitarian ideologies." 
Although Fr. Laszlo was not able to consult material in Hungarian 
archives when he originally completed his research, his use of a wide array of 
published primary sources ensures that his work is well documented. In some 
cases, a greater degree of nuance would have strengthened his work, but the 
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The Lives and Struggles of 
Hungarians in America 
Sandor Zsiros 
Translated by Erzsebet Molnar 
Bela Vardy and Agnes Huszar Vardy. Ujvildgi kiizdelmek. Az amerikai 
magyarsag elete es az Ohaza [Struggles in the New World. The Lives of 
Hungarian Americans and the Old Country], Budapest: Mundus Magyar 
Egyetemi Kiado, 2005. Hard cover, 370 pp., table of contents in English and 
Hungarian, name and subject index, ISBN 963 9501 22 0. 
Having red through the collection of essays by the prominent Hungarian-
American historians and literary scholars, Professors Bela Vardy and Agnes 
Huszar Vardy from Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, I am 
saddened by the book's apparent message. It seems to suggest that the days of 
Hungarians in America are numbered. And what is even more heartbreaking 
in this barely perceptible message is the possibility that their — and perhaps 
our — passing will not be bemoaned by anyone of our neighbours. This sad 
message appears to be present in the volume, even though there is not a single 
sentence about the approaching passing of the nation. The authors did not 
write about Hungarians of Hungary, but rather about Hungarian Americans 
and their relationship to the mother country. The twenty-three studies in the 
volume constitute an overview of the Hungarian presence in North America. 
This presence may reach back as far as the arrival of a certain Tyrker during 
the reign of King St. Stephen (997-1038) of Hungary, who is revered as the 
Christianizer of his nation. But this Tyrker episode is closer to a myth than to 
accepted historical truth. Different is the case with Stephen Parmenius of 
Buda (ca. 1555-1583), a prominent Protestant scholar, who reached the shores 
of North American as a member of the famed Gilbert Expedition in 1583. But 
this daring Hungarian became the victim of a shipwreck close to Nova Scotia. 
The nearly two dozen studies in this volume give us an overview of 
the most important issues faced by Hungarian Americans in the course of the 
past several centuries. These include two summarizing essays on their history 
and literature; five studies on Louis Kossuth (1802-1894) and his famed visit 
to (1851-1852) to the United States; four studies on Hungarian-American 
literacy, historical scholarship, and centres of Hungarian Studies; five essays 
on the birth and development of Hungarian-American churches, the lives of 
the turn-of-the century economic immigrants, and their relationship to the 
Slovaks who emigrated from what used to be Upper Hungary; five studies on 
the nature and effect of the Treaty of Trianon upon Hungarian Americans; and 
finally two studies on the changing American image of Hungary and 
Hungarians since the mid-19th century, and on their relations with the new 
Hungary that had emerged from behind the Iron Curtain following 
communism's collapse in 1989-1990. The collected studies in this volume 
permit us a glimpse into the lives and struggles of the Hungarian immigrants 
in the United States, and they also tell us how these immigrants have enriched 
American society by their contributions in many different fields, in many 
different ways. As an example, Hungarians have played a role in the 
American War of Independence that resulted in the birth of the United States 
of America. Similarly, they had a role in the American Civil War nearly a 
century later, which solidified the indivisible unity of the new nation, and 
brought about the liberation of the slaves. This also holds true for the turn-of-
the-century economic immigrants contributed their "sweat and blood" to the 
building of America's industrial society. Moreover, they also produced a series 
of new generations whose members became hardworking and useful members 
of American society. 
This process of migration and Hungarian contributions to America 
continued during the interwar years, when numerous internationally known 
scientists, scholars, and artists entered the country, fleeing from the spread of 
Fascism and Nazism. Although few in numbers, their contributions were so 
extensive that some observers began to speculate about the unique "mystery of 
the Hungarian talent." The most prominent scientists among these immigrants 
included: Theodore Karman (1881-1962), Leo Szilard (1896-1964), Eugene 
Wigner (1902-1994), Zoltan Bay (1900-1992), John von Neumann (1903-
1957), and Edward Teller (1908-2003). But there were many others, in many 
different fields, a number of them becoming Nobel Laureates. Among them 
were George Hevesy (1885-1966), Gyorgy Poly a (1887-1985), Gabor Szegi 
(1895-1985), George Bekesy (1899-1972), Denes Gabor (1900-1979), 
Charles Goldmark (1906-1977), and later John Kemeny (1926-1992) and 
George Olah (b. 1927) in the sciences and mathematics; Bela Bartok 
(1881-1945), Fritz Reiner (1888-1963), George Szell (1897-1970), Eugene 
Ormandy (1899-1985), Antal Dorati (1908-1988), and Sir George Solti 
(1912-1997) in music; Oscar Jaszi (1875-1957), Ferenc Molnar (1878-1952), 
and Geza Roheim (1891-1953) in literature and the social sciences; Titus 
Bobula (1878-1961), Marcel Breuer (1902-1981), and William Fellner( 1905-
1983) in architecture; and members of the unusually gifted Polanyi family, 
Charles (1886-1964), Michael (1891-1976), and John (b. 1929), who 
embraced a number of disciplines. Hungarian immigrants were also present in 
significant numbers in the birth and development of the American film 
industry. The most prominent among them were Adolf Zukor (1873-1976), 
William Fox [Fischer] (1879-1952), and Sir Alexander Korda (1893-1956). 
This list of these names can fill us with pride. We believe there are not many 
nations in the world that have produced so many geniuses, and who have 
contributed so much to the New World in proportion to their numbers. 
The younger members of the post-World War II political refugees and 
their descendants, as well as those who left Hungary during the anti-Soviet 
Revolution of 1956, have found their way into America's scientific, industrial, 
business and financial world in great numbers. In some instances, they moved 
into the highest levels in their chosen fields — such as in the case of George 
Soros (b. 1930), Andy Grove [Grof] (b. 1936), Steven F. Udvar-Hazy 
[Udvarhazy] (b. 1946), and Charles Simonyi (b. 1948) — demonstrating once 
again the talent and resourcefulness of the Hungarians. Today there exists 
something approximating a "Virtual Hungary" on the North American 
continent. But there are some questions in our mind: On the one hand, will 
the successful members of this "Virtual Hungary" be willing to help their 
small native country and their fellow Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin? 
And will the mother country have the courage to utilize the knowledge and 
achievements of its successful children, many of whom are waiting for the call 
for help? These questions are posed by the authors already in their 
introductory study to this volume. We must voice our agreement with them, 
but also our doubts about the Motherland's willingness to accept help, as well 
as her ability to aid the survival of the dwindling Hungarian population of 
North America. One can hardly deny that an intimate interaction between 
Hungary and the Hungarian-American communities is an essential pre-
condition for the survival of those communities, and for the continuation of 
the Hungarian language and culture in the English speaking world of North 
America. Our doubts about Hungarian future in the New World is supported 
by date supplied by the authors themselves. Thus, we learn from their book 
that of the 800,000 Magyars (among nearly two million Hungarian citizens) 
who emigrated to the United States since the mid-19th century, in 1980 nearly 
1.8 million (1,776,000) still claimed to be fully or primarily of Hungarian 
origin. But of these only 180,000 (10%) spoke Hungarian at home. Ten years 
later their numbers had shrunk to less than 1.6 million (1,582,000), of whom 
only 147,902 (less than 9%) spoke Hungarian within their families. We know 
form other source that the census of the year 2000 showed further decline 
among Hungarian Americans. Their numbers had shrunk to below 1.4 million 
(1,398,000), and the number of Magyar-speakers among them to 117,973 
(barely over 8%)]. We can learn about the fundamental reasons for this 
astonishing decline from the extremely rich collection of notes that the authors 
have appended to their studies. (There are more than 650 notes that refer to 
the more than 230 printed sources. The reader is also aided by a detailed name 
and subject index that had been appended to this volume.) 
Having read the book, we have become ambivalent about Hungarian 
future in North America, and this ambivalence is accompanied by a good dose 
of pessimism. This is all the more so, as we know that the two authors have 
approached their subject sine ira et studio (without anger and prejudice). 
Thus, while describing the successes and achievements of immigrant 
Hungarians, they also point out the latter's failures, disappointments, and 
personal tragedies. The most serious reasons behind these failures appear to be 
failed illusions. The resulting disappointments general become hotbeds of 
dissension, breach, and infighting among them; and this appears to 
characterize Hungarians everywhere. We cannot leave unmentioned the 
negative role that some of the non-Magyar nationalities of the Kingdom of 
Hungary — within Austria-Hungary — have played in the lives of Hungarian -
Americans. This is particularly so with respect to the Slovaks from the former 
Hungarian Highlands. Most of them being semi-literate peasants, they first 
became conscious of their national identities only in America, where under the 
leadership of their nationalistic priests they began to work against Hungary. 
Thus, in a sense, they were among those who had laid the foundations for the 
Treaty of Trianon (1920), which codified the dismemberment of Historic 
Hungary, along with the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire. The result was 
birth of several small multinational states, motivated by extreme forms of 
nationalisms, which Balkanized Central Europe and lead to the outbreak of 
World War II. The resulting emotional conflicts are still around us every-
where, causing considerable problems not only for Hungarians, but for all 
nationalities in the Carpathian Basin. 
One of the largest sections of the book is entitled "Kossuth in Ameri-
ca." It contains five slightly abbreviated and revised studies from three 
different publications. The first of these describes Kossuth's "Triumphant 
Tour" in the United States in 1851-1852. The leader of the defeated 
Revolution of 1848-1849 was received with great ovation as the anointed 
champion of liberty and as a prophet of human freedom. Yet, seven and a half 
months later he left the United States as a bitterly disappointed man. He 
returned to Europe incognito under the name Mr. Alexander Smith. He had 
come with great hopes, but he left filled with disappointments, for he was 
unable to achieve any of his goals. He came in the belief that he could gain the 
support of the United States for a renewed war against the Habsburgs. But in 
those days America was still under the Washingtonian principle of "non-inter-
vention." Moreover, most of them expected that Kossuth, as the champion of 
liberty, would fight for the liberation of slaves in America. It did not happen, 
because these two goals did not mash. The authors of this volume explain the 
reasons for these mutual failures and disappointments. 
A separate section, containing four different studies, deals with the 
development of Hungarian-American journalism and Hungarian-American 
studies at institutions of higher learning in the United States. After describing 
the story of the ephemeral early Hungarian newspapers in America, the 
authors discuss in detail the establishment of the two major Hungarian-
American dailies, the Cleveland-based Szabadsag [Liberty] (1891) and the 
New York-based Amerikai MagyarNepszava [American Hungarian People's 
Voice] (1899). Both papers began as weeklies, but within a few years both of 
them became "national" dailies (1904, 1906). They competed against one 
another fiercely, even though they both represented the same basic Kossuthist 
Hungarian nationalism that was the dominant ideology of all of the 
turn-of-the-century economic immigrants, and remained so into the 
post-World War II period. Unfortunately, the coming of the post-World War 
II immigrants with their different tastes, social backgrounds, and political 
views, and the rapid decline of the number of Hungarian speakers among the 
"old timers," resulted in the decline of both of these newspapers. During the 
1960s they both reverted to being weeklies, and in 1996 they merged into a 
single weekly. The merged newspapers, which in 2007 are in the 117th year 
of their publication, now function under the combined title Amerikai Magyar 
Nepszava/Szabadsag [American Hungarian People's Voice/Liberty]. In the 
course of the past century there were many other short-lived newspapers, but 
in the long run none of them could compete with these two flagships of 
Hungarian-American journalism. The two dailies became the "Bible" of the 
semi-literate early 20th-century economic immigrants. Circumstances in Ame-
rica forced most of these immigrants to sharpen up their literacy skills so as to 
survive in the very competitive industrial society. These newspapers and their 
short-lived rivals represented the main bond among the Hungarian immig-
rants, who were scattered in two dozen different states within the Union. They 
were the primary means of information from the homeland, they relayed job 
opportunities to the immigrants, and they informed the members of the 
various Hungarian-American communities about the goings on in their 
fraternal associations, social organizations, and religious congregations. Their 
content and language was generally of modest level, because they had to be 
geared to the educational level of the immigrants. At the same time they stood 
for a kind of Hungarian patriotism that fulfilled the needs of the immigrants, 
while also asserting their faithfulness to their newly found second homeland. 
The content and political orientation of the merged papers remained un-
changed until 2006. But then, under a new owner and editor, it began to 
reflect more the political altercations in today's Hungary, than the needs and 
interests of the Hungarian-American community. While fulfilling their 
obligations to their communities and to their nation, Hungarian-American 
newspapers also carried on a defensive war against the Slovak-American 
press, whose tone during the period of economic immigration was 
increasingly anti-Hungarian. Emerging Slovak nationalism carried out a fero-
cious campaign against the Hungarians. They were depicted in the most unfa-
vourable terms, and Hungary was castigated as a "prison of nationalities." 
Eventually these accusations were also taken up by the English-speaking 
American press, defaming the Hungarians, and preparing the ground for 
Hungary 's d ismemberment fo l lowing World W a r I. 
Naturally, clashes went back and forth in these ethnic newspapers, 
each trying to destroy the other's reputation. S o m e of the most vicious Slovak 
attack appeared in the April 15, 1894 issues of The Pittsburgh Dispatch, 
which reads as fol lows: 
A Magyar is regarded by the general public as a sort of fiend 
incarnate, who roams about the hills of Fayette and Westmoreland 
counties with a firebrand in one hand, a bomb in the other, and a 
knife in his teeth, leaving a trail of blood and ashes behind him. 
He is popularly supposed to subsist on the refuse of slaughter 
houses and to live in pig sty, and stables.... The ferocious act of the 
Magyar... has brought him the distinction of being a most 
intractable citizen.... [He] is a direct lineal descendant of that 
horde of wild men, who under the leadership of Attila swept over 
the Ural Mountains into the land of the Goths and Vandals, now 
Austro-Hungary, subduing the people and exacting tribute from 
those having dominion over it.... The Magyar, or Hungarian, first 
appeared in the Connesville coke region in 1885.... [He] is a short, 
stocky fellow... of repulsive countenance, a greasy, coffee-colored 
complexion.... The Magyar is always ready to fight, if he has 
friends to help him through..., [but if] resisted by determined 
officers they become abject cowards.... At the White mines... a few 
years ago, an old storeroom, about 30x60 feet... was transformed 
into barracks, in which 87 families of Magyars lived, ate, slept, 
drank, fought, and died.... Bed bugs were present in such numbers 
that they could be scooped up from the floor by the shovelful. On 
the mattresses of the beds there was a veritable glue made by 
crushing the vermin, as the Huns had rolled about in their troubled 
dreams. The floors were covered with a two-inch accumulation of 
filth, and the glass in the windows so begrimed with dirt as to 
exclude the light of the day.... It is quite certain that he [the 
Magyar] has acquired many of the vices and but few of the virtues 
of the people among whom he has sojourned, which, added to 
those inherent in his nature, render him an individual of whom 
almost any community would be glad to be rid. 
The ethnic churches also jo ined in this fray. We can read about all this 
in the study titled "Hungarians and Slovaks in Turn-of-the-Century America." 
It is well known that in the late 19th and early 20th century many millions of 
European, including nearly two million Hungarian citizens of various 
nationalities migrated to America. Most of them came from the ranks of the 
landless or impoverished landed peasantry, who wished to make their fortunes 
in the New World and then repatriate. Until the years preceding Wor ld War I, 
these migrant groups were made up mostly of young men, who wanted to 
work hard for a few years, spend as little as possible, then return home and 
become independent small farmers or craftsmen. A few of the immigrants did 
achieved this goal by accumulating enough "capital" to be able to repatriate 
and set themselves up as independent farmers. They built impressive houses 
and bought a few acres of land. In this way they emerged out of poverty and 
also rose in their social positions in their villages. The majority of the 
immigrants, however, stayed in the New World. Rapidly industrializing 
America simply offered them much more than their homeland. Life was still 
hard even in the United States, for it was filled with trials and tribulations. 
They had to work under awful conditions, and without the protective laws that 
were passed during the New Deal. But in America they still had a brighter 
future than in their homeland. Meanwhile, before the coming of the protective 
laws, only their fraternal, social institutions, and churches gave them a degree 
of protection. Although promising a better future, America in those days was 
still insensitive to major social issues. 
Fraternal organizations came into being to fulfil some of the needs 
that contemporary American society was unable to provide. They became the 
immigrants' welfare institutions, and in the course of time they also assumed 
various cultural functions by becoming citadels of increasing literacy and 
national culture. We can also mention the role of the "boarding houses" that 
provided a "home away from home" for the immigrants. But at the same time 
they also became centres of debauchery under the inhuman conditions the 
immigrants were forced to endure. Thirty-forty young men were squeezed in a 
hostel run by a husband-wife team, which many times became the source of 
arguments, personal jealousies, fisticuffs, and even murders. On the other 
hand, they also constituted communities in which the immigrants tried to help 
each other. 
In addition to the fraternals, Hungarian-American churches also 
played a key role in forming Hungarian communities, and in keeping their 
Hungarian identities. The role of the religious congregations cannot be 
overemphasized in the preservation of national identity and culture. This role 
was even greater than that of the fraternal groups. At the same time it must be 
pointed out that the role of the Hungarian churches in America has changed 
considerably, as compared to their role in the motherland. In the contemporary 
Hungarian village, the church was a holy place that concerned itself exclu-
sively with religious matters. It was not a place for non-religious social events. 
Any form of profane expression or deed within its walls was regarded as a sin. 
The other important village institution was the village inn or pub, which was 
exclusively a male preserve. It was in the village inn where the men conger-
gated after work and after Sunday church services, and found outlet for their 
socio-cultural needs. Women were excluded form this "fraternity." The latter 
usually congregated in front of their houses, and discussed in great detail the 
goings-on and the ever changing personal relations in the village. All this 
changed drastically in America, where the two institutions — the church and 
the village inn — became interlocked. Whereas in Europe the church basement 
was occupied by the crypt, where the most important personalities of the 
village or town were laid to rest, in America this church basement became the 
social hall, where men and women met on common grounds. While those 
above were praying, those below were enjoying themselves and living it up. 
Social events, church dinners and even dances were held in the subterranean 
church basement, which would have been unthinkable in Hungary. It would 
have been regarded as profane act and a major sin. But mingling social and 
religious life in the church building was most natural in America, and it 
remains so even today. 
Along with the changing role of the churches buildings came the 
changing role of the priests and pastors. They too had to assume various 
non-religious social functions, which would have been unthinkable back 
home. Moreover, the church members who financed the building of the 
church, also assumed greater role in running the affairs of the congregations, 
which resulted in the lessening of the powers of the clergy. As described by 
the authors of this volume, 
Hungarian-American churches and priests have become essential 
components in the lives of the immigrants. In these Hungarian-
American churches they could pray in Hungarian, they could talk 
to each other in Hungarian, they could practice their rituals in 
Hungarian, and they could speak to each other about their joys and 
sorrows in Hungarian. Hungarian-American churches, therefore, 
were really Hungarian churches, where at least as much emphasis 
was put on one's Hungarianness as on one's religiosity and 
religious affiliation. As such, these churches, parishes, and 
congregations were more 'national' in character than those in 
Hungary, where one's Hungarian identity was a given fact, and 
where emphasis was naturally on religion, and not on nationality. 
The authors devote a great deal of attention to the sketching the 
development of the various Hungarian denominations in the United States. 
Both Catholic and the Protestant churches appeared in America at the end of 
the 19th century. The number of the Catholic parishes spread through this 
continent-size country largely via the activities of Father Karoly Bohm 
[Charles Boehm] (1850-1932). His actions were paralleled by those of Father 
Kalman Kovats (1863-1927), who placed even more emphasis upon the 
preservation of the Hungarian national identity within the Catholic Church 
than did Father Boehm. Occasionally, this lead to disagreements between 
these two pioneers of Hungarian Catholicism in America. The Hungarian 
Reformed (Calvinist) Church was also planted in America about the same 
time, toward the end of the 19th century. Hungarian Reformed congregations 
grew in numbers largely through the activities of Rev. Gusztav Juranyi 
(1856-192?). Rev. Janos Kovacs (1861 -1921), and Rev. Zoltan Kuthy (1875-
1821). As a result of their work, Hungarian national identity became almost 
synonymous with Hungarian Reformed identity. The two merged into the 
single idea of "Hungarian Calvinism." Personal disagreements among the 
various pioneers and their immediate successors, however, soon resulted in a 
breach within the Hungarian Reformed Church. Initially, the cause of this 
breach was the question whether Hungarian Reformed congregations in 
America should be under the Hungarian Mother Church in Hungary, or 
should they join one of the American Protestant denominations. This breach, 
which subsequently became even more intense, eventually split the Hungarian 
Reformed Church in America into half a dozen different sub-denominations. 
This split naturally created havoc among the Hungarian Calvinists. Yet, even 
so, they achieved great things for the various successive waves of immigrants. 
But with the rapid Americanization process in the second half of the 20th 
century, the number of the Hungarian Reformed congregations declined 
significantly, and those that survived also became ever smaller. 
This decline and disintegration also became evident in case of the 
Hungarian Catholic parishes in America. This process can be demonstrated 
with the fate of St. Elizabeth Parish in Cleveland, Ohio. Founded by Father 
Charles Boehm [Karoly Bohm] in 1892, by the interwar years this pioneer 
parish had 7,000 parishioners. All of them lived in the same section of the 
city, in the Buckeye Road region, in Cleveland's so-called "Little Hungary." 
Due to dying off of the old immigrant generations, and the influx of African 
Americans in the 1960s and beyond, the number of parishioners declined 
rapidly. By the end of the 20th century, St. Elizabeth parish members 
numbered barely 400, and even those lived mostly in the suburbs, attending 
the Sunday masses in their original church simply to keep the church and the 
parish from going out of existence. The rapid assimilation of the second, third, 
and fourth generations of Hungarians, and the decline of religiosity, makes the 
future of these Hungarian "ethnic churches" very bleak. The coming of two 
waves of post-World War II immigrants — the DPs and the 56-ers — infused 
new life into the Hungarian-American community and its institutions, 
including their churches. But because of the relatively small numbers of these 
political immigrants (26,000 and 42,000), and because of the 56-ers greater 
propensity to melt into American society, this revitalization was only 
temporary. This was true in spite of the fact that university-level Hungarian 
Studies Programs had their heyday in the 1960s through the 1980s. The 
collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended 
these golden years very rapidly. By the early 21st century only a few major 
universities — especially Indiana University in Bloomington and Columbia 
University in New York — were able to preserve some of what they used to 
offer by way of Hungarian Studies during the golden age of that discipline in 
the United States. 
The two world wars created a peculiar situation for Hungarian 
Americans. They had to face the reality that their new country, the United 
States, had a role — however minor — in their old country's dismemberment at 
Treaty of Trianon (1920), and once more in the Treaty of Paris (1947). During 
the interwar years Hungarian Americans became reconnected to their Old 
Country, which also discovered them suddenly and unexpectedly. Their joint 
sorrow and pain brought them together once more. They also became 
involved in the protest movements that tried to reverse Hungary's 
dismemberment. These movements took various forms, including mass 
demonstrations, the unveiling of a second Kossuth statue in New York, the 
establishment of the "National Association of Hungarian Americans" at a 
"Hungarian National Congress" in Buffalo, New York, and a sensational 
ocean flight by Gyorgy Endresz (1893-1932) in 1931, only four years after 
Charles Lindbergh's original feat in 1927. 
The Second World War caused even more difficulties for Hungarian 
Americans, when their Old Country became embroiled in the war on the side 
of the Axis Powers. Although the reasons for this alliance was simply 
Hungary's effort to regain some of the lost Hungarian-inhabited territories 
from the succession states of Austria-Hungary, it still placed Hungary and the 
Hungarians on the wrong side in this war. The great majority of Hungarian 
Americans supported Hungary's effort to regain the lost territories, but an 
equal number of them disliked its alliance with Germany and Italy. The 
struggle between the pro-revisionist majority and the anti-revisionist minority 
played itself out in the so-called "Eckhardt versus Vambery controversy," 
which created much havoc within the Hungarian-American community, but 
ultimately lead to nowhere. The only person who was able to represent 
Hungary on the highest level was Archduke Otto von Habsburg (b. 1912), the 
oldest son of the last king of Hungary, who during the first half of the war had 
a close relationship with President Roosevelt. Unfortunately, political-military 
developments in the course of 1943-1945 altered the situation to a point where 
Otto's influence declined and his views lost their significance. 
We cannot leave unmentioned an astonishing study entitled 
"Hungarian Women in Soviet Concentration Camps 1944-1949." The author, 
Agnes Huszar Vardy, unveils many facts about the horrendous fate and 
tragedy of many tens of thousands of innocent Hungarian women. During the 
last phase of the war they were collected and deported to Soviet slavery. Then-
ranks included many young girls between the ages of 15 and 17, as well as 
women several months into their pregnancy. Their story will be told in several 
volumes to be published by the authors of the book under review. 
The last section of this volume has two astonishing studies about the 
changing image of the Hungarians in the United States, and about the 
consequences of the fall of communism upon Hungarians at home and abroad, 
as well as upon their relationship to each other. The first of these studies 
demonstrates clearly the difference between the image and the self-image of 
the Hungarians — the latter being significantly higher than the former. But this 
is universally true for all nationalities and all individuals. What is interesting 
in case of the Hungarians is the fact that the highpoint of their national image 
in America was in the mid-19th century. It was connected with the American 
visit of Louis Kossuth in the course of 1851-1852. Thereafter, this image 
declined significantly, largely due to the coming of the semi-literate turn-of-
the-century economic immigrants from Hungary. Almost two-thirds of them 
were not even Hungarians, but only citizens of Hungary. Yet, they were the 
ones who created the lowly "Hunky" image that persisted well into the 
post-World War II period. Only in the 1950s and 1960s did the Hungarian 
image begin to rise again, partially because of the many gifted Hungarians 
who immigrated to America, and partially because of the heroic image of the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956. 
The final study in this impressive volume has some daring con-
clusions about the regime change, following the collapse of communism in 
1989-1990. After four decades of Soviet communist domination and 
misadministration — which ruined the country economically and transformed 
the nation morally — finally a "government with a national spirit" was formed 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall (1932-1993). The fall of 
communism created a euphoria in Hungary, which was also taken up by 
Hungarian Americans. Tens of thousands were thinking about repatriating to 
the old country. However, these dreams never materialized. The Antall 
government made one mistake after the other, partly due to great external 
political and economic pressures, and partly in consequence of its inability or 
unwillingness to deal with the most important issues inherited from the 
Soviet-communist period. Nobody was held accountable for the criminal acts 
of the previous forty years. Hungarians at home, as well as Hungarians 
Americans were shocked to see that none of the vicious henchmen of 
communist rule were called to account. In point of fact, most of them 
remained part of the administrative system, and by helping each other, these 
communist (now ex-communist) apparatchikis were able to "privatize" many 
million dollars' worth of property into their own packets. In this way, in 
addition to escaping punishment, they were able to move from the ranks of 
"party aristocracy" into the ranks of "money aristocracy." As a result, the new 
Hungarian society became increasingly polarized, with the decent Hungarian 
remaining on the bottom of society, while the former communist bureaucrats 
moving into the ranks of the nouveau riches [new rich]. Those who suffered 
the most were the intellectuals without party connections, and pensioners who 
could barely establish a minimal existence for themselves. Given these 
realities, the plans for mass repatriation evaporated very suddenly. And this 
was all the more so, as prospective repatriates soon became aware that they 
were not really wanted at home. This was made absolutely clear to them by 
various semi-official pronouncements, which indicated that neither they, nor 
their expertise were needed in the new Hungary that the new regime was 
ready to build. This building process, however, was soon sidetracked, and by 
1994 there was such a universal dissatisfaction in the country that Hungarian 
electorate returned the ex-communist Socialist Party into power. 
This is an excellent book, which opens one's eyes, but also makes one 
sad. Its message is filled with pessimism, not only about the future of 
Hungarian Americans, but also about the fate of the Hungarians in Hungary, 
as well as in the former Hungarian territories of the Carpathian Basin. 
Masked Ball at the White Cross Cafe: 
Introducing a Book about Jewish Emancipation 
and the Origins of the Holocaust* 
Janet Kerekes 
Today, in certain assembled groups, there will be Hungarians, Hungarian 
Jews, Jewish Hungarians, Jews w h o identify themselves only as Hungarians; 
and likewise, there are Englishmen, English Jews, Jewish Engl ishmen, and 
Jews who identify themselves only as Englishmen. Once upon a t ime, it was 
hoped that there would have been only two identifiable groups: Hungarians 
and Englishmen. 
* A speech delivered 25 September, 2005 at Israel's Book Store, Toronto, Ontario, to 
launch Masked Ball at the White Cross Cafe: The Failure of Jewish Assimilation. 
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New York. Toronto. Oxford. The book examines the efforts of Hungarian Jews to 
assimilate after emancipation, between the years 1867 and 1920. Notably, it is 
written from the non-Jewish perspective, and hence, a byproduct of this work is to do 
away with the notion of anti-Semitism and typical renderings of anti-Semites. 
Masked Ball exposes the real issue at stake after emancipation, which gave rise to the 
Jewish Question: the assimilation of the Jews into the host society, the imperative to 
become 'just like us.' Crucial to understanding the pivotal role of assimilation is the 
centuries leading up to 1867 (which may be considered the benchmark for 
emancipation in Western and Central Europe). Chapters on the era of Toleration, the 
Enlightenment, and the Liberal era provide this grounding. Simultaneously, the book 
engages in a comparison with Britain, and shows that Jews' efforts to assimilate were 
unsuccessful not only in Hungary, but also in Britain. Within the limits set by the 
national context, both countries responded uniformly to the presence of unreformed 
Jews in their midst. By employing 1920 as the cutoff date, the argument is made that 
by this year the finality of the rejection of Jewish non-assimilation was clear. The 
role of contingency, which determined the precise fate of European Jewry, came into 
play at that time. 
When I first scribbled down that it was the emancipation of the Jews 
that had caused the Holocaust, I had no idea that I would be on a journey that 
went backwards from 1939 all the way to the Enlightenment. It was a time-
consuming exercise and one that forced me to suspend my own identity in 
order to carry out this work with integrity. What did make my task somewhat 
easier after a while is that I found these two hundred years were bound by one 
primary theme: the assimilation of the Jews. So sensitive did I become to the 
literature that eventually I could tell when a translation had not been faithful to 
the original meaning. Which is not to say that my translators were inferior in 
any way; they were excellent. What this does illustrate is that we have such 
preconceived notions about both the meaning and intent of comments directed 
at Jews from the Enlightenment on that they dictate what we see on the 
printed page, despite what is written there. 
Summarily labelled as 'anti-Semitic', these references to Jews 
revolved around Jewish assimilation, even though the word itself was not 
always used. Beginning with the Enlightenment, it was hammered at ever 
since... That is, until the Holocaust. I would not say that the subject of Jewish 
assimilation has been neglected for the last sixty years. I would rather say it 
became taboo. Why? Because nobody wanted to admit into the historical 
record the rather popular opinion that Jews had failed to assimilate. To do so 
would be to indict the Jews as instruments in their own destruction, and this 
was an unthinkable proposition after the horrors of the Holocaust. At the same 
time, the image of Europeans as unwilling to live with Jews who were 
unassimilated indicted the Europeans in the Holocaust. An equally 
unacceptable proposition. Least of all did anyone want to admit into the 
historical record that already before 1900, this failure and its likely disastrous 
consequences were clear to a number of people — both Jews and non-Jews. "A 
new unrest is perceptible throughout the civilized world on the subject of the 
Jewish Question," wrote the Englishman Arnold White in 1899. "The 
conclusion, therefore, seems obvious, that either the situation must be dealt 
with — i.e., by Europe as a whole — or an alarming outbreak against the race 
and the clock of civilization thus be thrown back for a hundred years."1 The 
best thing was to bury the whole issue of assimilation, for it implicated 
everybody. And so it has been. 
How would you have recognized an assimilated Jew? The point is, 
you wouldn't have. For an assimilated Jew was exactly 'just like us.' Precise 
definitions of assimilation are lacking. The reason for this, I would suggest, is 
that assimilation was considered an outcome, not a process: the process was 
the implementation of a series of reforms articulated by the Enlightenment 
thinkers (below) which culminated in assimilation. Thus, there were indicators 
of successful assimilation, as well as signs of failure to assimilate. For 
example, Peter Agoston, author of one of the seminal works on the Jewish 
Question in Hungary in 1917, wrote that assimilation implied that Jews would 
pick and choose from the whole population rather than tending to help only 
their coreligionists.2 Signs that Jews had failed to assimilate came in the form 
of a general list as well as more specific complaints. Composing the former 
was the Jews' embrace of Zionism; their cosmopolitanism; the coupling of 
cosmopolitanism and Zionism with an enthusiastic nationalism (an irritating 
and impossible combination according to many, if not most Europeans); their 
supranational tendencies; their saturation of the professions; their monopoliza-
tion of fields ranging from the theatre to the press to capitalist enterprises; 
their lopsided participation in the economy; their disproportionate involve-
ment in radical politics; their stunning financial successes in times of 
economic distress for others; the large number of Jews who remained 
traditional and rejected the very concept of assimilation; the feeling, to use a 
quote, "that it doesn't matter what side he's on, because he can't begin to 
understand our problems or our ethics or our morality or our way of looking 
at things;"' the domination and Jewification of society; and lastly, their 
'Jewishness', which seemed so obvious to so many. More specific complaints 
include this comment by Istvan Lendvai: "The Caesarian madness of the 
intellectual ghetto, which entertains that he is the only civis europaeus and 
everybody else is a stupid barbarian."4 Or, this statement by Charles Booth: 
"The whole district has been affected by the increase in the Jewish population. 
It has been like the slow rising of a flood... No Gentile could live in the same 
house with these poor foreign Jews."' 
To be considered authentically Hungarian, or British, or French there 
was a litmus test. And the litmus test of successful assimilation was, in the 
words of Hungarian historian Istvan Szabo: "If the assimilant, without any 
reservation has donned the new volk consciousness of his identity, and his lost 
identity is henceforth as indifferent to him as any other alien identity."6 There 
were probably only a liny number of Jews about whom this could have been 
said. Obviously, we no longer adhere to this meaning of assimilation. Today, 
here in North America at any rate, the prevailing ethos is one of pluralism. 
Assimilation in a multicultural environment has more to do with the 
newcomer adjusting than becoming 'just like us.' In fact, there is no 'just like 
us.' This change in meaning has created all kinds of confusion and added to 
the difficulties of studying this subject. Thus, Barry Rubin writes in his book, 
Assimilation and its Discontents, "Most of their two millennia in the Western 
world, Jews assimilated only infrequently,'" implying that assimilation has 
always been a possibility. The mechanism of assimilation as a way to join the 
larger society did not exist before the Enlightenment. Conversion was the only 
way Jews could find acceptance, and conversion has nothing in common with 
the notion of assimilation. And then, there is the well-known expression, 
"Jews were more German than the Germans," which is meant to underscore 
not only how assimilated German Jews were, but Jews in general, as well. 
Perhaps we should take a look at this expression. To be more German than the 
Germans? Instead of assimilating, Jews simply forged a new distinction for 
themselves, and were considered caricatures. This failure to assimilate is what 
people called the Jewish Question. 
Yet there are two countries which have received the Good House-
keeping Seal of Approval for producing assimilated Jews, where Jews were 
accepted. One is Britain, and there is almost universal consensus on this point. 
The other is Hungary, where what I would call a regional consensus obtains. 
Hungarian Jews have been proclaiming for decades that nowhere else were 
Jews so assimilated. Would these reputations hold up under intensive 
examination? I am afraid they did not. Not only was the Jews' effort to reform 
and thereby assimilate unsuccessful in both Hungary and Britain, but many of 
the issues revolving around non-assimilation were similar. For example, 
concerning the fulfilment of their patriotic duty in Hungary during World War 
I, the military command called attention to the number of immigrant Galician 
Jews who hid out rather than enlisting or who deserted. Jews feel the same 
way they did in the Middle Ages, wrote Agoston;H wars then were no affair of 
theirs because they did not belong to any party. In Britain, less than one per 
cent of those eligible had enlisted as of October 1916.9 Lacking identification 
with Britain, English-born Russian Jews saw no reason to fight the Germans; 
in fact, some Jews expressed solidarity with their Anglo-German and Anglo-
Austrian brethren. Lacking any appreciation for the fact that Russia was 
Britain's ally, they considered it grounds for indifference to the war cause. Of 
the many who did not enlist some cited opposition to war, their parents having 
left Russia so they should not be conscripted; others cited religious reasons. 1 
Between the covers of this book lies a world that will probably be as 
foreign to readers as it was to newly emancipated Jews. This world is the non-
Jewish world, where Christians were living for the first time with Jews as part 
of their society, and not separate from them. And for many non-Jews, this was 
an experience that provoked disappointment, frustration, and bitterness. The 
difficulties inherent in assimilating have been recorded by some historians. 
But that was not the interest of Christian Europeans. Their interest was to see 
that Jews lived in harmony with their non-Jewish neighbours. And they had 
articulated the means by which Jews would be able to accomplish this. What 
they found was that Jews refused to comply, or they were incapable of 
complying, or they did not understand what was required, and thus remained 
unassimilated. To make matters worse, emancipated Jews started to display 
new traits that screamed non-assimilation. It was not, for example, a sign of 
embracing the norms of society, of wanting to be a part of society, of an 
expression of happiness or gratitude to be included in society at long last, to 
then take up arms against that society, having only been recently admitted to 
it. I do not mean this literally — except in the case of Jewish anarchists. But 
figuratively speaking, this is exactly what Jewish social iconoclasts and 
political revolutionaries did in substantial numbers. This is the non-Jewish 
perspective on Jewish assimilation, the perspective framing Masked Ball at 
the White Cross Cafe. 
Apart from the fact that the very subject of assimilation has been 
taboo for the last sixty years, there are a number of barriers that make it 
terribly difficult to come to grips with this issue. In exchange for pointing out 
some of these barriers which come in the form of misconceptions, beliefs, and 
myths, I would like to offer the facts. 
It is a popular assumption that the Enlightenment opened the doors 
wide to acceptance of the Jews. Although, there is the less well-known view 
about the Enlightenment which argues the opposite: that Voltaire and many 
other philosophes were 'anti-Semitic.' Neither of these views can hold up 
under scrutiny. What Voltaire and the other Enlightenment thinkers 
recognized were the profound difficulties inherent in incorporating this people 
that had never been part of Christian Europe: not in the political, cultural, or 
social sense; never on 'intimate' terms, in the sense of breaking bread with 
them or marrying them; and whose day-to-day rhythm was so at variance with 
the Christian rhythm. They recognized that certain aspects of Jewish religious 
practice would make it difficult — if not impossible — for Jews to become full 
participating members of the polity. But, with the burden of universal 
humanism resting heavily on their shoulders, Voltaire and other Enlighten-
ment thinkers began to wrestle with the idea of incorporating the Jews into 
society. The outcome of this process was what I have termed the Enlighten-
ment ideals specific to the Jews. These were a series of radical reforms 
targeted specifically at the Jews. Hopefully, accomplishing these reforms 
would culminate in the Jews' assimilation. Perhaps, then, Jews would find 
acceptance in the broader society. 
However, it does appear that the laborious efforts of the Enlighten-
ment thinkers were ignored, for there is no mention of reforms attached to any 
of the bills of emancipation that were passed in Central and Western Europe 
during the nineteenth century. There is a good reason for this. While the 
Enlightenment thinkers had been weighed down by one burden, liberals were 
weighed down by another: the liberal ethos, which dominated much of the 
nineteenth century, and was dictating 'freedom for all.' Emancipation was 
hotly debated in each country that eventually emancipated its Jews. Liberals 
were embroiled in this debate as wholeheartedly as everyone else and they 
believed that reform was indispensable. But liberals convinced themselves 
that being emancipated and living in a free society would be sufficient 
impetus for the Jews to make the needed reforms and assimilate. And they 
went ahead and passed bills of emancipation. After that, only heretical liberals 
talked about the need for Jews to assimilate. These facts have been 
conveniently dropped from the liberal canon. 
It was a bit like the child who pointed out that the emperor was 
wearing no clothes when many people started pointing out to the liberals that 
Jews were not assimilating, that the liberals' assurance that Jews would 
assimilate once they were emancipated was a crock. But liberals resolved this 
embarrassment by immediately appropriating and altering the meaning of a 
term to isolate these individuals and demean their views: anti-Semite.' Ever 
since, anti-Semites are those who are marginal, irrational, hateful people who 
distort everything about Jews. Or, as historian Robert Wistrich described the 
first batch of anti-Semites of the late nineteenth century: "semi-radicalized, 
frustrated intellectual misfits and some sensation-mongering journalists."12 
While there were undoubtedly some irrational Jew-haters, it was the 
respectable views of some very respectable people with which public opinion 
concurred. In Hungary, for example, Gyula Verhovay was a member of 
parliament representing the ultra-left Independence Party, a strong supporter 
of the workers, and the darling of Hungarians. Yet his newspaper, the Fiig-
getlenseg, stereotypically would be called an anti-Semitic rag. Bishop Ottokar 
Prohaszka was regarded by many as the outstanding figure and symbol of the 
cultural and intellectual renaissance that took place in Hungary in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. He worked ceaselessly for the poor, 
was a determined advocate of religious modernism, and three of his books 
were put on the Index by Rome because of his views on evolution. Yet a 
reading of his works on the Jews would place him at the forefront of the 'anti-
Semitic' camp. We do not have to protect these liberals any longer, nor do we 
have to live with this dichotomy. These were reputable men whom we can 
respect. They were not suffering from a "disease of the mind," "damaging to 
reason," that afflicted "men and women of otherwise powerful and subtle 
thoughts,"13 as historian Paul Johnson put it in an article published earlier this 
year. 
We come up against the same problem every time we use the term 
anti-Semitism. While the belief is that anti-Semitism is prejudice, discrimina-
tion, racism, false accusations, and an irrational hatred against Jews, the reality 
is, that between emancipation and the Holocaust, what is called anti-Semitism 
was the public discourse on the failure of the Jews to assimilate, and the 
negative effects that this failure was having on society. It cannot be 
emphasized enough how much the persistent use of the term anti-Semitism is 
one of the greatest barriers to exploring and understanding this period. 
There is another barrier, and it is far more emotionally charged. For 
the most part, as much as we care to envision the ancestors of modern Jews, 
or, if you are Jewish, your forebears, Hollywood has helped us along by 
giving us very benign stereotypes. Fathers were fiddlers on the roof and 
mothers were meine Yiddishe Mamas. It is time to face some unpleasant 
truths. These Jews, who had been marginalized for centuries, repeatedly ex-
pelled, boarded up in ghettos, held in the lowest possible esteem by the host 
society, taxed beyond endurance, and forced into quasi-legal or outright 
illegal acts simply to survive, were probably, on the whole, most unappetizing 
people. The well-worn descriptions of Jews as money-grabbing; immoral; of 
Jewish men lusting after Christian women; honourable only to their own kind; 
are not too far from the truth. Whether or not these unflattering characteristics 
were due to the marginalization and isolation of Jews over the centuries — 
which many Europeans from the Enlightenment period on did believe? the 
fact remains that they did not want these influences infiltrating their society. 
After emancipation, new issues arose and eroded this sympathetic explanation 
for negative Jewish traits. The development of a positive relationship to the 
state was not going well, and led to descriptions of Jews as unpatriotic. Many 
emancipated Jews remained strongly traditional and were in fact opposed to 
the very idea of assimilation. Others were 'modern' Jews, but they were 
displaying new 'unassimilated' tendencies: they were edgy, uneasy, 
iconoclastic, and spearheaded many of the revolutionary movements. They 
were so disproportionately prominent in certain endeavours that they 
monopolized them. They were socially cohesive; and they still stood out from 
mainstream society. These charges were also pretty well correct. The 
Hollywood image of fiddlers on the roof and Yiddishe Mamas is just a myth. 
How strongly did Europeans really feel about this non-assimilation? 
Well, if we believe the myth that after the emancipation of Jews in Western 
and Central Europe, life for Jews was essentially good, and that the good 
times lasted until the advent of the Nazis in 1933, then we would have to 
conclude that Europeans were not really upset about the unassimilated 
behaviour of Jews. But this is another myth. There were some good times 
after emancipation, of course. However, by 1920, most assuredly, the good 
times were over. By 1920, many people were not only looking for a solution 
to the Jewish Question, they were demanding one. Not only this. By 1920, the 
status of the Jews had already been internationally renegotiated — a fact that 
historians have virtually ignored — and a grievous oversight. With one stroke 
of the pen, the Balfour Declaration, which laid the groundwork for a Jewish 
state; the Numerus Clausus law in Hungary, which reclassified Jews as a 
nationality or race; the Minorities Treaties forged at the Paris Peace Con-
ference, which counted Jews among the minorities in the newly established 
states; and, the decision of the Bolsheviks to classify Jews as an ethnic group, 
erased the entire body of Enlightenment and liberal thought as it pertained to 
the Jews, along with their two-pronged program for the Jews' emancipation: 
wholesale reform, and the classification of Jews as citizens of the Mosaic 
faith. Jews were once again identified as a separate entity, distinct from the 
majority society. Why did this occur? Well, emancipation had been based on 
the expectation that Jews would make the appropriate reforms and assimilate. 
This expectation had not been fulfilled. 
Thus, by 1920 a watershed was reached, at which time Europeans 
served the Jews notice that they were in the process of settling the Jewish 
Question. It is that loose cannon — contingency — that determined the Jews' 
precise fate. Yet the popular belief is that the Holocaust occurred because of 
the demented fanatical ideology of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis, discrimination, 
prejudice, racism, ignorance... modernity. There is no mention in this list of 
the failure of Jews to assimilate, but I hardly see how it can be excluded. My 
original germ of an idea — that emancipation was the cause of the Holocaust 
— has remained the underlying thesis of Masked Ball at the White Cross Cafe. 
No one had ever entertained the idea of living with the Jew as Jew in their 
midst. Theological objections to the Jew as Jew had been overcome by the 
offer of conversion to Christianity. Later, secular objections to the Jew as Jew 
were overcome by a program of reform which would culminate in assimila-
tion. Emancipation ruptured a 1500-year-old continuum and placed in society 
Jews whose ways and behaviours were at odds with it. 
About the Holocaust itself, there are two beliefs that I would like to 
highlight. One is that we can derive the benefit of a lesson from it. That the 
Holocaust contains lessons for humankind, warning each of us of the lethal 
dangers of prejudice and discrimination. This year, Auschwitz is the 
messenger of this lesson, and we have been saturated with the lessons that we 
must learn. If prejudice and discrimination and so on were the genuine reasons 
for the Holocaust, it might make sense to speak of educating people as to how 
to overcome these pernicious biases. But these cannot be considered the 
fundamental reasons, and therefore there is no lesson to be learned. The other 
belief is that the Holocaust is manifest proof of the need for a Jewish state. 
With the phrase 'never again' ringing in our ears, Israel is seen as the protector 
of Jews and as a place that can provide a safe haven for Jews. This is actually 
a very late version of the Jewish perspective on why the creation of the state 
of Israel was necessary. Since 1798, at any rate, there are records showing that 
Jews were quite desperate to re-establish a homeland.14 There is also the non-
Jewish perspective on this matter. Very succinctly put, the creation of the state 
of Israel was a very good way to get rid of the remaining Jews left in Europe 
after 1945. This is also a very late version. The idea of ridding Europe of its 
Jews by establishing a state for them had already been articulated in 1793.15 
Since the seventeenth century, certain Christian groups have been advocating 
that Jews be restored to what was then Palestine. This was for religious 
reasons. Then, there have also been political reasons. Britain, since the mid-
nineteenth century, and America, for the last several decades, have both had 
an interest in maintaining a bulwark in the Middle East. Exactly who has been 
most served by the creation of the state of Israel? In the grand scheme of 
things, the Holocaust figures only in a small way in the establishment of the 
state. Other factors have played a much larger role in its creation, and will 
continue to exert an influence over its existence. 
These are only some of the many tentacles adhering to this book. 
Masked Ball inadvertently challenges a number of historical and current 
notions pertaining to the Jews. These notions persist because the importance 
of assimilation has not been acknowledged and will persist as long as it is not 
acknowledged. 
Carnival season, the prelude to Lent, was a popular time in 
Hungary and was ushered in annually in January; the year 1896 
was no exception. In this particular year, an article appeared in a 
local newspaper announcing that the Israelite Women's 
Association would start the carnival season with their ball to be 
held at the White Cross Coffeehouse (Feher Kereszt Kdvehaz) on 
the 11th of January. In considering this pre-Lenten event, the name 
of the venue only adds emphasis to a faultily constructed syllo-
gism: 'Everyone goes to a pre-Lenten ball in Hungarian society. I 
(the Jew) am part of society. Therefore, I too, will go to a ball.' 
Missing in this syllogism is that crucial piece of information that 
Hungarian society was a Christian society, a fact that Lajos 
Hatvany, a prominent publisher and 'man of letters,' and baptized 
Jew, was keenly aware of. He, too, wrote about Jews attending 
balls, twenty-five years after this announcement appeared. 'My 
dear Jews,' he wrote, 'you must put on frock coats if you want to 
go to the ball.' (In the context of Hatvany's comments, 'frock 
coats' stood for conversion.) In sponsoring this ball which was, 
after all, only the social aspect of a profoundly religious period, 
Christian society might easily have understood that in religious 
matters, these Jewish women's apprehension of the dictum that the 
Jews should 'become just like us' extended as far as, but no further 
than participating in the customs that appertained to the Christian 
religion.16 
For Jews, many parts of this book will make for very pa inful reading. 
For those who consider themselves iiberals, this book may be disconcerting, 
to say the least. And for some non-Jews, the book may be an articulation of 
what they always knew, and they may feel vindicated. 
Thus, there is much at risk here in publishing this book. And so I 
understand how tempting, even compell ing it is to perpetuate the current 
versions of this period of history. But I should like to think that the time has 
finally come when we can put the issue of Jewish assimilation back on the 
table again. 
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Another Look at the Early Moholy-Nagy 
Edit Toth 
Oliver Botar. Termeszet es technika: az Ujraertelmezett Moholy-Nagy, 1916-
1923. Budapest: Vince Kiado and Pecs: Janus Pannonius Muzeum, 2007. Pp. 
223. 3995 Ft, ISBN 978-963-9731-35-6. 
The exhibition Termeszet es technika: az Ujraertelmezett Moholy-Nagy, 
organized by Oliver Botar at the Janus Pannonius Museum Pecs, Hungary 
(2007 December 20 - 2008 March 31) presents the early carrier of Laszlo 
Moholy-Nagy in the context of the 1917-1923 period of revolutionary 
upheavals. Its accompanying book is a variation of the 2006 City University 
of New York Graduate Center exhibition catalogue Technical Detours: The 
Early Moholy-Nagy Reconsidered, and the author's most extensive publication 
to date. We may characterize Botar's work as biographical writing, since one 
of its main preoccupations is establishing a detailed chronological account of 
the young Moholy-Nagy's activities and intellectual development leading up 
to his 1923 employment at the Bauhaus. His story drives the point that this 
prestigious teaching post was the consequence of the artist's intensive and 
diverse activity he had been engaged in during the previous years. 
Botar's intention, stated in the subtitle of the book, is to reconsider the 
young Moholy-Nagy's motivations underlying his works and thinking at a 
critical juncture of his artistic formation. Considering the wide range of media 
and influences the artist had contact with around this time, it is not an easy 
task to pin down his early work. Botar manages to handle the complex history 
and shows that a somewhat vague search through artistic styles leads 
Moholy-Nagy to develop towards his mature Constructivism. The author goes 
through the various components of Moholy's art: Hungarian activism, the 
Hungarian Communist movement, the German Youth (Jugendbewegung) and 
life reform (Lebensreform) movements, biocentrism, Ostwaldian "energetics," 
Bogdanovian "tektology," German reform pedagogy, Raoul Hausmann's 
Optophonetics, and "elementarist abstraction" (p. 15-16). 
The first part sets the stage for the book's central feature in the second 
chapter: Botar's discovery of a canvas covered with two different-style 
paintings. Moholy-Nagy during the 1918-19 Hungarian revolutions is 
described in a subtle way as a quickly-made "revolutionary without a role," 
constantly searching for opportunities and artistic advancement. This picture 
of the painter especially comes across in the English version of the catalogue, 
while the Hungarian one suggests a man with firmer Communist conviction. 
In both, however, the figure of the artist emerges through his extensive, but 
often brief relationships and interactions with prominent Hungarian painters 
and literary men of the time, while his art develops in reaction to them. 
In the second chapter Botar draws attention to Moholy-Nagy's 1920-
21 Ackerfeld pictures and their connection to the organicist ideas of the 
German Lebensreform movement. In part, this attention serves the purpose of 
disclaiming the accepted view of the artist (popular especially in the United 
States) as the representative of technocratic ideas. The author instead explains 
these paintings as attempts at reconciling nature and technology. The 
Ackerfeld works also provide the context for Botar's discovery of a similar 
painting on the back of Architektur I (1922, Salgo Trust for Education), to 
which he accords distinguished attention. The canvas appears as the midpoint 
both in Moholy-Nagy's early carrier and in the book itself. Given the artistic 
weaknesses of the newly discovered work, its importance may at first be 
overlooked. Botar's careful stylistic analysis, however, convinces us that on 
the one hand, the formerly over-painted Eisenbahnbild mit Ackerfelder und 3 
documents the transition between the series of field paintings and machine 
Dada compositions. On the other hand, Architektur I on the front side of the 
canvas shows the transitional stage between "glass architecture" and 
"transparency" paintings. Thus the two artworks together, Botar argues, 
exemplify the transformation of Moholy-Nagy's art from Dada to international 
Constructivism (p. 129). Here, for the first time, the artist reacts against his 
own work instead of against the ideas of others. This suggests that he has 
developed his own voice, a new form of artistic expression. 
At the same time, the Ackerfeld pictures' marriage of the organic with 
the technological parallels the amateur photograms of plants created at the 
Loheland Lebensrefonn community, which in turn Botar establishes as the 
source of the artist's own practice of the medium. The importance of 
Termeszet es technika, in my view, lays in mapping out Moholy-Nagy's 
connections with the German reform pedagogy movement through his wife 
Lucia and her involvement in the Loheland community (p. 188). With this 
background in mind Moholy-Nagy's affinities with the activity of the Bauhaus 
becomc clear. Indeed, in 1923 his art offered the best transition for the 
materialization of Gropius's new slogan, the unity of art and technology, 
without loosing all connections with the romantic organicist roots of the 
Weimar artistic establishment. Moholy's relation to Herwarth Walden's Sturm 
gallery, which provided an exhibition forum for the Bauhaus professors, 
points to further shared interests rather than radical differences. 
The last part of Termeszet es technika gives a more theoretical inter-
pretation of Moholy-Nagy's two works related to the 1922 Construe-
tiveDynamic Entergy System manifesto, which the artist published in the 
Sturm periodical in collaboration with the art critic Alfred Kemeny. The 
important document had relevance both for the ongoing leftist ar tistic debates 
and for Moholy-Nagy's later art culminating in his famous Light Modulator. 
Through a 1928 drawing (Kinetic-Constructive System: Movement Track for 
Play and Conveyance) Botar explains the idea of the Constructive-Dynamic 
Energy System as an entertainment construction — similar to those found in 
Luna parks — which invite us for an active experience while extending the 
limits of our sensations. He attributes the idea and theoretical basis of the 
manifesto to Alfred Kemeny who visited Moscow in 1921 where he may have 
come into contact with Bogdanov's concept of "tektology," which defined 
reality as composed of force relations. By connecting Bogdanov's biologically 
rooted system to Moholy-Nagy's art and thinking, the author gives their 
organicist aspects a firmer Marxist grounding. At the same time, Botar rightly 
points out the privileged attention accorded to questions of sensation and 
optics by Moholy-Nagy and other German Dadaists-Constructivists. I would 
propose that we should recognize in this distinctive preoccupation an 
important difference from Russian Constructivism and its materialist ap-
proach. Maybe it would be even possible to set the two movements apart 
along these lines. 
Botar's Termeszet es technika gives an engaging and nuanced account 
of the early Moholy-Nagy's art, tastefully presented and complemented with 
high-quality colour reproductions. By following along the different steps and 
places of his development, both scholars and the general reader can find 
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